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The research space of this practice-led Ph.D. invites filmmaking, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, and neuroscience to interact towards an expanded understanding of the 
uncanny and the related concept of hauntology. The three films produced explore 
methods of spontaneous, creative play. 
 
Scanner follows a scientific study that attempts to explore a neurological underpinning 
of the uncanny through an fMRI brain scan study. The film explains the process, 
describes the results, and illustrates the uncanny by experimenting with the 
documentary form. 
Unhomely Street, made while experiencing post-concussive syndrome, unwittingly acts 
as a therapeutic project. Through post-hoc reflection the film reveals unconscious 
aspects of the creative process.  
Psychotel, a ‘thesis’ film, is informed by psychoanalytic accounts of the uncanny, 
philosophical, and neuroscientific descriptions of selfhood, and influenced by 
representations of the uncanny in art work and the supernatural horror genre. 
 
In conclusion, following Nicholas Royle’s assertion that the world is uncanny because 
of the discrepancy between our apparent (self) knowledge and our inability to enact 
change,
1
 I reflect upon the potential of filmmaking as research to promote new ways of 
thinking. Through a neuropsychoanalytic account of the uncanny I show that the 
evolved brain operates according to primitive and automatic processes. These processes 
are largely hidden from consciousness and the uncanny occurs when our sense of 
agency is challenged. While this view is underpinned by neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology, I demonstrate that it is not at odds with the psychoanalytic account of the 
‘return of the repressed’. In short, in the words of Freud, the uncanny arises when the 
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The Guest House 
 
 
   This being human is a guest house. 
   Every morning a new arrival. 
   A joy, a depression, a meanness, 
   some momentary awareness comes 
   As an unexpected visitor. 
   Welcome and entertain them all! 
   Even if they’re a crowd of sorrows, 
   who violently sweep your house 
   empty of its furniture, 
   still treat each guest honourably. 
   He may be clearing you out 
   for some new delight. 
   The dark thought, the shame, the malice, 
   meet them at the door laughing and invite them in. 
   Be grateful for whoever comes, 
   because each has been sent 
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Gulls keen and dive, their wings   




An introduction, as we know, is always written last. Following the conclusion in which 
I am troubled by what a creative-practice ‘contribution to knowledge’ means, I consider 
Jacques Derrida’s project and am further troubled by what knowledge in general may 
claim. The implications of this must be left aside up to a point as the Ph.D. candidate is 
obliged to argue and defend originality of thought – as if such a thing could be said to 
exist. On returning to the start I reconsider the title of this project, imagining the reader 
would infer my intentions were to fix the uncanny, as one would a butterfly with a pin, 
and prove by scientific method that such a thing exists in material form. On the 
contrary, I consider aspects of reductionism in science, and explore how science 
accommodates methodological flaws.
4
 I highlight the theoretical nature of ‘scientific 
metaphors’ of contemporary neuroscience, not so dissimilar to the Freudian topologies 
that are rejected by scientific fields.
5
 At the same time I draw on these theories to 
progress an understanding of mind and psychical processes that act as inspiration for my 
creative practice and advance my understanding of film spectatorship. 
 
My aim in taking an interdisciplinary approach is to ‘deterritorialise’.
6
 Martin 
McQuillan’s definition of deconstruction ‘(if we really must have such a thing)’, is ‘an 
act of reading which allows the other to speak’.
7
 The ‘inherent’ superiority of one term 
over another, which deconstruction aims to expose, is evident in institutional 
disciplinary boundaries that rely on difference for their identity. The presence / absence 
                                                 
3. Fay Musselwhite, ‘Star’, Contraflow, Sheffield: Longbarrow Press, 2016, p. 94. Extract. 
4. It is the reductionism, necessary to isolate small areas of study, fundamental to scientific method, that often provokes responses in 
the humanities. The alignment of life experiences with brain activity causes concern and protests that there must be more to life than 
neural activity. This is a theme that runs throughout this research. A specific example of such an outcry is discussed chapter 6, in 
relation to Damasio’s theory of selfhood. See Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, p. 227. 
Methodological flaws in brain scanning surveys are noted in appendix 1. 
5. Psychology and neuroscience largely exclude Freudian theory. Although psychoanalysis, psychology, and neuroscience all 
recognise the extent to which the individual functions according to mental processes that operate below the threshold of 
consciousness, psychology, and neuroscience use the term nonconscious to create a distance from the Freudian concept of the 
unconscious. This is explored in the chapters to follow. 
6. I use the term ‘deterritorialise’ in reference to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s accounts of territorialising and deterritorialising 
behaviours as explored in A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brain Massumi, London: Bloomsbury, 1987. The idea of territory is 
explored throughout the book; however, in chapter 11, ‘1837: Of the Refrain’ (pp. 360‒408) they explore territory in detail. I return 
to their ideas in relation to my practice with reference to Unhomely Street in chapter 3, and in Psychotel I quote them: ‘A territory is 
first of all the critical distance between two beings of the same species.’ Ibid., p. 372. 
7. An impossible task as ‘whenever we think we are hearing the other speak we are always reducing its otherness to the self-same’. 
Martin McQuillan (editor), ‘Introduction: Five Strategies for Deconstruction’, in Deconstruction: A Reader, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000, p. 6. 
7 
 
dichotomy is central to the assumption of metaphysics that Derrida questions.
8
 
Presence, as singularity, a unified position, is demanded by the institution through the 
Ph.D.’s knowledge claim. The objectivity of academic practice can conceal the 
problematics of metaphysics that is in some ways assuaged by the creative practice 
Ph.D., in which the inevitable aspect of the personal, complete with traces, unconscious 
influences, transgenerational phantom, the product of a logocentric culture, is attended 
to, even deconstructed.  
 
A spectre haunts metaphysics: the spectre of the brain. Fabian Fajnwaks, professor of 
psychology writes: ‘That the unconscious has nothing in common with the brain is not 
self-evident for our neuroscientist colleagues’.
9
 While understanding Fajnwak’s 
frustration with the clunky tools of brain imaging and the unfounded idea that this 
technology holds the key to the holy grail of knowledge, I question the ‘nothing’ written 
here. When I focus on the inside of my head I experience a black void where images 
come and go, a personal cinema screen. With practice I am able to experience 
pulsations, the merest hint that a highly energetic and consumptive organ hides within. 
Brain imaging is a shocking reminder that such activity goes on unseen, behind the 
scenes, unconscious. 
 
Although Freud abandoned the ‘Project’, his work retains the echoes of thoughts 
relating to neural activity.
10
 A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad is one such text.
11
 Freud 
describes the workings of the psyche by drawing an analogy between the means by 
which memory appears to be limitless in its recording, undergoes erasure, and yet is 
retained, and the mechanics of the Wunderblock.
12
 Concerning this ‘note’, in ‘Freud and 
                                                 
8. See Jacques Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, Writing and Difference, trans by Alan Bass, London: Routledge, 2003, 
pp. 246‒291, 247‒9. Derrida questions the history of presence and its relation to consciousness alongside absence and the 
unconscious. He points to the absence and presence of the penis, central to Freudian theory and the history of the assumption of 
presence from Descartes to Hegel with reference to Heidegger’s project as a binary opposition at the heart of logocentric repression. 
9. Fabian Fajnwaks, ‘Impression – Trace – Signifier – Letter’, Pipol 9, 2019, <https//www.pipol9.eu/category/chiffre/>, accessed 18 
January 2019.  
10. The ‘Project’ was Freud’s attempt to conceive of a scientific psychology based in neurophysiology. The published work arose 
from Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess in 1895, in which he presents three types of hypothetical neurons. In this work are the 
foundations of repression and the reality principle; however, Freud abandoned the ‘Project’ in favour of seeking psychological 
predispositions of the psychodynamic process, most likely due to the state of neuroscience at the time and the impossibility of 
scientifically demonstrating his theories. Sigmund Freud (1895), ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 1, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Hogarth, 1966, pp. 
295‒343.  
11. Sigmund Freud, ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad’, in McQuillan (editor), Deconstruction, pp. 51‒55. 




the Scene of Writing’, Derrida expands Freud’s metaphor to discuss writing in its 




Fajnwak ends his article thus: ‘If our colleagues in Neuroscience are so interested in the 
Freud of the “Project”, it is because they read the impressive routes that he delineates as 
a metaphor for writing.’ These ‘impressive routes’, without reference to the ‘writing’ of 
neuronal activity, present the brain as an absence in the black box in which the psyche 
dances. 
 
Of course, one must remain within one’s disciplinary boundary. As my discipline is 
creative practice I feel enabled, within the constraints of academic rigour, to consider 
the implications, affective repercussions, and the appearance of structures and systems 
outside my field. I see this as the principal institutional benefit of the art practice Ph.D., 
that it permits emotional response and gut-reaction, and is founded on play. My Director 
of Studies, Sharon Kivland, at a recent seminar suggested the role of the work of art was 
to seduce, invite, and provoke its audience into consideration and awareness of its 
underlying themes and influences. The work of art should not be expected to present 




It is often through openness that insights are gained. It is with openness that I 
approached the films and text. At times their interrelation lacks specificity and the 
conclusions, in the light of problems with knowledge in general, are cautious. My 
experience of undertaking this research has broadly been one of experiencing different 
modes of being; reader, writer, thinker, filmmaker (creative dreamer, image-catcher, 
listener, recorder, storyteller, etc.), specific states that I consider from psychical and 
biological perspectives. 
 
The work is personal and as such, has a subjective tone. I am a white, British, middle-
class, middle-aged, academic, female filmmaker living in a safe environment in 
precarious times. I began the research with post-concussive syndrome following a head 
injury. In this difficult period I was preoccupied by the notion of the Sixth Great 
                                                 
13. Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, p. 250. 
14. Sharon Kivland presented ‘Arise, Wretched of the Earth’, a research seminar at Sheffield Hallam University Art and Design 
Research Centre, in which she discussed her recent exhibition ‘Die Holzdiebe’, ZAK, Zitadelle, Berlin, 2019. The exhibition is 
founded on Karl Marx’s articles for the Rheinische Zeitung (October 1842) reporting on the proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province 
Assembly ‘Debates on the law of thefts of wood’. 
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Extinction and the Anthropocene.
15
 As the research progressed and my mental health 
improved (the relation between the two is explored in chapter 3), I became persuaded by 
the positive stance of Donna J. Haraway, the notion of the Chthulucene, and a possible 
future of multispecies collaboration. Haraway understands the power of narrative. 
Human beings tell stories. The stories we tell are more than entertainment, they shape 
our (inter)actions and reveal the structure of thought.
16
 Haraway proposes the 
Chthulucene as an alternative cultural narrative to the Anthropocene. Deleuze and 
Guattari write of ‘becoming-animal’, Derrida writes of ‘The Animal That Therefore I 
am’.
17
 These texts have informed the latter stages of the research and point towards the 
future, understanding that the future is always haunted by the past. The study of the 
uncanny orbits around the individual and collective psyche ‒ what is wrong with us and 
can we do anything about it? These are questions posed rather than answered and the 
contribution I make towards these broad issues is modest. 
 
Room plan: structure of the thesis 
  Hope is the thing with feathers 




The research, undertaken over a five-year period, comprises the thesis, three films, and 
a science survey. The research is practice-led and practice-based: the resulting films 
produce new knowledge through devising original approaches to represent subjectivity 
and affect.
19
 My practical contribution comprises three films, Scanner, a six-minute 
documentary, Unhomely Street, a twenty-minute essay film, and Psychotel, a sixty-
minute essay film. 
 
                                                 
15. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2014, referenced in Donna J. 
Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, London: Duke University Press, 2016, p. 43. 
16. For a brief discussion listen to ‘The Science of Storytelling’, Inside Science, Radio 4 podcast, broadcast 25/04/19, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0004cqh >, accessed 18 June 2019. See Antonio Damasio, ‘The Naturalness of Wordless 
Stroytelling’, in The Feeling of What Happens, London: Vintage, 1999, pp. 188‒89. 
17. See ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible’, in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983, pp. 244‒360, and Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. by David Wills, New York, NY: 
Fordham University Press, 2008. 
18. Emily Dickinson, ‘Hope’, Selected Poems, New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1990, p. 5. Extract. 
19. For a definition of practice-based and practice-led see Andrew Johnston, Differences between practice-based and practice- led 
research, <http://www.creativityandcognition.com/research/practice-based-research/differences-between-practice-based-and-
practice-led-research/>, accessed 20 October 2016. ‘Practice-led research is concerned with the nature of practice and leads to new 
knowledge that has operational significance for that practice. Practice-based research is an original investigation undertaken in order 
to gain new knowledge partly by means of practice and the outcomes of that practice. Claims of originality and contribution to 
knowledge may be demonstrated through creative outcomes which may include artefacts such as images, music, designs, digital 
media or other outcomes such as performance and exhibitions.’ 
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Scanner describes a scientific study that investigates the neurological underpinning of 
the uncanny through an image-based survey and brain scan study using an fMRI 
scanner. Unhomely Street, produced while experiencing post-concussive syndrome, 
reveals unconscious mechanisms in the creative process and in this instance shows 
filmmaking to be a therapeutic activity. Psychotel explores the uncanny and was 
approached as a filmic equivalent to a Ph.D. chapter. The contribution to knowledge, as 
detailed in the conclusion, is the sum of the research and practice, and consists of 
conventional contributions including new insights drawing on interdisciplinary texts, 
and practical contributions in the form of the films that expand filmic language to 
express the research in affective terms. 
 
The thesis follows a roughly chronological order describing the course of the research, 
each chapter building on the last. Theoretical research weaves with the filmmaking 
towards an explication of the creative output. At times this is inconclusive but builds a 
picture of how interdisciplinary perspectives shape the practical work. Below I outline 
each chapter to indicate how the narrative of the research unfolds.  
 
Chapter 1. Returning to the start sketches the ground from which the research 
developed. The first subchapter, The uncanny and twenty-first century hauntology 
provides a summary of the uncanny and hauntology and an overview of the referenced 
texts. Background to the practice summarises my filmic influences and introduces my 
past films and art works, with a focus on their uncanny content. 
    
Chapter 2. Methodological windows introduces interdisciplinary research. Why 
Neuroscience? presents film as an emotional medium with reference to the work of 
screenwriter Phil Parker, and respective work on emotion and consciousness of film 
theorist Peter Wyeth and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. I introduce 
neuropsychoanalysis and neuroaesthetics, provide commentary on attitudes towards 
these new fields, and outline my own motivations in taking an interdisciplinary 
approach. Unconscious, nonconscious: a note clarifies terms and how they will be used 
in the thesis. Scanner: fMRI study and short film describes the process of the scientific 




Chapter 3. Inviting the unconscious to speak explores creative practice as a process of 
affective response. Creative Play: Art practice as research cross-references descriptions 
of creative practice and mathematical thought that occur below the threshold of 
consciousness. Parallels are drawn between creative practice and psychoanalytic method 
as engaging unconscious processes. Unhomely Street: filmic intuition reflects on the 
method of production of this film, therapeutic aspects of the process, and the nature of 
the imagery produced. Hauntology, as a critical framework from Derrida, and a 
characteristic tone of this century from Mark Fisher, is reflected upon in the light of the 
film.  
 
Chapter 4. Pointing the bone: A review of metaphor commences with reference to China 
Miéville’s novel Embassytown, a story of an alien race that must stage metaphors in 
order to expand their thinking. The work of Jacques Lacan is introduced alongside 
linguistic theories of metaphor from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and 
neuroaesthetic approaches to understanding metaphor from Irving Massey. Michael 
Robbins’ theory of primordial consciousness is comparatively reviewed. Derrida’s 
deconstructive work explores metaphor through an expanded understanding of writing, 
and Deleuze and Guattari employ metaphors to develop conceptual frameworks, often 
drawing on mathematical figures, to concretise ideas within abstract environments. 
Building on chapter 3, and a hypothesis that filmmaking involves a process of 
translation from feeling to image, the purpose of the chapter in this central position in 
the thesis is to explore an understanding of metaphor as an originary language of 
thought.  
 
5. Psychotel, Ground floor: Check-in  is the first of three chapters that reflect on 
Psychotel. The film was produced over a four-year period and edited in three main post-
production blocks. These blocks relate to the three chapters to follow that expose the 
process and thinking behind the film. The blind narrator and the sexual uncanny reveals 
the starting points of the film, some more obvious attempts to make filmic references to 
the uncanny, including images of castration and dismemberment, and the process of 
finding a look and style with which to proceed. The return of the repressed and the 
uncanny child explores Freudian repression as a process of hierarchical inhibition of the 
lower by the higher modes of mental operation to enable predictive strategy. The 
psychoanalytic understanding of the uncanny as ‘the return of the repressed’ is reviewed 
12 
 
through Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis towards a new understanding of film 
spectatorship. Maria Torok and Nicolas Abraham’s concept of the transgenerational 
phantom is introduced in relation to themes of child abuse in the film. 
 
6. Psychotel, Second floor: single or double room? focusses on the second stage of 
production when slower sequences were made in an attempt to instil feelings of quiet 
uncertainty and oneiric logic. Myself and I: the structure of selfhood explores the 
psychoanalytic and neuroscientific accounts of the phenomenological experience of the 
strangeness of mental life. The uncanny double: otherness and automaticity looks at 
disrupted physics and reversed speech in the film with reference to the uncanny valley 
theory, art-house films, and the horror genre. I could not sleep with her in the room 
reviews a sequence in the film that was shot in Istanbul. The orientalist nature of this 
sequence is re-examined in the light of filmmaking as an unconscious process. 
 
7. Psychotel, Third floor: Lift going up explores the latter stages of production including 
the voice-over that shapes the narrative. The all-seeing narrator and the harbinger of 
death considers the role of the narrator with reference to Nicholas Royle’s idea of 
Reality Literature. Themes of death are explored through the use of dead animals in the 
film. Commentary on the animal as ‘other’ builds on previous chapters. Spirit level and 
the quantum uncanny considers telepathy as an extension of the omnipresent narrator 
with reference to Derrida and Royle. The relation of the uncanny to quantum physics 
and Eastern philosophies is assessed with reference to meditation, creative practice, 
hypnagogia, and schizophrenia as related mental states. 
 
8. Check out: Exit ties together multiple threads, identifies small contributions to 
knowledge, and offers concluding remarks about modes of thinking, creative practice, 
and the academic workplace. Chance: the magic book shop reflects on chance 
occurrences during the research and the importance in creative practice of allowing 
accidents to happen. Reception: creative-practice research offers concluding 
commentary on the psychological ‘space’ of the research. Intuition and affect provides a 
summary of inferences about the psyche as explored in the thesis, and clarifies intuition 
in filmmaking. Behind the curtain: the uncanny unconscious proposes an interpretation 
of the psychoanalytic unconscious and its relation to the uncanny in which the two ideas 
are closely associated. Visitor’s book: filmmaking in precarious times reflects on 
13 
 
Haraway’s message, provides a summary of contributions to knowledge, and outlines 


































RETURNING TO THE START 
The uncanny and twenty-first century hauntology 
She wonders about getting away, 
Flattens herself slimmer than a pay packet 




Freud’s 1919 article Das Unheimlich attributes the uncanny to the castration complex, 
with reference to childhood fears, and disembodied limbs, but his discussion ranges to 
include repetition, coincidence, the appearance of automaticity, madness, doubles, the 
evil eye, silence, solitude, darkness, death, and the supernatural. The uncanny is a 
peculiar sensation, where one feels arrested, stopped in one’s tracks by a feeling of 




The psychoanalytic and philosophical accounts of the uncanny converge on the idea of 
something hidden from direct sight and the implication is that this is, metaphorically 
speaking, a cognitive veil. There exists a discrepancy between the individual’s sense of 
agency and the automaticity that underpins much of human behaviour. That the 
conscious self is not the primary driver of the organism produces a sense of doubling. 
This account can be found in many philosophical and psychoanalytic texts but this 
interdisciplinary account, introducing the neuroscientific work of Damasio, is an 
original contribution to an understanding of the uncanny.  
 
The literature review addresses the development of thinking of consciousness and 
selfhood across humanistic and scientific fields including the work of Damasio, Freud, 
Derrida, Hélène Cixous, Deleuze, Guattari, Fisher, Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jentsch, 
Adrian Johnson, Irving Massey, Barry Opatow, Royle, Mark Solms, and Katherine 
Withy. These accounts are explored herein and in the films, illustrating the uncanny in 
the narrative content and showing how the repressed might return through art practice. 
 
                                                 
20. Fay Musselwhite, ‘In the Absence of Salt’, Contraflow, p. 94. Extract. 
21. ‘Das “Unheimlich”’ ‘has always been more interesting to parse and deconstruct than to summarize’, Alexandra Kokoli, The 
Feminist Uncanny in Theory and Art Practice, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, p. 18. See Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 1‒2 for a comprehensive introduction and the book overall for an expansion 
and deconstruction of the uncanny.  
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Derrida’s critical framework of hauntology implies that it is the nature of being to be 
haunted.
22
 Hauntology questions the assumption of presence in metaphysics as an 
expansion of Derrida’s deconstructive project. The framework relates to the uncanny as 
both accommodate the idea of what is absent or hidden from view. Hauntology 
emphasises the non-linearity of thought, while the uncanny involves a disruption of 
selfhood arising from the split nature of the psyche.
23
 Both are conceptual frameworks 
that suggest patterns of thought. Fisher’s work on hauntology focusses on the mood of 
the times at the start of this century.
24
 It was with great sadness that I learned of Mark 
Fisher’s death in January 2017, having read in Ghosts of My Life how writing, as a 
process of ‘externalising negativity’, helped him work thorough depression.
25
 Derrida’s 
hauntology, an eschatological reaction to Fukuyama’s optimism towards liberal 
democracy and free market capitalism, proposes that we learn from the past, let the 
ghost, or the ‘other’ speak.
26
 For Fisher, hauntology is a meditation on the prevalence of 
depression and a loss of creativity in the twenty-first century, characterised by ‘a 
crushing sense of finitude and exhaustion’.
27
 In contrast Haraway more playfully 
describes these times as ‘the dithering’.
28
 Haraway rejects the Anthropocene as it saps 
the strength of the imagination to envisage a future of multispecies coexistence. In 
Haraway I find a positive approach to thinking about the troubled future, with her 
concept of the Chthulucene as ‘one of the big-enough stories in the netbag for staying 
with the trouble in our ongoing epoch’.
29
 Among Haraway’s objections to the discourse 
of the Anthropocene is that it ‘saps our capacity for imagining and caring for other 
worlds, both those that exist precariously now [...] and those we need to bring into 
alliance with other critters’
30
 Haraway emphasises the importance of cultural narratives, 




The reference to the neuroscientific uncanny in the title relates to the science survey and 
the film Scanner that is discussed in chapter 2, and my application of work from the 
                                                 
22. See Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx, the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International, trans. by Peggy 
Kamuf, New York, NY: Routledge, 1994. Hauntology is explored further in chapter 3. 
23. This understanding of the uncanny is expanded in chapter 6. 
24. See Mark Fisher, Ghosts of My Life – Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures, Winchester: Zero Books, 2014. 
25. Ibid., p. 29.  
26. Derrida, Spectres of Marx, pp. 222‒21. 
27. Fisher, Ghosts of My Life, p. 8. 
28. Donna J. Haraway, Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin, Environmental Humanities, vol. 6, 
2015, pp. 159‒165, 161. ‘The dithering’ is a reference to Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2312, a science fiction novel of 2012 as Haraway 
notes. 
29. Donna J. Haraway ‘Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’, e-flux, Journal#75, 2016, <http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/75/67125/tentacular-thinking-anthropocene-capitalocene-chthulucene/>, accessed 1 February 2017, p. 11. 
30. Haraway, ‘Tentacular Thinking’, p. 8. 
31. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, pp. 99‒103. 
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fields of neuroscience and psychology that builds on psychoanalytic and philosophical 
accounts of the uncanny in chapters 5 and 6. Twenty-first century hauntology combines 
Derrida and Fisher’s accounts of hauntology with Haraway’s work as a background that 
informed my thinking during the filmmaking process. 
 
In considering theories of selfhood from science and the humanities I contribute to the 
current understanding of the uncanny in relation to mind and brain, and employ 
filmmaking as an investigative strategy.  
 
Background to the practice 
Out of the meaningless practical shapes of all that is living or lifeless 
Joined with the artist’s eye, new life, new form, new colour,  
Out of the sea of sound the life of music, 
Out of the slimy mud of words,  




A longstanding preoccupation in my filmmaking has been the representation of 
subjectivity. I have enjoyed films that occupy a netherworld of feeling and metaphor. 
My influences have been European art-house cinema, and US, UK, and Canadian 
independent cinema, including the work of Jean Cocteau, Ingmar Bergman, Luis 
Buñuel, Maya Deren, Peter Greenaway, Derek Jarman, David Cronenberg, and David 
Lynch.
33
 What unites these filmmakers – and what influenced my own filmmaking – is 
the staging of a discrete cinematic world that is not intended to be viewed as a 
representation of reality.
34
 A line can be traced from the early cinema of George Méliès 
at the start of last century to the Surrealist movement, beginning in the early 1920s with 
Buñuel’s Un Chien Andalou in 1929, and Deren’s At Land in 1944, laying the 
foundations for a cinematic approach that differs from the dominant narrative form. In 
mainstream cinema the camera primarily acts as a third person observer of performed 
scenes intended to represent reality, where cinematic pleasure is gained from empathetic 
                                                 
32. T. S. Eliot, ‘Choruses from “The Rock”’, T. S. Eliot: A selection by the Author, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951, p. 121. Extract. 
33. It is worth noting that there appears one woman out of eight directors. An article on the website of the Center for the Study of 
Women in Television and Film, Martha M. Lauzen found that in a study of the top 700 films of 2014 women comprised only 13% 
of directors, Women and the Big Picture: Behind-the-Scenes Employment on the Top 700 Films of 2014, 
<https://womenintvfilm.sdsu.edu/files/2014_Women_and_the_Big_Picture_Report.pdf>, accessed 6 September 2018. 
34. Bergman took influence from the Surrealist movement and presented dreamscapes, a clearly defined example being the 
doppelgänger sequence in Wild Strawberries, dir. Ingmar Bergman, Svensk Filmindustri, 1957 [on DVD]. Lynch’s work features 
dream sequences, but these examples present filmic worlds that are not specific in their relation to the subjective viewpoint, rather 
the entire narrative is staged in a weird, imaginary setting.  
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alignment with the principal character.
35
 What differs in Surrealist films and the 
examples of art-house cinema listed above is that representations of reality are 
combined with scenes whose closest real-world reference is fantasy or dream. 
 
Surrealism as characterised by an attempt ‘to express, either verbally, in writing or in 
any other manner, the true functioning of thought’.
36
 Barbara Creed sees Un Chien 
Andalou as emphasising ‘the crucial role of the internal eye, the mind’s eye, in viewing 
film’.
37
 She describes Lynch and Cronenberg as Surrealist film makers,
38
 and highlights 
the Surrealist intention of uniting dream and reality.
39
 She writes:  
 
 The Surrealist’s untamed eye is first and foremost an inner eye. Of central importance 
 to their  views on the cinema is the relationship between the viewing of a film and the 
 act of dreaming. To them watching a film unfolding in a darkened cinema embodied the 




I propose the Surrealist intention to combine dream and fantasy with reality, and to 
represent the internal mind’s-eye view, has contributed to cinematic trends of increased 
non-linearity. Film theorist Allan Cameron recognises a trend towards increased 
cinematic, narrative complexity since the early 1990s. He defines these modular 
narratives as films that ‘articulate a sense of time as divisible and subject to 
manipulation’.
41
 In 2004 Harper coined the term the cinema of complexity 
42
 to describe 
the condition of film in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century characterised by 
                                                 
35. I acknowledge mainstream cinema also includes instances of subjective representation however the third person viewpoint is the 
dominant mode. This viewpoint is the filmmaker’s perspective which on viewing becomes the spectator’s position. In this sense the 
spectator aligns themselves with the filmmaker and follows the narrative according to the filmmaker’s intention. However through 
the events of the narrative the spectator experiences the emotional turmoil of the character. The effect on the spectator is achieved 
through engagement of empathy by witnessing the performance of emotion as well as by a system of related fantasy that the 
spectator runs alongside the film, their own slightly adapted versions of being a hero. 
36. André Breton (1924), The First Surrealist Manifesto, trans. by A. S. Kline, 2010, 
<https://nihilsentimentalgia09.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/manifestopdf.pdf >, accessed 7 October 2016, referenced in Graeme 
Harper and Rob Stone, ‘Emobilism and New ‘Film’: Surrealism in the Post-Digital Age’, The Unsilvered Screen: Surrealism on 
Film, London: Wallflower Press, 2007, p. 148. 
37. Barbara Creed, ‘The Untamed Eye and the Dark Side of Surrealism: Hitchcock, Lynch and Cronenburg’, in The Unsilvered 
Screen: Surrealism on Film, edited by Graeme Harper and Rob Stone, London: Wallflower Press, 2007, p. 125. 
38. Creed, The Unsilvered Screen, 2007, p. 115. 
39. Ibid., p. 124. Creed notes that Breton saw ‘surreality’ as a new state where dream and reality were combined to resolve 
contradictions of oppositional states such as real / imaginary, life / death, high / low.  
40. Creed, The Unsilvered Screen, 2007, p. 119. 
41. Allan Cameron, Modular Narratives in Contemporary Cinema, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 1. Examples he cites 
as illustrative of this trend include;  
 Pulp Fiction, dir. Quentin Tarantino, Miramax, 1994, [on DVD],  
 Groundhog Day, dir. Harrold Ramis, Colombia Pictures, 1993 [on DVD],  
 Memento, dir. Christopher Nolan, 2000 [on DVD],  
 21 Grams, dir. Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, 2003 [on DVD],  
 Peppermint Candy, dir. Lee Chang-dong, 2000 [on DVD].  
42. Graeme Harper, ‘DVD and the New Cinema of Complexity’, in Nicholas Rombes, New Punk Cinema, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005, pp. 89‒101. 
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‘a complex interaction of no longer mechanical production techniques’ brought about 




The emergence of complex and modular narratives such as Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp 
Fiction since the late 1980s immediately follow a wave of popular surrealist cinema 
including Cronenberg’s Dead Ringers (1988), and Naked Lunch (1991), and Lynch’s 
Blue Velvet (1986), Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me (1992), and the cult television 
series Twin Peaks (1990).
44
 My exposure to these films as a student in the late eighties 
and early nineties alongside a consideration of the non-linear quality of thought led me 
to experiment with atemporal narratives. Between 1993 and 1994 I made three short 





Creed writes that Lynch ‘draws on motifs much beloved of the classic Surrealist: 
doubles, identity loss, the bizarre and unexpected, doomed lovers, the dream, the 
uncanny, decay and death’.
 46
 She notes Lynch’s fascination with the horror that lies 
below the surface of suburban normality. She suggests that while Lynch is concerned 
primarily with mental states, Cronenberg’s unique surrealist vision is focussed on the 
body, the abject, and also the uncanny.
47
 Creed notes that the uncanny is, for the 
Surrealists, central to notions of the marvellous, convulsive beauty, and objective 
chance.
48
 My first short film, Thread, uses the metaphor of a narrative thread to weave 
together disparate elements, connected by a literal piece of string.
49
 My intention was to 
represent an interrelationship between things that resulted in simultaneous occurrences, 
questioning the idea of ‘objective chance’. This was explored more literally in the BFI 
funded film The Bather.
50
 This film suggests telepathy among the characters and hints 
                                                 
43. Graeme Harper, ‘Emobilism and New ‘Film’, p.143. My short films were made prior to my going on-line and were produced on 
film and edited in a linear fashion, so new digital technology cannot account for their atemporality. 
44. Blue Velvet, dir. David Lynch, De Laurentiis Entertainment, 1986 [on DVD], Dead Ringer, dir. David Cronenberg, Morgan 
Creek Productions, 1988 [on DVD], Naked Lunch, dir. David Cronenburg, Studiocanal, 1991 [on DVD], Twin Peaks (television 
series), dir. David Lynch, Lynch / Frost Productions, 1990 [on DVD], Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me, dir. David Lynch, Universal 
Pictures, 1992 [on DVD]. 
45. These were conceived before I encountered Cameron’s examples of modular narratives. Thread, dir. Susannah Gent, Fuji Film 
Scholarship and The Northern Media School, 1993,  [on-line], Black Bag, dir. Susannah Gent, Fuji Film Scholarship and The 
Northern Media School, 1994 [on-line], The Bather, dir. Susannah Gent, BFI Production Projects and The Northern Media School, 
1994, [on-line]. 
46. Creed, 2007, p. 128. 
47. Ibid., p. 131.  
48. Ibid., p. 116. 
49. Thread, dir. Susannah Gent, <http://susannahgent.weebly.com/early-shorts.html>. Thread, was shown at a historical 
retrospective of ‘One Hundred Years of the Short Film’ at the Cambridge Film Festival in 1995. I was honoured to be included in 
this programme as my work was shown alongside the work of Maya Deren. This was the first time I had seen At Land. I was 
surprised on two counts: How had I managed not to see this film before and how had I managed to make a film in such a similar 
vein?  
50. The Bather, dir. Susannah Gent, BFI Production Projects, 1994, <http://susannahgent.weebly.com/early-shorts.html>. 
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at an omnipotent controller. Black Bag employs an atemporal structure to explore the 
memory of an incident of child abuse.
51
 These structural approaches to narrative and a 
preoccupation with subjectivity are highlighted in my feature film Jelly Dolly.
52
 Jelly 
Dolly begins with clearly bracketed dream sequences that become increasingly 
entangled with the protagonist’s waking world. The film attempts to capture the fluid 
state of simultaneously viewing the external world and the internal mind’s-eye-view.  
 
Following Jelly Dolly, I experimented with fine art and ‘rogue taxidermy’, making 
installations and sculptures between 2006 and 2011.
53
 Although the term uncanny could 
be applied to my work prior to 2009, it was visiting the Matt Roberts Unheimlich 
exhibition in Leeds that first drew my attention to the concept of the uncanny. At the 
time I was working with dead foxes.
54
 Matt Roberts show was publicised with Steve 




Fig. 1. X is very useful, Susannah Gent  
 
                                                 
51. Black Bag, dir. Susannah Gent, Fuji Film Scholarship awards and the Northern Media School, 1994, 
<http://susannahgent.weebly.com/early-shorts.html>.  
52. Jelly Dolly, dir. Susannah Gent, Cornerstone Media International, 2004 [on DVD]. Clips from the film can be seen at 
<http://susannahgent.weebly.com/jelly-dolly-clips.html>, and the trailers at <http://susannahgent.weebly.com/jelly-dolly.html>. 
53. I have been a working member of the Minnesota Association of Rogue Taxidermists since 2010.  
54. This sculpture features a young fox without legs. The legs are in the trolley along with an axe. An older fox without eyes pushes 










Fig. 2. Suspension of Disbelief, Steve Bishop 
 
Matt Roberts curated a second show on the subject of the uncanny, the following year.
55
 
Again I was struck by similarities between some of the work exhibited and my own.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Self Portrait as a Matryoshka part 2, Wendy Mayer 
 
 
Fig. 4. 12 Heads, Susannah Gent 
 
 
Having become familiar with the term Unheimlich, I realised I had been looking at the 
word on a daily basis for over a decade as I have a framed poster from a film festival on 
the wall of my lounge. 
56
 
                                                 















Fig. 5. Femme Totale 
 
There was something uncanny about finding connections between my work, my home, 
and these exhibitions although, as Freud points out with the instance of the number 62, 




The relation between the psychoanalytic and psychological ideas of the uncanny and art 
practice/s has gained currency since the 1993 exhibition curated by Mike Kelley entitled 
‘The Uncanny’ for Museum Arnhem and further developed for Tate Liverpool in 2004. 
Other exhibitions include: ‘Disquieting Strangeness’, curated by Sharon Kivland for the 
Centre for Freudian Analysis & Research, London, 1997, and ‘The Uncanny’, curated 
by James Putnam, Ronchini Gallery, London, 2013. During this period a number of 
books were published on the subject including Anthony Vidler, The Architectural 
Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely, 1992, Terry Castle, The Female 
Thermometer: 18th Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny, 1995, Nicholas 
Royle, The Uncanny, 2003, and more recently, Anneleen Masschelein, The Unconcept: 
the Freudian Uncanny in Late-Twentieth-Century Theory, 2011, and Katherine Withy, 
Heidegger: On Being Uncanny, 2015. This follows the popularity of surrealist cinema 
of the mid-1980s, and coincides with the Young British Artists supported by Charles 
Saatchi. Damien Hirst’s work may be seen as influencing a renewed interest in 
taxidermy, and although the YBA work is more associated with shock tactics, the 
uncanny is present in their work.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
56. Poster for a women’s film festival in Dortmund 1997 in which I had three films selected. Unheimliches Vergnügen’ translates as 
‘unbelievable pleasure’ but there is clearly a play on ideas between the text and image with the ambiguity of the raven and hair. 
57. Sigmund Freud ‘The “Uncanny”’ (1919), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 
17, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Hogarth, 1955, pp. 218‒256, 237. Although Freud attributes the uncanny 
sensation arising from repetitions, such as coming across the number 62 several times in a day, to superstition and primitive belief, it 
is worth noting that the brain is equipped with pattern recognition facilities. Rather than suggesting Freud is incorrect in his 
observation here, this furnishes us with a good example of how nonconscious mental operations (pattern recognition facility) are 









Figs. 6., 7., 8. Sarah Lucas, ‘Pauline Bunny’, Mark Quinn ‘Blood Portrait’, Jake and Dinos Chapman, ‘Zygotic 
acceleration, biogenetic, de-sublimated libidinal model’ 
 
Themes of death, dismemberment, the occult, and perversion feature in the YBA work 





Fig. 9. Deer, Susannah Gent  (photograph by Jen Booth)                             
 
 
Fig. 10. Sentimental Rabbit Suicide, Susannah Gent  
 
                                                 
58. Deer, Burngreve Chapel, Sheffield, 2008, Sentimental Rabbit Suicide, Open Up, Sheffield, 2007, Nexus Gallery, Manchester, 









Fig. 11. Rabbit Shadow, Susannah Gent  
 
During a residency at Bank Street Arts in 2009, I began a collaboration with the 
Sheffield-based poet, Fay Musselwhite. This collaborative work initially took the form 
of live performance with video, but later became short poetry films.
59
 Through these I 
sought to improve my technical skills and undertook some training. No longer faced 
with having to raise a budget to make a film, the absolute requirement when I began 




I have come to recognise creative play as central to my filmmaking method. Although 
this might be discussed through the humanities, drawing on theories from art-practice-
research, my interest in the representation of subjectivity has led to an interest in the 
brain. My work in taxidermy stems from a fascination with biology and anatomy and in 




                                                 
59. Goat Boy and other Journeys performed at the Sheffield Poetry Festival 2011 and Off the Shelf Literary festival 2011. 
Subsequent video works include; 
 Taxidermy for Beginners, dir. Susannah Gent with Fay Musselwhite, 2013 [on-line] <https://vimeo.com/75998733>,  
 Goat Boy, dir. Susannah Gent with Fay Musselwhite, 2013 [on-line] <https://vimeo.com/76336202>,  
 Taxidermy Tea Party, dir. Susannah Gent, 2013 [on-line] <https://vimeo.com/74014681>,  
 Leaving Mojave, dir. Susannah Gent with Lindalee Welch, 2013 [on-line] <https://vimeo.com/76208527>. 
60. When I began filmmaking video cameras did exist but they were primitive and film festivals did not screen video work. 




METHODOLOGICAL WINDOWS  
Why Neuroscience?: Interdisciplinary Research  
Rather than words comes the thought of high windows: 
The sun-comprehending glass, 
And beyond it, the deep blue air, that shows  




As a lecturer in filmmaking, I have found film theory can cause confusion when 
introduced to students engaged in production. Structuralist accounts, and some 
psychoanalytic film theory may seem divorced from the experience of making or 
viewing film. Films made to explore theory may be awkward insofar as they employ 
audio-visual means to discuss concepts, but often fail to engage with cinematic 
language.
62
 I find Phil Parker’s approach useful, outlined in The Art and Science of 
Screenwriting, as it considers films in a cultural and industry context while exploring 




In 2006 I took a short course with Parker, then employed by the UK Film Council to 
coach script editors in how to select and develop projects applying for UKFC funding. 
Although Parker’s approach focuses on mainstream genre film and could be seen as 
prescriptive, I found it offered possibilities as a ‘toolkit’ to use when teaching student 
filmmakers. Parker’s ‘creative matrix’ includes everything he considers important to a 
writer when undertaking a screenplay; genre, style, tone, form, plot, story, and theme. 
He identifies eight basic themes into which all narratives fall.
64
  
• the desire for justice 
• the pursuit of love 
• the morality of individuals 
• a desire for order 
• the pursuit of pleasure 
• a fear of death  
• a fear of the unknown  
                                                 
61. Philip Larkin, ‘High Windows’, High Windows, London: Faber and Faber, 1986, p. 16. Extract. 
62. Riddles of the Sphinx, dir. Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen, BFI, 1977, is a prime example. 
63. Phil Parker, The Art and Science of Screenwriting, Chicago, IL: Intellect Books, 2006. 
64. Although Parker is adamant that all narratives fall into these categories, I would stress that they apply to mainstream feature 
films. My approach to teaching is never to suggest that students shoe-horn their work into these categories, rather to use it as a 
check-list; the question being, if a project does not have one of these themes, then what theme does it have? Frequently 
underdeveloped narratives have more than one theme and it is identifying and simplifying this issue that helps develop the project. 
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• the desire for validation 
These themes suggest genres. A film with the theme of the pursuit of pleasure is likely 
to be a comedy, while the pursuit of love will be a romance.
65
 This thematic approach to 
genre suggests that audience expectation is firstly emotional. If the comedy does not 
make you laugh it is not a good film. These emotional responses could be seen in 
physiological terms; the thriller should produce adrenalin, and the romance oxytocin, 
perhaps, although this is speculative.  
 
Parker’s theme, the fear of the unknown, relates to the supernatural and psychological 
horror genres. The quality of feeling expected by the audience in this genre is different 
from the action horror where the source of the fear is known. I propose that this type of 
fear, that stems from uncertainty, relates to the uncanny. Parker’s identification of this 
principal theme within a mainstream genre suggests it is commonplace for audiences to 
seek films that make them feel disquieted. 
 
My interest in emotion brought me to neuroscience. Before the 1990s the scientific 
community largely ignored emotion, considering it too subjective for laboratory 
research.
66
 With the advent of brain imaging technology and the study of patients with 
neurological damage, the work of Damasio, Jaak Panskepp, Louis LeDoux, and V. S. 
Ramachandran, among others, has brought emotion to the forefront of neuroscientific 
study.
67
 Emotion is understood as a neural mechanism closely related to consciousness. 





Peter Wyeth argues against reading films according to the structuralist approach.
69
 For 
Wyeth, the alignment of film with the text, established by Christian Metz in the 1970s 
                                                 
65. Defining genre, Parker writes: ‘Genres are sets of patterns, combinations of narrative elements, which screenwriters and the 
audiences recognise and use in interpreting the screenwork. [...] This memory of narrative patterns is in turn used by screenwriters 
and others to establish a set of expectations within the audience which are then built upon.’ See Parker, The Art and Science of 
Screenwriting, p. 29. The basic fiction categories used as viewing guidelines are romance, comedy, horror, thriller, drama, action 
and adventure, family, and children’s. Clearly the last category relates to the certificate of the film rather than to the content and in a 
hub, such as Amazon Prime Video or Netflix, films may be listed under more than one heading.  
66. It is noted by Damasio in the preface of Descartes Error that prior to publication in 1995 the study of emotion was neglected by 
the neurosciences. Joseph LeDoux makes a similar point in the preface of The Emotional Brain. See Damasio, Descartes Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995, pp. xv‒xvi, and Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional 
Brain, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998, p. 9. 
67. Damasio, Descartes Error, and The Feeling of What Happens, London: Vintage, 1999, LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, Jaak 
Panskepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, V. 
S. Ramachandran, and S. Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the Architecture of the of the Mind, London: Fourth 
Estate, 1999. 
68. This is expanded in chapter 5 with the introduction of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. 
69. Peter Wyeth, The Matter of Vision: Affective Neurobiology and Cinema, Hertfordshire: John Libby Publishing, 2015. 
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from Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics, fails to account for the emotional 
experience of the audience. Wyeth, informed by the attention on emotion in the 
neurosciences, sees this as a more general problem of logocentrism and advocates a 
focus on ‘Vision, the Automatic, and Emotion (VAE)’, in contrast to ‘Language, 
Consciousness, and Reason (LCR)’, that he sees as dominant in western ideology.
70
  
Wyeth points out that in evolutionary terms vision pre-dates language by over two 
million years, suggesting that emotional response to image, and the construction of 
narratives by predictive cause and effect association, forms the most basic neural 




The search for origins is problematic, as Derrida warns. His work on the ‘arch-trace’ 
shows Western discourse as falsely underpinned by the myth of originary presence, 
God, man as unified consciousness, and the notion of truth. He proposes the individual, 
the presence as presented in metaphysics, is a fiction. Of Grammatology demonstrates 
how writing precedes spoken language, in which writing is understood as a trace.
72
 For 
Derrida, writing includes the information of cellular activity.
73
 The trace ‘has diverse 
possibilities ‒ genetic and structural’ and ‘articulates its possibility in the entire field of 
being’.
74
 The writing of the psyche is contained in Derrida’s idea of the trace and 
although not explicit, the relation of mind to brain aligns the trace and neuronal activity. 
 
Out of general interest and in support of my creative practice I study cosmology and 
quantum physics for the general reader.
75
 Although I cannot work with maths I 
appreciate Max Tegman’s proposition that reality is mathematics.
76
 These interests stem 
from a tendency to seek patterns; how aerial views of the planet make human activity 
look like lichen. These points, underpinning my interest in science and interdisciplinary 
research, return throughout the thesis and films. 
 
                                                 
70. Wyeth, The Matter of Vision, p. 9. 
71. Ibid., p. 13.  
72. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
73. In discussing the breadth of the term writing in his application, Derrida writes: ‘It is also in this sense that today the biologist 
speaks of writing and of pro-gram for the most elementary processes of information within the living cell.’ Of Grammatology, 1998, 
p. 9. I return to this point in chapter 4. 
74. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 51. 
75. An area of interest relating to the uncanny that has not made it into this project is dark matter. That 85% of the universe is made 
up of a material that we know nothing about, that is known of but not understood, is indeed uncanny.  




Damasio uses the term ‘movie-in-the-brain’ to describe thought.
77
 He acknowledges this 
is a rough metaphor as the nervous system has more sensory portals than just sight and 
sound, however the comparison between thought and film is reminiscent of the parallel 
drawn by Metz between cinema and dreaming.
78
 For Damasio, emotion is the 
physiological change in the organism as it is transformed by an external object. The 
conscious counterpart to this process is feeling. In The Feeling of What Happens, 
Damasio tells us that what we are conscious of is ‘a mental pattern in any of the sensory 
modalities, e. g., a sound image, a tactile image, the image of a state of well being’.
79
 It 
is ‘images’ of these ‘objects’ of which the organism is conscious as well as a ‘presence 
that signifies you, as observer of the things imaged, owner of the things imaged, 
potential actor in the things imaged’.
80
 Damasio continues:  
 
The simplest form of such a presence is also an image, actually the sort of image 
that constitutes a feeling. In that perspective, the presence of you is the feeling of 





This suggests that image is the primary mode of thought and language is an 
evolutionary late-comer. Wyeth’s assertion that film is more appropriately viewed in 
terms of image and emotion, rather than as a language, is founded on this evolutionary 
tenet. Interdisciplinary research remains controversial. The boundaries that demarcate 
academic fields are constructs. Granted these demarcations are necessary for 
institutional and methodological reasons, but significant information may lie at the 
junctions where these fields of study overlap.  
 
Neuropsychoanalysis links psychodynamic concepts and neuroscientific mechanisms 
and combines the philosophical and scientific foundations of mind and brain.
82
 Adrian 
Johnston recognises neuropsychoanalysis as being predominantly Anglo-American, and 
aims to bring continental philosophy into this new dialogue as he considers ‘the 
                                                 
77. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 9. 
78. Christian Metz, ‘Part III The Fiction Film and its Spectator: A Metapsychological Study’, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: the 
Imaginary Signifier, trans. by Celia Britton and Annwyl Williams, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983, 101‒37.  
79. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 9. 
80. Ibid., p. 10.  
81. Ibid.  
82. For a definition and outline of Neuropsychoanalysis see Mark Solms, ‘What is Neuropsychoanalysis?’, Neuropsychoanalysis, 
2011, vol. 2., 1‒13.  
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deliberate, principled neglect of biology and related fields is no longer justified or 




Semir Zeki, a professor of neuroaesthetics, considers the artist to be a neuroscientist of 
sorts ‘because all art obeys the laws of the visual brain, it is not uncommon for art to 
reveal these laws to us, often surprising us with the visually unexpected’.
84
 As a 
neurobiologist specialising in the visual brain, Zeki’s version of neuroaesthetics aims at 
understanding the neural basis of visual art.
85
 This approach differs from that of Warren 
Neidich, an interdisciplinary artist who launched the online platform Artbrain, whose 
focus is philosophical not scientific.
86
 Neidich promotes the emancipatory power of art 
as a vehicle in political and social change. He understands the brain as being in a state 
of permanent evolution through neuroplasticity, and is engaged with the ways in which 
art forms impact on this development.
87
 Further, the art work, through the effect it has 
on the brain, and the codes used by the brain to understand the world, is capable of 
promoting new forms of thought.
88
 Although Neidich wishes his version of 
neuroaesthetics to be distanced from Zeki’s, there are correlations.
89
 Both point to art as 
promoting new ways of seeing and thinking; however, Neidich’s concern is a common 
concern of the humanities for science’s seemingly reductive method. Elizabeth A. 
Wilson, in Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body, points to the 
importance of building new conceptual models in both the neurosciences and cultural 
studies, to explore the neurobiology of emotion and affect theories that draw on 
evolutionary tenets. Wilson proposes that ‘the ongoing viability of feminist, queer, and 
other critical endeavours may well depend on their ability to engage more seriously, less 




                                                 
83. Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou, Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience, New York, 
NY: Colombia University Press, 2013, p. 81. 
84. Semir Zeki, statement of neuroaesthitics, <http://www.neuroesthetics.org/statement-on-neuroesthetics.php>, accessed 2 
February 2016. 
85. On the aims of neuroaesthetics, Zeki writes: ‘The first step in this enquiry is to define the function of the brain and that of art 
[…] One overall function, common to both, makes the function of art an extension of the function of the brain: the acquisition of 
knowledge […] The characteristic of an efficient knowledge-acquiring system, faced with permanent change, is its capacity to 
abstract, […] the consequence of the abstractive process is the creation of concepts and ideals.’ Semir Zeki, statement of 
neuroaesthitics, ibid.  
86. Artbrain: Journal of Neuroaesthetics, and the conference of ‘Neuroaesthetics’, Goldsmiths College, 2005. 
87. The principal difference between these two approaches is that Zeki’s scientific project takes the work of art as an independent 
entity from which information about the brain’s operation can be gleaned. Neidich’s opinion is that the work of art exists in a social 
and cultural as well as aesthetic field, and as such cannot be viewed outside the culture in which it was created. 
88. Artbrain, <http://www.artbrain.org/about/>, accessed 2 February 2016. 
89. This was made clear in a personal meeting with Neidich, October 2014. 
90. Elizabeth A. Wilson, Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004, p. 83. 
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Freud, who trained as a neurologist and neuroanatomist, considered psychoanalysis to 
be a science.
91
 On the subject of science he writes: 
 
 We have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply 
 defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with 
 such definitions. The true beginning of scientific study consists rather in describing 
 phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them. Even at this 
 stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the 




Here Freud acknowledges the creative aspect of scientific thought. His own remarkable 
insight into the mind was, by his own admission, highly speculative. Interdisciplinary 
research views a subject through different methodological windows. The combination 
of evolutionary biology, psychoanalytic approaches to understanding subjectivity, and a 
new focus on emotion as a way to comprehend cinematic pleasure, offers rich 
interdisciplinary possibilities. In turn these suggest new approaches to filmic 
representations of subjectivity. 
 
Unconscious / nonconscious: a note  
It was not death, for I stood up, 




Mark Solms, a major contributor to the new field of neuropsychoanalysis, asserts that 
‘there can’t be a mind for neuroscience and a mind for psychoanalysis. There’s only one 
human mind.’
94
 Avinash DeSousa makes a similar point regarding the gulf between the 
psychoanalytic and cognitive science views of consciousness, suggesting that these 
views are twins that have been raised apart:  
 
                                                 
91. Rui Freire Lucas notes that ‘Freud acknowledges constructing his theory by disregarding any philosophical foundation and 
believing that, eventually, even his metapsychological considerations, which were considered speculative, would be underpinned by 
future neuro-anatomo-physiological knowledge.’ Rui Freire Lucas, ‘The Quantum Unconscious and the Observant Consciousness’, 
Psychology, 2016, 7, 836‒63, p. 849, with reference to Sigmund Freud (1924), ‘An Autobiographical Study’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 20. 1959, 1‒74, p. 59 and Sigmund Freud (1914), ‘On Narcissism: An 
Introduction’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14, 1957, 67‒102, p. 78. 
92. Sigmund Freud, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915), The Theory of Psychoanalysis, vol. 11, trans. and ed. by James 
Strachey et al., London: Penguin, 1984, pp. 107‒138, p. 113. He also writes: ‘The advance of knowledge, however, does not tolerate 
any rigidity even in definitions. Physics furnishes an excellent illustration of the way in which even ‘basic concepts’ that have been 
established in the form of definitions are constantly being altered in their content.’ p. 113‒14.  
93. Emily Dickinson, ‘The Letter’, Selected Poems, New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1990, p. 22. Extract. 
94. Casey Schwartz, When Freud Meets fMRI, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/08/neuroscience-
psychoanalysis-casey-schwartz-mind-fields/401999/>, accessed 1 February 2016. Solms is a neuropsychologist, psychoanalyst, and 
co-editor of the interdisciplinary journal Neuro-psychoanalysis, and co-author with Oliver Turnbull, The Brain and the Inner World, 
New York: Other Press, 2001. Solms and Turnball aim to explore the neurological origins of Freudian psychoanalysis, believing 
that an interdisciplinary approach is essential to studying brain and mind. 
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 The psychoanalytic twin was raised in the consulting room, exposed to primal scenes, 
 intrapsychic conflict and the risky improvisations of clinical work, whereas the 





The difference in approach to the same questions makes interdisciplinary research 
rewarding; however, as these fields employ different terminology, an introductory note 
on the terms nonconscious and unconscious is required.   
 
In the neurosciences the term nonconscious is used to describe all mental activity that is 
not conscious. In alignment with Freud, the neurosciences understand most brain 
activity operates below the threshold of consciousness, but these fields, not upholding 
the general tenet of psychoanalysis, use the term nonconscious to distinguish it from the 
Freudian unconscious. Freud employs the term unconscious to all that is not conscious, 
yet ‘The Unconscious’ describes a specific region or function of the psyche that 
develops in early childhood and is comprised of repressed psychical material.
96
 Yet 
Freud did not intend us to consider all mental material as repressed. In the opening 
paragraph of The Unconscious he writes:  
 
 [...] but let us state from the very onset that the repressed does not cover everything that 





As this distinction is not always clear, and as the research draws on psychoanalysis and 
neuroscience, I use the term nonconscious to refer to mental material that is not 







                                                 
95. Avinash De Sousa, ‘Freudian Theory and Consciousness: A Conceptual Analysis’, Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, vol. 9, 
2011, 210‒217, p. 212. 
96. Sigmund Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, vol. 11, trans. and ed. by James 
Strachey et al., London: Penguin, 1984, pp. 159‒222. 
97. Ibid., p. 167.  
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Scanner: fMRI study and short film 
I leaned my head upon 
my father’s arm, and wept 
owl-blind in the morning sun 




Adrian Johnston believes that both psychoanalysis and neuropsychoanalysis ‘stand 
mutually to benefit from being interwoven in ways motivated by a meticulous 
reconsideration of Freudian theories of affect in conjunction with data from scientific 
investigation of the emotional brain’.
99
 An interesting example stemming from brain 
mapping data demonstrates both Freud’s insight and inaccuracy as follows. Freud 
writes: 
 
 Reitler (1913) observed a patient [...] who suffered from having to take a long time over 
 putting on his stockings; this man, after overcoming some resistances, found as the 
 explanation that his foot symbolized a penis, that putting on the stocking stood for a 
 masturbatory act, and that he had to keep on pulling the stocking on and off, partly in 




In Phantoms in the Brain V. S. Ramachandran recounts a patient with a lower limb 
amputation. The patient reported that during sex he experienced an orgasm in his 
missing foot. Ramachandran, who jokes that he should have titled his book The Man 
Who Mistook his Foot for a Penis, explains the odd experience as due to the close 
proximity of the brain region related to the foot being adjacent to the area for the 
genitals.
101
 What this demonstrates is three-fold: mental notions stem from physical 
origins, those physical, brain-based origins are not available to the one experiencing the 
sensations, and once an idea has been established, that idea can grow independently.  In 
drawing together these two texts, that is a small contribution to knowledge, I became 
intrigued by the possibility of seeking a neurological underpinning to the uncanny. I 
was motivated to engage with brain imaging as I experience witnessing the brain in 
action as uncanny.  
 
                                                 
98. Peter Porter (1963), ‘The Great Poet Comes Here in Winter’, Twelve Poets 1950‒1970, edited by Alexander Craig, Queensland: 
The Jacaranda Press, 1975, p. 144. 
99. Johnston, ‘Misfelt Feelings: Unconscious Affect Between Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience and Philosophy’ in Self and Emotional 
Life, p. 81. 
100. Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 206.  
101. V. S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the Architecture of the Mind, London: 
Fourth Estate, 1999, pp. 36‒37. These accounts from Freud and Ramachandran feature in the film Scanner. 
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In collaboration with Dr Yael Benn, cognitive psychologist researcher at the University 
of Sheffield, we devised a two-part scientific study to acquire an image-set of uncanny 
images and observe the brain activations in response to those images using an fMRI 
scanner. It was my intention from the onset to make a documentary film that describes 
the process and results of this study. 
 
The behavioural study was designed to acquire an image set. We invited participants to 
view images and rate them according to ‘eeriness’.
102
 The images were sourced from 
Internet searches for the uncanny, weird, eerie, creepy, and control images were selected 
to make sets of related images.
103
 This produced a set of three hundred images. Using an 
online survey we approached our professional and personal networks to raise two 
hundred and fifty participants who rated each image according to eeriness valance. To 
conduct the fMRI survey, we took the top fifty images rated most eerie and edited them 
into two three-minute sequences interspersed with control images of everyday images. 
Each film comprised twenty-five uncanny images and seventy-five control images. 
Between each image was a black screen with a small red cross that provided a focus 
point. The cross was intended to cause the participant to remain looking at the centre of 
the image. The black screen provided a base-line of neural activity that could be 
subtracted from the scan data produced when the participants looked at the images. 
With this base-line activity removed, what remained was the record of the neural 
activity of the participants when looking at the control images and the uncanny images. 
The films were constructed so that each image played for a known duration allowing the 
brain activity to be matched against each image.
104
 In this way we were able to see the 
difference in activation with the uncanny image set and the control images.  
 
                                                 
102. We used the word ‘eerie’ as we felt uncanny might be confusing, although this is not a perfect solution. I made this decision 
after participating in a survey conducted by the University of Sheffield. The survey aimed to collect participant responses to robotic 
voices to test the Uncanny Valley theory, a hypothesis from Masahiro Mori in 1970. The rating card for this survey used the word 
eerie rather than uncanny. In conversation with the devisor after taking part I was told that asking participants if they found 
something uncanny caused confusion as the word was not so widely understood.  
103. See appendix 1. for the image set and a description of the online survey.   
104. Both the images and the black spacing were held for a duration of three, four, or five seconds. The seconds were edited so as to 




    
Fig. 12. Brain scan images from the two participants for the uncanny image set 
 
The two scan images show the activations when viewing the uncanny images seen from 
the rear and the side rear. The red and the yellow shading relate to the two participants. 
The activations can be seen as largely concentrated in the visual cortex. 
 
   
Fig. 13. Brain scan images from the two participants for the uncanny image set and the control image set 
 
These two images show the red and yellow activations of the two participants for the 
uncanny images plus the light and dark blue shading that shows the activation occuring 
for both participants for the control images but not the uncanny images. 
 
The two surveys were imperfect in a number of ways. The selection of original images 
was made from a combination of Internet searches and personal selection. The Internet 
search was made using the words uncanny, weird, eerie, and creepy. This brought up a 
wide range of images from the grotesque to the comical. Fisher makes a distinction 
between the weird and the eerie, proposing the weird is when something is added that 
should not be there and the eerie is when something is missing. He distinguishes 
between these feelings and the uncanny, which he describes as the strange within the 
familiar, further stressing that the strange is different to the horrific.
105
 These subtleties 
are lost in the image selection, and the survey contained images from all these 
categories. When rating images according to eeriness valence it is likely that the 
                                                 
105. Mark Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie, London: Repeater, 2016. 
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participants in many instances rated most highly those images that were most impactful, 
in consequence producing an image set for macabre, grotesque, and horrific rather than 
uncanny. Seeking the uncanny in a still image is a reductive endeavour.
106
 Feelings of 
uncanniness often arise through associations made, things said, places revisited. 
Nevertheless, the image set produced may be analysed according to uncanny content as 
demonstrated in Analysis of Selected Survey Images in appendix 1. 
 
For the fMRI study we were only able to scan two participants due to scanner 
accessibility and costs.
107
 What was demonstrated in the results was that when viewing 
the control images the participants showed activations in the secondary visual cortex 
suggesting viewing these images was accompanied by imagined images. When viewing 
the uncanny images there is a pronounced activation of the visual cortex. Given the 
richness of the philosophical and psychoanalytic accounts of the uncanny, this result 
could be deemed trivial and disappointing. It may appear obvious that images of 
strangeness cause us to look harder. This survey shows us participant response to 
images, and does not give us information about feelings of uncanniness more generally. 
Yet, this is a repeatable experiment that matches brain activation to image and although 
only a starting point, it shows what happens in the brain when we see these ‘uncanny’ 
images. Hélène Cixous notes the repeating motif of the eye in E. T. A. Hoffman’s The 
Sandman, writing: 
 
 Through the unending series of substitutions, the eye becomes multiplied, and the 
 familiar work of the eye, in turn becomes the enigmatic production of its scattered 
 doubles, sparks of fire, lorgnettes, eyeglasses, far- and near-sighted visions, the 





The eyeglasses of Coppelius the optician and the glass eyes of the doll, Olympia, that 
push Nathaniel to insanity are lesser features in Freud’s account of uncanniness in this 
tale compared to the threat by Coppola to Nathaniel’s eyes when found in his father’s 
                                                 
106. The experience of uncanniness frequently arises from sound or an idea rather than a specific image in itself.  
107. For scientific data to be produced the survey would have to be repeated with at least six participants. The use of the scanner 
was enabled by a Sheffield Hallam University, Art and Design Research Centre grant. The scanner is located at the Hallamshire 
Hospital but is under the jurisdiction of the University of Sheffield, and is used for research projects. The size of the sample means 
that the results of the survey do not show scientific findings, rather they demonstrate a method of inquiry. The method of analysing 
the data produced by the scanner fits the brain activations from the participants onto a standard model of the brain. This approach 
produces a generalisation of the results, however this allows for experiments to be repeated. It is known among the scientific 
community to be a problem in this type of survey but data gathered from larger samples validate the results in spite of this 
manipulation. As we are looking for quite general differences in response to image type rather than attempting to pinpoint small 
regional activations, this is unproblematic. 
108. Hélène Cixous, ‘Fiction and its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud’s Das Unheimlich’, New Literary History, vol. 7, 1976, 
525‒548, p. 527. 
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study. For Freud, the ‘substitutive relation between the eye and the male organ’ leaves 




Freud also makes reference to the evil eye as a source of uncanniness.
110
 A correlation 




The short film Scanner gives further information about the fMRI study. See appendix 1 






















                                                 
109. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 231. Although for Cixous this Oedipal relation is overstressed, in ‘Das “Unheimliche”’. 
110. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 240. I believe Freud would have loved brain scanning technology. He states: ‘Research has given 
irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the brain’, but of the specific relations of the mental apparatus 
to anatomy he writes; ‘every attempt to go on from there to discover a localization of mental processes, every endeavour to think of 
ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as migrating along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely’. Freud, ‘The 
Unconscious’, p. 176. 
111. Royle notes that the uncanny involves ‘a special emphasis on the visual [...] on what is revealed to the eye’. See Royle, The 




INVITING THE UNCONSCIOUS TO SPEAK  
Creative play: art practice as research  
 The sea is actually made of eyes. 
Whether of drowned fishermen or of peasants 





The uncanny image of the brain in action prompted the film Scanner. When I turn my 
mind to certain organs in my body I can feel them at work; the heart, lungs, and 
stomach. It takes some work to visualise the brain. Instead, I see an oval, dark space 
into which pictures appear. The use of mirroring and vignettes helps to indicate 
subjectivity in the films. If I allow myself to drift or dream, this space becomes 
expanded and takes on the dimensions of my entire visual field. The images below from 
a walking arts project and Unhomely Street vaguely resemble the cross section of the 
brain, through the texture and symmetry.113   
 
 
Fig. 14. Walking sketches, stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
 
Fig. 15. Unhomely Street, stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
                                                 
112. Peter Porter, ‘The Great Poet Comes Here in Winter’, Twelve Poets 1950‒1970, p. 144. Extract. 
113. The images shown are from a collection of filmic sketches I made with the Walking Arts Research group. WARG began in 
2014 with some departmental seed funding to encourage Sheffield Hallam University Media Arts academic staff to undertake 
research. I produced the sketches to explore the act of walking using a structuralist method of filmmaking in which I commenced by 
taping a small waterproof camera to my leg to see what a leg walking looked like. The finished sketch gives the impression of 





Fig. 16. Brain scan 114                                  Fig. 17. The brain in cross-section 115 
 
The work of Ernst Haeckel, his meticulous though stylised illustrations of natural forms, 
holds my attention. Seen alongside images of the brain and neurons, the brain and its 
connectivity can be seen for what it is, a natural form. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Drawings of neurons 116                                               Fig. 19. Image of neuron 117 
 
 
Fig. 20. Ernst Haeckel, Kunstformen der Natur, 70. Ophiodea, 85. Ascidiae, 61. Phaeodaria 118 
                                                 
114. Prof. Michael Chee, cognitive neuroscience laboratory, 
<http://www.amnh.org/education/resources/rfl/web/brainguide/images/fmriscan_lg.jpg>, accessed 29 February 2016. 
115. <http://medicalschool.tumblr.com/post/51078532800/the-human-brain-in-cross-section>, accessed 29 February 2016. 
116. Based on drawings by Cajal, illustration in Neurons, Synapses, Action Potentials, and Neurotransmission, Robert Stufflebeam, 
<http://www.mind.ilstu.edu/curriculum/neurons_intro/neurons_intro.php>, accessed 29 February 2016. 
117. KTSDESIGN / Getty images, science photo library, <http://psychology.about.com/od/biopsychology/f/neuron01.htm>, 





















Deleuze and Guattari relate the physical structure of the brain to structure in thought 
patterns. They write: ‘Arborized paradigms give way to rhizomatic figures, acentered 
systems, networks of finite automatons, chaoid states.’
119
 With reference to scientific 
propositions such as ‘geometrical projections and algebraic substitutions’, they suggest 
that ‘operations of scientific knowledge’ are not simply functions of the brain but ‘the 
functions themselves are the folds of a brain that lay out the variable coordinates of a 




Roger Penrose, a major contributor to the theory of general relativity and cosmology, 
asserts that consciousness allows him to recognise mathematical beauty. Mathematical 
beauty is an aspect of the laws of physics which, for Penrose, shape both external reality 
and the mind.
121






                                              Fig. 21. Fractal 123                                   Fig. 22. Mathematical imagery 124 
 
The images below show mathematical structure by computer generation and in naturally 
occurring forms. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
118. Ernst Haeckel, 70. Ophiodea, 85. Ascidiae, 61. Phaeodaria, Kunstformen der Natur, 1904,  
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Kunstformen_der_Natur>, accessed 29 February 2016. 
119. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. by Graham Burchell & Hugh Tomlinson, London: Verso, 1994, 
p. 216. 
120. Ibid., p. 215.  
121. Penrose takes the position that an external reality exists, a view which I share. A precise philosophical argument against 
correlationism can be found in Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 
49‒85. 
122. A discussion of the Mandelbrot set can be found in Roger Penrose, ‘Mathematics and Reality’, in The Emperor’s New Mind: 
Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics, London: Vintage, 1990, pp. 40‒86. 
123. Jock Cooper, random fractal, creative commons attribution-noncommercial 3.0 United States license, <http:/www.fractal-
recursions.com/fractals/fractal-1008111.jpg>, accessed 1 March 2016. 
124. Math videos, <http://www.subdude-site.com/WebPages_Local/RefInfo/MathScience/MathVideos/math_videos.htm>, accessed 









Fig. 23. Romanesco broccoli 125                                         Fig. 24. Sunflower 126 
 
As Penrose asserts, the mind, arising from the brain, operates according to the laws of 
the cosmos. The visual expression of these is both aesthetically pleasing and 
recognisable. Penrose argues against the common association of language with 
consciousness. As a mathematician he tells us that on occasion when interrupted while 
deep in thought he has found language inaccessible.
127
 He cites Einstein: 
 
 The words or language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in 
 my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements of 




The creative process arrives as a strange sort of compulsion. In the later stages I may 
view the work as a desire to communicate, but initially it is experienced more as a need 
to ‘out’ something. When engaged in practice my experience is that I encourage images 
to form in my mind, then make connections, often unconsciously, between aspects of 




This description of the creative process parallels other accounts. The theatre director 
Peter Brook describes the early stages of a new project: ‘I listen to the patterns that arise 
in the deep level of the brain, when impulses become sounds and syllables – and before 




Nietzsche writes about the conception of Zarathustra:  
                                                 
125. Romanesco broccoli, Image: Flickr, Tin,G., <http://www.wired.com/2010/09/fractal-patterns-in-nature/>, accessed 29 February 
2016. 
126. Sunflower, istockphoto, <http://www.abc.net.au/science/photos/mathsinnature/photo13.htm>, accessed 29 February 2016. 
127. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, p. 549.  
128. Ibid., p. 548, citing Albert Eisnstein in a letter to J. Hadamard. 
129. I acknowledge that this is not accurate in terms of the actual process, but it stands as a description of what I experience – I live 
with these images, they inform my present. Certain mental images, pictures of scenes and ideas, seem to go together. In this way an 
associated collection of sequences builds. Much of my decision making relies on intuition. The image either feels right or it does 
not, and I am led by an emotional tone. 









 The notion of revelation describes the condition quite simply; by which I mean that 
 something profoundly convulsive and disturbing suddenly becomes visible and audible 
 with indescribable definiteness and exactness. One hears – one does not seek; one takes -




Jean Cocteau describes inspiration as: 
 
 the result of a profound indolence of our incapacity to put to work certain forces in 
 ourselves. These unknown forces work deep within us, with the aid of the elements of 
 daily life, [...] we indulge ourselves like invalids who try to prolong dream and dread 
 resuming contact with reality [...] when the work that makes itself in us and in spite of 




These accounts suggest the creative process engages a different level of consciousness 
to ordinary awareness and the arrival of thoughts or images is experienced as coming 
from another location, a ‘psychic elsewhere’.  
 
Patricia Townsend, psychotherapist, artist, and researcher of the creative process, draws 
comparison between the artist’s engagement with their medium and the analyst / 
analysand relationship as a way of understanding the artistic experience.
133
 Townsend 
interviewed thirty artists about their experience of making new work and found frequent 
reports of a discontinuity between the conscious mind of the artist and the idea of the 
work; inspiration seemed to come from elsewhere.
134
 Townsend observes; ‘There is a 
sense of ‘recognition’, as if there is a precise fit between the shape of the idea and the 
inner ‘something’ that the artist wants to put into the work.’
135
 These observations strike 
me as familiar regarding my work.  
 
Joanne Morra explores how ‘aspects of subjectivity are embodied in our working 
practices’, with reference to Freud’s notion of ‘working-through’.
136
 She observes how 
                                                 
131. Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Composition of Thus Spoke Zarathustra’, translated by Clifton P. Fadiman, The Creative Process, ed. by 
Brewster Ghiselin, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1952, pp. 201‒203, 202. 
132. Jean Cocteau, ‘The Process of Inspiration’, The Creative Process, pp. 81‒82, 82.  
133. Patricia Townsend, ‘A Life of its Own: The Relationship Between Artist, Idea and Artwork’, Free Associations: 
Psychoanalysis and Culture, Media, Groups, Politic, no. 65, 2014, 99‒119, 101‒2. Townsend contributed to the ‘Making Space’ 
conference, UCL, 2012,  from which this special edition of Free Associations arose. Her interviews with artist were prior to the 
conference in support of the conference contribution and subsequent publication. 
134. Artists describe allowing ideas to ‘jostle’, ‘resonate’, ‘crystallise’. Artist, Russell Mills, sees the mind as a ‘shed’, a working 
space for ideas to come together. Townsend, ‘A Life of its Own’, 101‒2. 
135. Artist John Aitkin describes an ‘otherness’ at work, where the idea has its own energy and the artist enters into a dialogue with 
it. Ibid., p. 104‒6.  
136. Morra writes with reference to George Perec, the curator Tacita Dean, and the art historian T. J. Clark noting how aspects of 
their work and research involves free association, gut instinct, and repetition. Joanne Morra, ‘The Work of Research: Remembering, 
Repeating, and Working Through’, in What is Research in the Visual Arts?: Obsession, Archive, Encounter, edited by Marquard 
Smith and Michael Ann Holley, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 45‒50. 
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each reach a point of self-awareness by this process of ‘working-through’, which she 
likens to psychoanalytic method. In conclusion, she stresses that the play between 





Eystein Victor Våpenstad, a psychoanalyst in Oslo, Norway, describes his method of 
clinical practice as ‘like the artist [...] waiting for new inspiration’. He writes: ‘The 
artistic capacity is absolutely necessary for human identification and involvement in the 




It is only in retrospect that I am able to discuss what I do in terms of a method. While in 
the midst of making I am simply ‘doing’. To call what I do ‘trial and error’ suggests it is 
more systematic than it is. It is more a process of ‘imagining and feeling’. I find 
solutions when I am not consciously ‘at work’, or rather the ‘at work’ of my practice 
involves an inverted game of ‘peek-a-boo’ in which I attempt not to look directly at a 
problem I wish to solve. In practical terms I go for a walk, play the violin or the guitar, 
meditate, sleep, and dream. I understand these approaches make favourable conditions 
for the thinking to occur behind the scenes, as it were. 
 
Unhomely Street: filmic intuition  
There is no lake because there is no lake anymore  




With reference to Michael Renov’s recognition of an ‘autobiographical outbreak of the 
1980s and 1990s’, Laura Rascaroli considers ‘an increased fragmentation of the human 





Unhomely Street and Psychotel are both hybrid films that present a fictional world 
where the viewer is invited to follow the actions of a protagonist; however, the staging 
                                                 
137. Morra, ‘The Work of Research’, p. 61. 
138. Eystein Victor Våpenstad, ‘On the Psychoanalyst’s Reverie: From Bion to Bach’, International Forum of Psychoanalysis, vol. 
23, issue 3, 2014, 161‒170,  163. 
139. Zinnia Gent-Salmon, 2019. My daughter recited this phrase having written it as part of a school exercise. 
140. Laura Rascaroli, The Personal Camera: Subjective Cinema and the Essay Film, New York, NY: Wallflower Press, 2014, p. 4., 
with reference to Micheal Renov, ‘Surveying the Subject: An Introduction’, in The Subject of the Documentary, Minneapolis, MN 
and London: University of Minnesota Press, pp. xi‒xxiv, 2004, xxii. Rascaroli notes the ubiquity of the term ‘essay film’ and strives 
towards a tighter definition. 
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of these story elements presents a subjective landscape of the character and the 
filmmaker. That I perform in my own work produces a doubling in which the character 
and filmmaker overlap. The ‘story’ in which the protagonist lives, acts as a vehicle to 
maintain the movement of the narrative that is secondary to the content of the voice-
over. Both films use first and third person narration to intentionally complicate the 
identity of the speaker / protagonist / enunciator to foreground the fragmentary nature of 
selfhood that is exposed by the critical framework of the uncanny through the research. 
This is explored further in chapter 6. Although not my conscious intention to make an 
essay film, Unhomely Street and Psychotel both fit Rascaroli’s definition of the 
category. Rascaroli notes that the origins of the essay film lie in a literary tradition of a 
strong enunciator. She recognises the problematic nature of the pronoun ‘I’, that ‘for the 
philosopher, is not an objective fact, a truth to be discovered, but something that must 
be achieved or created, as well as attested’.
141
 Yet she identifies the essay film as 
employing strategies to produce ‘an audiovisual discourse that asks to be experienced 
by the viewer as eminently personal’.
142
 In the essay film ‘meanings are presented by 
the speaking subject as a personal, subjective meditation’ that Rascaroli suggests 




Unhomely Street was completed in 2016 following a three-year period of simultaneous 
conception, production, and editing. The institutional film funding process requires a 
series of formal documents to be produced: a synopsis, outline, treatment, and script, 
which impose a discipline on the writer and provide the funder with material to inform 
their decisions.
144
 What differed for me in undertaking a practice-based Ph.D. was that I 
was able to explore open-ended approaches to production.
145
 When planning Unhomely 
Street, I felt resistant to writing a script but proceeded with the intention to explore how 
I felt about contemporary life. At this stage I did not see the project in a research 
context; rather, the experimental approach taken aimed to extend the initial stage of 
what might be called creative dreaming. Although the project did not proceed with a 
                                                 
141. Rascaroli, The Personal Camera, p. 9. Rascaroli notes the difficulty of producing first-person expression in art and literature 
following the deconstructive and post-structuralist work of Barthes, Derrida and Foucault. 
142. Ibid., pp. 12‒13.  
143. Ibid., p. 36.   
144. While I appreciate this requirement of the commissioning process, this places constraints upon the filmmaker that inevitably 
shape the work in a conventional structure and promote rapid decision making around creative ideas. In my film career I have 
existed on the margins of the film and television industry, having made short films for the BBC and BFI, a commercially distributed 
art house feature film, and dramas for Channel Four. I have been frustrated by the lengthy procedure of funding applications, the 
requirement to finalise the details of a project at an early stage, and filmmaking by committee. Having said that, I have had the 
opportunity to work with some excellent commissioning editors.  
145. By open-ended I mean I was not obliged to describe what I was making while in progress. This allowed for the intuitive, 
emotional, and mysterious aspects of creative production, described herein.  
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research question as such, following Hannes Rickli and Christoph Schenker, the film 
might be framed as a ‘make yourself a picture of the world’ approach.
146
 During the 
planning stages of the project, I sustained a head injury and developed post-concussive 
syndrome that lasted over two years. Unhomely Street became a vehicle that charted the 
course of my recovery from mental illness. This aspect of the narrative only became 
fully apparent in the latter stages of post-production. The film as an artefact offers a 
point of reference to assess the filmmaking process as an agent in my recovery, and the 
representation of a mental illness makes material the subjective experience through the 
audio-visual medium.  
 
The original narrative intention of Unhomely Street was to follow a female protagonist 
in a state of fugue, as she wanders an alienating city underbelly of clubs and free parties. 
The film investigates the position of the outsider; a woman without belongings, 
therefore without identity or more importantly, state registration. The performed 
sequences stem from the original intention to make a loose work of narrative fiction, 
and these scenes provide anchoring points, or filmic punctuation marks. They are 
accompanied by a third-person narration that further stabilises the spectator’s position 
as that of ‘watching a story unfold’. Unhomely Street slides between the representation 
of subjectivity understood according to cinematic conventions of interiority, and 
attempts to render thought images.  
 
At the start of the production I asked friends to talk to camera, against a green screen 
background, about how they felt about capitalism. In the original format these rushes 
amount to documentary interviews. The subsequent artistic transformations signpost the 
sequence as intentionally subjective without obscuring the original content. The 
recorded polemics suggested certain visual treatments. Steve Bollom’s gentle tone and 
succinct performance was suggestive of a tree. Other contributors became a boil, a pool, 
or situated in a pub setting, presented as murky recollections of a previous night’s 
drinking session. The visual effects attempt to render the recollection of drunkenness. 
                                                 
146. In their discussion of various aspects of artistic practices they suggest the artist creates an environment that is comparable to 
that of an experimental system, a term taken from the sphere of scientific research, where the output of the experimental process 
cannot be identified at the outset. The ‘aesthetic thing’, in this case a film, can be understood as an ‘epistemic thing’ in the sense that 
it is a vehicle for the questions explored through the artistic practice. In considering what sort of knowledge the essay film produces 
I reflect on the work as a conduit for the conveyance of emotion. Schenker, Christoph, and Hannes Rickli, Experimentation, 
<https://www.academia.edu/22231863/Experimentation._In_Department_of_Art_and_Media_ZHdK_ed._Practices_of_Experiment





This is not new, rather, operating as filmic short-hand. Thought is multi-sensory, but as 
it has audio / visual quality, the filmic medium provides a platform for the 
representation of mental states. Sequences emerged from material shot without clear 
future usage in mind; underwater footage, material recorded on the Berlin U-Bahn.
147
 
Spoken commentary was recorded as an attempt to generate a stream of consciousness. 
The intention, although vague at the time of recording, was to ad-lib first-person 
material that gave the inner voice the quality of being unmoored. 
 
The film was made in small sections where the footage came together by a process of 
intuitive amalgamation. I was aware of resistance to initiating final assembly as this 
would signal the end of the period of spontaneous creative play. It took two passes and 
one pick-up shoot to take the film from first assembly to completion of the picture edit. 
This act of assembling and subsequent rapid completion of the film was coincidental 
with my recovery from post-concussive syndrome.
148
 It is difficult to assess the extent 
to which this production aided the recovery process, but the act of externalising my 
trauma in the form of a fictional work allowed me to take ownership of the condition. I 
am reminded in this of psychoanalysis as a ‘talking cure’ and Freud’s concept of the 
compulsion to repeat.
149
 Repetition compulsion, originally thought to be a working 
through or re-enactment to bring about mastery of a trauma, was later reviewed by 
Freud as a tendency to return to a previous state from which the idea of the death drive 
originated.
150
 Freud described this as a ‘kind of organic elasticity’.
151
 Acting out 





                                                 
147. Several devices were used in the filming of this project including a GoPro, a phone camera, and a Canon XF100. 
148. I wonder now whether the film would have benefited from a period of rest before completion. It is always tempting to push a 
film to completion whereas distance gained from a few months of not watching it can be very valuable. I worked this principle into 
the production period of Psychotel. As Unhomely Street was also charting my recovery from an unpleasant condition it is 
understandable that I may have worked to engineer its closure. 
149. Sigmund Freud ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, vol. 18, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Hogarth, 1955. 
150. See Sigmund Freud (1914), ‘Remembering, Repeating, Working Through’ The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Hogarth, 1950, pp. 145‒157, 150, 
for Freud’s initial account of repetition compulsion. This understanding of the compulsion to repeat was expanded with the account 
of the fort-da game, and developed into the theory of the death drive, summarised as ‘an urge inherent in organic life to restore an 
earlier state of things [...]’, [original italics], in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)’, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Hogarth, 1955, pp. 269‒338, 
283‒284 (fort-da game), and 308. 
151. Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p. 309. 
152. Freud, ‘Remembering, Repeating, Working Through’, p. 150. 
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Bessel A. van der Kolk explored trauma as repeated on physiologic and 
neuroendocrinologic levels as well as behavioural and emotional.
153
 He writes that 
‘[p]eople who have been exposed to highly stressful stimuli develop long-term 
potentiation of memory tracts that are reactivated at times of subsequent arousal’.
154
 My 
experience of post-concussive syndrome was characterised by obsessive preoccupation 
with atrocity that had little to do with my life. The syndrome resulted from a mechanical 
injury, tissue damage, and disruption to the endocrine system. The visual landscape of 
my subjective experience, which became the content of the film, appeared as a post-hoc 
embellishment arising from trauma. This is compatible with both the psychoanalytic 




Damasio understands the experience of sadness can be simultaneously produced by 
stimulating brain stem nuclei, concluding that emotions, defined as the physiological 
events from which feelings arise, produce emotion-related thoughts, not the other way 
round.
156
 He writes: 
 
 When the emotion sadness is deployed, feelings of sadness instantly follow. In short 
 order, the brain also brings forth the kind of thoughts that normally cause the emotion 
 sadness and feelings of sadness. This is because associative learning has linked 




He comments that this is an approximation of William James’s hypothesis over a 
century ago, that felt emotions are perceived body states.
158
 That bodily response 
precedes emotional response is controversial.
159
  
                                                 
153. Bessel A. van der Kolk, ‘The Compulsion to Repeat the Trauma: Re-enactment, Revictimization, and Masochism’, Psychiatric 
Clinics of North America, vol. 12, no. 2, 1989, 389‒411,  389, <http://www.cirp.org/library/psych/vanderkolk/>, accessed 20 June 
2019. 
154. Kolk, ‘The Compulsion to Repeat the Trauma’, p. 410. 
155. Damasio’s account of the as-if body loop, describes a complex network that combines representations of the body’s interaction 
between the internal and external world, and representations of previous experiences of like situations that he terms ‘somatic 
markers’. These neural events occur below the threshold of consciousness, or enter consciousness as ‘feelings’, in the form of 
thought images. Damasio’s ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ will be further explored in chapter 5. For a full description of somatic 
markers see Damasio, Descartes Error, 1995. 
156. This was discovered by accident when his colleague, treating a patient with Parkinson’s symptoms by introducing electrical 
current via electrodes positioned in a region of the brain stem called the mesencephalon, misplaced an electrode by a couple of 
millimetres and caused the patient to rapidly fall into a state of suicidal hopelessness. The patient had no history of depression and 
seconds after the cessation of the treatment, the patient’s mood returned to normal. Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, 
Sorrow and the Feeling Brain, London: William Heinemann, 2003, p. 66‒69. Damasio’s understanding of the physicality of 
emotions has been contested and it could be argued that ‘the emotion sadness’ is the ‘feeling of sadness’. We know from experience 
that one can make oneself feel sad with deliberate thoughts, however Damasio’s understanding of embodied emotion emphasises the 
chemical nature of the brain and the relation of emotion to this chemistry. 
157. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, p. 71. 
158. Ibid., p. 105.  
159. Karen Simecek describes Damasio’s ‘somatic theory of emotion’ as out-dated, promoting ‘affect theory’ for its ‘greater 
acknowledgment of the entanglement of feeling and thought’. While there is ground for observing the complexity of the relation of 
bodily states and feelings, Damasio’s acknowledgment of a ‘rich two-way network’ indicates his somatic approach comprehends the 





Fig. 25. Unhomely Street still, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
Layered, textured footage was used to make sequences that convey the feeling of 
despair in the midst of post-concussive episodes. The human subject within the frame is 
surrounded by visual material that one might assume is inside the head.
160
 This material 
combines archive footage of war with close up abstract textures and CGI components. 
Although admittedly crude, these sequences communicate interiority to be read as the 
rendering of thought images. In this way the film presents an original representation of 
anxiety episodes associated with post-concussive syndrome.
161
 That images were 
sourced from online archives and information sites introduces the Internet, and the 
media in general, as a player in the anxiety-machine represented.
162
 I question why 
historical atrocities, some of which I have known about for years, became such an 
obsessive focus. The material body is made of cells, each of which individually 
demonstrates an inclination towards survival. A brain injury is likely to promote 
defence action on the part of the psyche and could account for the obsessive anxiety and 
preoccupation with death. If Damasio is correct, then the images in my mind arose from 
my physiological state, but this does not account for the specificity of these images. 
 
The narrative is underpinned by a sense of unrest in the face of the political, social, and 
environmental landscape of the twenty-first century. Derrida’s concept of hauntology is 
introduced through the film’s anachronistic temporal structure, a partially veiled 
narrative suggesting responsibility to those dead and those not yet born, and a character 
who is haunted by the past in the face of the future yet to come. Short extracts from 
Spectres of Marx feature in the closing section of the film describing the human as 
                                                                                                                                               
to the neurosciences. See ‘Affect Theory’, The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory, vol. 26., issue 1., 2018, 205‒224, 206,  
<https://academic.oup.com/ywcct/article-abstract/26/1/205/5067354>, accessed 20 June 2019. 
160. As such these sequences still operate according to filmic convention in which the viewer understands the filmic world through 
alignment with an on-screen protagonist. 
161. I return to this contribution to knowledge, and the contributions of the other films in the conclusion. 
162. I use the word ‘machine’ here in reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term machine to describe interconnected 
systems; the syndrome, the brain, the media, memory, the socio-political climate, environmental circumstances.  
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unheimlich. What post-concussive syndrome bought to the fore was a sense of fragility 
of selfhood. Some time into the illness I reflected upon knowing that I was not always 
like this, but was unable to recall how I had previously felt. With mental illness came an 
uncertainty of who I was and an awareness of the precarious times in which we live.  
 
Some of the atrocities recounted in the voice-over of Unhomely Street are little known. 
They are not dwelt upon, perhaps because they induce shame and fear, and combined 
they amount to humankind’s dark secrets that impact upon the collective living ego like 
Abraham and Torok’s transgenerational phantom. Colin Davis considers the similarities 
between the phantom of Abraham and Torok and the spectre of hauntology.
163
 Derrida’s 
spectre is a deconstructive figure that opens up uncertainty and brings into question the 
self-sufficiency of the living present.
164
 Abraham and Torok see the phantom as the 
presence of a dead ancestor in the living ego.
165
 In Spectres of Marx, Derrida criticises 
Francis Fukuyama’s ‘jubilation of youthful enthusiasm’
166
 reminding us that in the 
1950s he had the ‘bread of the apocalypse’ in his mouth.’
167
 Although eschatological 
contemplation appears as a cross-cultural, pan-historical human tendency, the term 
anthropocene acts as a harbinger of doom.
168
 Regarding the future-to-come, Derrida 
considers whether its expectation prepares for its coming or if it ‘recalls the repetition of 
the same’.
169
 This echoes the sentiment of the film in which historical atrocity becomes 
evidence of an imagined future outcome. When Derrida talks of ‘the extremity of the 
extreme today’
170
, and suggests that the future can only ‘announce’ itself in relation to a 
‘past end’, a ‘last extremity’, he describes a future as informed by the past.
171
 
                                                 
163. Colin Davis, ‘É’tat Présent Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms’, French Studies, vol. 59, no. 3, 373–379, 2005, 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/339962547/Davis-Colin-Etat-Present-Hauntology-Spectres-and-Phantoms >, accessed 8 
September 2017. 
164. See Fredric Jameson, ‘Marx’s Purloined Letter’, in Jacques Derrida and Terry Eagleton et. al., Ghostly Demarcations: A 
Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx, London: Verso, 2008, pp. 26‒67. 
165. I shall return to this phantom in a later discussion of Psychotel. 
166. Derrida, Spectres of Marx,  p. 17. 
167. Ibid., p. 16. When Derrida talks of the ‘apocalyptic tone in philosophy’ he describes Fukuyama as late for the funeral, however, 
this déjà vu can be seen as a growing trend which has been gathering pace in the light of historical events. 
168. The term Anthropocene is widespread among geological scientists and refers to a proposed epoch where human activity 
impacts on the Earth’s ecosystem. There is no official consensus as to the start of the Anthropocene but it is generally thought to be 
arrival of the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century. Although the term itself refers to a proposed geological era, the 
word has doom-laden connotations. 
169. Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p. 45.  
170. Ibid.   
171. Events that became the focus of post-concussive syndrome anxiety were the Holocaust (1941 ‒ 1945), and lesser know 
atrocities of the second Sino-Japanese War (1937‒1945) including the Rape of Nanking and Unit 731, a human experimentation 
research unit that saw the death of an estimated quarter of a million people. Avery Gordon introduces haunting to the field of 
sociology. Although hauntology is not acknowledged as the foundation of this approach, her work on torture, slavery, and state 
managed disappearances exposes the influence of the invisible of the socio-historical field in the contemporary sociological 




Fisher interprets hauntology as characteristic of these times, that we live in an age of 
mental illness, unable to envisage an alternative future.
172
 With reference to popular 
music but also presented as a wider mood of the times, Fisher describes the twenty-first-
century as characterised by ‘a deflation of expectations’, ‘anachronism and inertia’.
173
 I 
account for the negative tone of Unhomely Street in the first instance by the emotions 
resulting from brain damage. The quality of thought images is a representation of that 
tone but the specific content must be attributed to the socio-historic field – Unhomely 
Street is a twenty-first century film and expresses the mood of the times. If one is 
anxious, one must be anxious of something, and in seeking what that of might be, the 




For Heidegger, anxiety is possible ‘because Dasein is anxious in the very ground of its 
being’.
175
 He suggests anxiety is an uncanny feeling that arises from ‘the existential 
“mode” of not-being-at home’.
176
 He sees anxiety as an originary state that makes fear 
possible, a ground from which fear of an external threat can arise.
177
 ‘Not-being-at-
home’ for Heidegger is a ‘more primordial phenomenon’ than the familiar ‘being-in-
the-world’.
178
 Freud distinguishes between mourning and melancholia as the former 
having a specific lost object, whereas for the latter the source of grief is unknown. 
Mourning is understood as a conscious phenomenon while melancholia occurs in the 
unconscious.
179
 It is interesting that Freud suggests in certain cases, toxins may be 
responsible for melancholia. He writes: 
 
 What is probably a somatic factor, and one which cannot be explained 
 psychogenically, makes itself visible in the regular amelioration in this condition that 





                                                 
172. Fisher, ‘Lost Futures’ in Ghosts of My Life, pp. 1‒47. It is with sadness that I re-read this chapter as Mark Fisher tragically lost 
his battle with depression in 2017.  
173. Fisher, Ghosts of My Life, pp. 6‒8. 
174. Here I emphasise a state of seeking rather than a conviction in an underlying source. 
175. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Fundamental Attunement of Anxiety as an Eminent Disclosedness of Dasein’, Being and Time, trans. 
by John Macquarrie and Joan Stambaugh, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2010, pp. 178‒184, 183. 
176. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 182‒83. 
177. Heidegger writes ‘The only threat which can be “fearsome” and which is discovered in fear, always comes from innerworldly 
beings while absorbing itself in them. The turning away of falling prey is rather based on anxiety, which in turn first makes fear 
possible.’ Being and Time, p. 180. [original italics].  
178. Being and Time, p. 183. He writes that ‘[i]n what anxiety is about, the “it is nothing and nowhere” becomes manifest.’ p. 181.  
179. Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, The Theory of Psychoanalysis, vol. 11, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., 
London: Penguin, 1984, pp. 245‒268, 245. 
180. Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, p. 262. 
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Heidegger asserts that anxiety is of nothing and at the same time of the whole of one’s 
world, and Freud describes a state of objectless loss. I suggest my condition, arising 
from physical damage, brought about feelings of anxiety onto which I built a worldview 
to correspond to that feeling. In some ways, hauntology, as accounted by Fisher, 
amounts to a mental ‘flu’ I caught at a time when I was susceptible to illness.
181
 One of 
the defining characteristics of the condition was living in a present that was wholly 
defined by a past (history of atrocity) that would undeniably bring about a certain future 
(repetition of the same). Ultimately living with this view was unsustainable and I found 





Fig. 26. Unhomely Street still, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
The words of Kristeva reflect my feelings when she describes her depression in uncanny 





 I owe a supreme, metaphysical lucidity to my depression. On the frontiers of life and 
 death, occasionally I have the arrogant feeling of being witness to the meaninglessness 




With the view that the power of destructive forces has never appeared as unquestionable 
and unavoidable as now,
185
 she describes a perverse aspect to the depressive affect, 
often visible in works of art, that fills a void and evicts death,
186
 and later indicates that 
this ‘taming’ of sorrow, and allowing grief to settle, may be a defensive act to protect 
                                                 
181. I have since discussed my state of mind during that time and found a correlation with others. Two of the cast of Unhomely 
Street were anxious to a point of problematic preoccupation with an impending unravelling of society resulting from over-
population, displacement following the effects of climate change, and the rise of fascism. Both considered capitalism to be at the 
heart of these issues. Others have reported feeling like this for a duration but ‘recovering’ to an extent that their anxiety did not 
adversely affect their daily lives.  
182. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1982, p. 3. 
183. Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 3. 
184. Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 4. 
185. Ibid., p. 221.  





 She asks whether the ‘beautiful object’, the work of art, can be sad, and 
whether this beauty follows war and destruction as testament to the possibility of 




Reflecting upon my choices in the final section of the film I consider whether the 
sounds and images used were indicative of an improved mental state or if they assisted a 
progressive move. Deleuze and Guattari describe the refrain as a territorialising 
assemblage, referencing the child in the dark whispering a tune as comfort, birdsong as 
a claim to territory, the drinking song, and the choir as acts of unity.
189
 I point to 
similarities between dance and the refrain in terms of intersubjectivity, something 
included in a presentation by Lara Maister at the New Scientist Consciousness 
conference, who noted pro-social effects in activities with synchronised group 
movement including dance and tai chi.
190
 Dance can be a war dance, intended to rouse 
spirits before battle, or a territorial statement that marks a personal space and regional 
boundary. It can also be a uniting gesture, and pro-social in the sense described by 
Maister. Dance is a primitive, non-linguistic form of communication, one that one can 
only assume is dangerous, given the number of cultures across history that have sought 
to control or ban it. The dance that concludes Unhomely Street recognises these modes.  
 
Deleuze identifies major stages of Bergson’s oeuvre: ‘Duration, Memory, Élan Vital’, 
and ‘Intuition’ as method.
191
 Bergson’s understanding of intuition, as outlined by 
Deleuze, proposes that perception and recollection ‘interpenetrate’ by ‘a process of 
osmosis’.
192
 Deleuze writes:  
 
 The Bergsonian revolution is clear: We do not move from the present to the past, from 





                                                 
187. Ibid., p. 84‒5.  
188. Ibid., p. 97‒8.  
189. Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brain Massumi, Mark Seem 
and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 319. 
190. Patrick Haggard et. al., ‘Consciousness’ conference, The New Scientist Live, London: The British Library, 2015. 
191. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York, NY: Zone Books, 1997, p. 13. For 
Deleuze, ‘Bergson forms part of a “counter-history”’ that he identifies with and whose work has provided materials for Deleuze’s 
‘tool box’. According to Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, translators of Bergsonism, Deleuze sees philosophy as ‘a kind of 
buggery,’ in which a ‘child’, a hybrid is made from the union of two philosophers. Deleuze writes: ‘I imagined myself getting into 
the back of an author, and giving him a child, which would be his and which would at the same time be a monster. It is very 
important that it should be his child, because the author actually had to say everything that I made him say.’ See Deleuze, 
Bergsonism, p. 8. 
192. Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 26. 
193. Ibid., p. 63.  
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Bergson sees the present as ‘pure becoming’.
194
 He understands a ‘past in general’ 
through which ‘all presents pass’.
195
 Duration is more about coexistence than 
succession.
196
 He reminds us that the present is never experienced by the individual. 
What is experienced is always the very recent past. The present is ‘the indivisible unit 




Filmmaking involves a process of selection. Selection is motivated by emotion in an 
attempt to capture material that will generate specific feelings. Bergson’s understanding 
of intuition relates to perception in general so far as we bring previous experience to 
perception. Intuition in filmmaking involves selecting material according to emotional 
response that is led by past experience, including that of cinema. Factors influencing 
intuitive selection are frequently nonconscious in the manner discussed in the previous 
chapter in relation to artistic and mathematical inspiration. In alignment with 
psychoanalysis, intuition as method suggests that the past of the individual, including 
the resolution of childhood complexes, exerts influence on the present. Yet Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus arose from a perceived shortcoming that psychoanalysis 
reinforces the existing social code based on familial lines, domestication, and 
repression.
198
 For them psychoanalysis contributes to reinforcing power relations.
199
 
Their concept schizoanalysis examines the related flows of capital and flows of desire to 
question how one can desire one’s own repression. In short ‘[i]ts goal is the 
transformation of human relationships in a struggle against power.’
200
 Drawing on Marx 





Unhomely Street represents anxiety of human brutality and atrocity. The psychoanalytic 
uncanny points to a return of the repressed of childhood complexes and the fragmented 
self. Schizoanalysis speaks of the subjugated individual whose desire is aligned with the 
flows of capital. The historical events referenced in the film point to war as both a 
capitalist industry (sale of weapons) and a territorial endeavour (access to resources), 
                                                 
194. Ibid., p. 55.  
195. Ibid., p. 59.  
196. Ibid., p. 60.  
197. Henri Bergson (1896), Matter and Memory, trans. by Nancy M. Paul and W. Scott Palmer, Oxford: Pantianos Classics, 1911, 
p. 96. 
198. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 15.  
199. Ibid., p. 73.  
200. Ibid., p. xxiii.  
201. Ibid., p. 83.  
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with killing as a mechanistic process. The Oedipal narrative is one of sex and death. 
Breeding grounds and killing fields. Capitalism promotes growth that exposes 
humankind’s tendency to expand and consume, and this is the thinly veiled horror story 
of the unconscious collective psyche.  
 
The cellar sequence was the last to be constructed and was the only shot to be added in 
the final edit. Here the question is asked: ‘Is all this killing really necessary?’ 
 
 





















POINTING THE BONE: A REVIEW OF METAPHOR  
Metaphor repeatedly breaks into the temple of stable meaning  
(which, as we know, is an ideological construct based on consensus)  
and drinks to the dregs what it finds there while somehow resisting 
being incorporated into the ceremony.202  
 
Avice Benner Cho, the protagonist of China Miéville’s Embassytown, is ‘the girl who 
was hurt in darkness and ate what was given to her’.
203
 Miéville’s sci-fi fiction reveals 
Lacanian linguistic theory through a tale of the Ariekei, an alien race whose language is 
a pure and direct experience of being. The Ariekei cannot lie as ‘each word is a funnel, 
[...] an opening. A door, through which the thought of that referent, the thought itself 
that reached for the word, can be seen.’
204
 As they can only speak of things they have 
experienced, to extend their thinking and communication they must create metaphor 
through performed scenarios. Avice, as a child, was used to make a simile. To begin: 
There was a human girl who in pain ate what she was given her in an old room built for 
eating in which eating had not happened for a long time.
205
 In time this became; ‘the girl 
who ate what was given her.’ Performing a simile was an honour, and although 





Metaphor in the narrow sense is an aspect of language learned by the individual born 
into a languaged culture. It can also be understood as a description of a mental process, 
an associational tendency that underpins all our thinking, of which linguistic metaphor 
is just one aspect. This second understanding of metaphor appears to reverse Lacan’s 
assertion ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’ in that language reveals the 
structure of thought.
207
 Lacan draws on metaphoric and metonymic processes as 
evidence of the ‘primacy of the signifier’, by equating them with Freud’s concepts of 
                                                 
202. Rolf Hughes, ‘The poetics of practice-based research writing’, The Journal of Architecture, vol. 11, issue 3, 2006, 283‒301, p. 
296. 
203. China Miéville, Embassytown, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 394. I read this book after not having read any fiction for over 
three years. It was recommended by my Director of Studies at a time when I was reading Lacan. I found it hugely stimulating and 
gave myself permission to read some fiction thereafter.  
204. Miéville, Embassytown, p. 62. 
205. Ibid., p. 28.  
206. Ibid., p. 187.  
207. Jacques Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconcious, or Reason Since Freud’, Écrits, trans. by Bruce Fink, London: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2006, pp. 412‒441. In this chapter Lacan details his theory of the structure of language and its relation 
to the unconscious. The phrase itself, ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’, is a contraction of this theory frequently used 





 Ideational representatives are, for Freud, that which 
can be repressed. For Lacan they are ‘representatives of the representation’ and can be 
equated with linguistic signifiers.
209
 This underpins Lacan’s equation of the unconscious 
with language.
210
 Language is the root of the Lacanian symbolic order in that the 
individual only becomes a subject once they have entered language. Bruce Fink clarifies 
that for Lacan ‘the subject is a relationship to the symbolic order’.
211
 In this sense the 




The mirror phase, from which the Lacanian subject emerges, involves a misrecognition 
of the specular image and subsequent denial of the inner experience of the ‘felt’ bodily 
self over the external image of self.
213
 This process of primary Lacanian repression, 
from which the unconscious is formed in early childhood, was later described by Lacan 
as an ongoing psychical process.
214 
The commencement of this stage coincides with a 
period in infancy when synaptic pruning occurs, a process that removes unnecessary 
structures to streamline connectivity in the brain by axon and dendrite elimination based 
on usage. This process is not uniquely human. A second stage in the formation of the 
subject occurs with the recognition that the mother has desire beyond the child. Lacan 
refers to this desire as the phallus.
215
 Initially the child wishes to be the phallus, that is, 
be the sole object of the mother’s desire. With the father’s presence it is apparent that 
the child cannot be the phallus, and thus the child enters and gains its place in the 
                                                 
208. Lacan’s hypothesis originates in Freud’s dream work, that which reveals the mechanism at work in the unconscious. Lacan 
aligns condensation to metaphor and displacement to metonym. Condensation describes the reduction of a volume of meaning 
within the dream to a reduced series of images or ideas. Lacan aligns condensation to metaphor as a signifying substitution that 
replaces one signifier for another. This replacement, by the introduction of another signifier expands the original idea and thus a 
multitude of meanings can be condensed into a single signifying unit. For Freud this was the difference between the latent and 
manifest content of the dream. Displacement refers to a process whereby the manifest content of the dream is obscured. For Freud 
this obscurement is a defensive act of repression. Metonym, the use of an element of the whole to convey meaning corresponds to 
Freud’s idea of displacement. See Joël Dor, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious is Structured like a Language, 
New York, NY: Other Press, 2004, for an in depth account. 
209. Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 8. 
210. Metaphor and metonym are conventionally understood as conceptual substitution. For Lacan they demonstrate the autonomy of 
the signifer over the signified, or the dominance of word-meanings over things, and show how, through words, meaning is made.  
211. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, pp. xi‒xii. 
212. Given that the subject is otherwise ordinarily a term that is interchangeable with self and ego, Fink points to the Lacanian 
‘definition’ of subject as ‘that which one signifier represents to another signifier,’ is unintuitive. Ibid., p. xi. Fink clarifies Lacan’s 
position in simple terms: ‘Other people’s views and desires flow into us via discourse. In that sense, we can interpret Lacan’s 
statement that the unconscious is the Other’s discourse in a very straightforward fashion: the unconscious is full of other people’s 
talk, other people’s conversations, and other people’s goals, aspirations, and fantasies (in so far as they are expressed in words).’ 
Ibid., pp. 9‒10. Original italics. 
213. The Lacanian Mirror Stage is explored in detail in Dany Nobus ‘Life and Death in the Glass: A New Look at the Mirror 
Stage’, in Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, ed. by Dany Nobus, London: Rebus Press, 1998, pp. 101‒138. Lacan 
originally presented the Mirror Stage at the Fourteenth International Psychoanalytical Congress at Marienbad in 1936, 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_stage>, accessed 26 November 2015. 
214. Recent experiments that have shown non-human animals recognise themselves in the mirrors. Experiments have been 
performed on primates, cetaceans and magpies, all of which, when an odourless coloured dot is placed in a position on the animal’s 
body that it would be unable to see without a mirror, on the forehead in the case of a chimp, behind a flipper on a dolphin and under 
the beak of the corvus (some of the animals were anesthetised for this to be done so they could not be aware of the application of the 
dot) all have exhibited behaviour including scratching, sniffing and looking to inspect the mark on their body. For a brief overview 
see <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/05/0502_dolphinvanity.html>, accessed 26 November 2015. 
215. This is not the penis of the father although the relation of the phallus to the penis is ambiguous. 
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symbolic order. The name of the father is the primal metaphor and demonstrates the 
way in which language functions to structure the psyche of the individual. What is 
emphasised in the Lacanian framework is the formation of the individual in relation to 
others and that that relation is born of and enabled through language, which pre-exists in 
the cultural field into which the individual is born. The structure of language shapes the 




Lacan uses the term langage to mean the structure of language and langue to refer to a 
specific language such as French. He is mainly concerned with langage and its general 
structures, and he makes further distinction between langage and parole, the speech act. 
He later coins the terms lalangue, ‘the primary chaotic substrate of polysemy out of 
which language is constructed’.
217
 Lacan’s emphasis on language is justified from a 
clinical point of view as it is the means of exchange between analyst and analysand; 
however, his opposition of lalangue and langage as corresponding to chaos and 
structure, brought together by metaphoric and metonymic processes, invites 
consideration of the creative process and language ‒ of the language of art practice.  
 
Lacan’s linguistic formula draws on Saussure who posited the linguistic sign as 
comprised of a concept image and a sound image. Saussure describes the sound image 
as a ‘psychological imprint’.
218
 Saussure’s choice of descriptive terms suggests a neural 
map. He is cautious not to suggest that the sound image is material as such, but he says 
it makes a sensory impression, and inherent in the idea is retention and the potential for 
recall of that impression. Summarising Saussure, Joël Dor writes: ‘The linguistic sign 
thus appears as a “psychic entity with two sides,” whose two components are 
established from the beginning in an associative relation.’
219
 Fink writes: ‘A slip of the 
tongue immediately reminds us that more than one discourse can use the same 
mouthpiece at the same time.’
220
 Fink suggests two different types of talk are ego talk 
                                                 
216. This connection between language and the structure of thought underpins Lacan’s understanding that the unconscious is 
structured like a language, and his later refinement that the unconscious is language.  
217. Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 97. La lalangue, although 
not a language as such is specified as the maternal tongue. The musicality of the word (la la) corresponds to the infant’s first words. 
See Dominique Simonney, ‘Lalangue en Questions’, Essaim, vol. 29, no. 2, 7‒16, p. 7. 
218. Dor, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan, p. 24. 
219. Ibid. Original italics.   
220. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 3. In this we are reminded of Miéville’s Ariekei who literally have two mouthpieces. It is also 
pertinent to Michael Robbin’s theory of primordial consciousness that I introduce later in this chapter. 
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and some other kind of talk, which come respectively from different psychological 




Using brain imaging technology to study patients with neurological damage it is now 
known that the neural correlates of language are dispersed across the two hemispheres. 
The brain regions concerned with word formation are not the same as those that deal 
with linguistic comprehension.
222
 This is apparent in stroke victims with aphasia who 
retain the ability to sing. It is proposed that music pre-dates speaking, and that the 





Dor points to the influence of Roman Jakobson in Lacanian theory. Jakobson identifies 
two linguistic operations at work when we speak; selection and combination.
224
 He 
refers to patients with aphasia whose difficulties show in either word choice (selection) 
or connecting terms (combination), whose compensatory approaches highlight 
metaphor and metonym as two types of operations; when word choice or selection is 
impaired, the aphasic chooses words that bear a relation of contiguity, and when 




Andreas Mavromatis, in his study of Hypnogogia, illustrates how frames of reference 
using metaphor and analogy are at work in the semi-conscious state. He gives an 
example of hypnopompic speech whereby a woman on waking asked her husband to 
‘light the towel’. She meant ‘draw the curtains’, alluding to the shape and quality of 




Saussure sees language as a ‘flux’ of concepts and sounds. He describes this as like two 
sides to a sheet of paper and makes the analogy of the meaning of the linguistic sign 
resembling the cut in the paper that interrupts the flux. Lacan modifies Saussure’s 
                                                 
221. Ibid.   
222. Discussed in a BBC programme ‘My Brain and Me’, broadcast 14 February 2017, 9pm, BBC 2, with the presenter Andrew 
Marr who had suffered a stroke in 2013.  
223. This view is outlined by Massey who makes reference to Flamand, Darwin, Nietzsche, although it is speculative. The 
suggestion, in brief, is that emotional noise such as a cry of pain came first followed by rhythm-based expressive sound followed by 
language, however this is not known. Irving Massey, The Neural Imagination: Aesthetic and Neuroaesthetic Approaches to the Arts, 
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2009, p. 123. 
224. Dor, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan, p. 31. 
225. Ibid., p. 32.  
226. Andreas Mavromatis, Hypnogogia: The Unique State of Consciousness Between Wakefulness and Sleep, London: Thyrsos 
Press, 2010, p. 165. This example is from Mintz, A. ‘Schizophrenic Speech and Sleepy Speech’, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
1948, 43, 548‒9. 
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analogy and replaces the flux of thought and the flux of sound with the flux of 
signifieds and the flux of signifiers, and replaces the notion of the ‘cut’ with the 
‘anchoring point’.
227
 Lacan’s point is that the sign only makes sense retroactively; sense 
is made from the sequential connections of signifiers and signifieds.
 228
 The point at 
which the meaning of an utterance is delivered is the Lacanian point de capiton.
229
 This 
idea may be common to the thought of the listener but it is worth considering the flux of 
language of the speaker who does not speak a rehearsed, meaningful utterance, rather 
meaning is revealed through the act of speaking. This is also the case with artistic 
practice.  
 
For the Ariekei language is a direct communication of emotion. Although art practice 
involves reflection, it is often experienced as an emergent and affective activity as 
discussed in the previous chapter. When Dor refers to the ‘primordial character of the 
signifier’, that is, evidenced by the metaphoric and metonymic processes of discourse, 
the term primordial in relation to the thought-image, flux of thought, or concept as 
opposed to the sound-image adds weight to the idea of the primacy of pre-linguistic, 
non-word based communication.
230
 Lacan writes: ‘We see that metaphor is situated at 




In their study of the human conceptual system cognitive scientists George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson explore metaphorical and nonmetaphorical structure.
232
 They identify 
nonmetaphorical structure as stemming directly from experience, giving examples of 
spatial orientations such as UP‒DOWN, NEAR‒FAR, IN‒OUT, and metaphorical 
concepts are understood and structured both on their own terms and in terms of other 
concepts.
233
 They contest classical language theory that understands metaphor as ‘novel 
or poetic linguistic expression’,
234
 stating: ‘The generalisations governing poetic 
metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in thought: They are general 
                                                 
227. Dor, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan, pp. 38‒9. 
228. As a brief aside I am reminded in this of the role of the observer in the quantum experiment. 
229. The point de capiton is translated as the ‘anchoring’ or ‘quilting’ point with reference to the seamstresses needle that secures 
the otherwise mobile material of a quilt. See <https://nosubject.com/Point_de_capiton >, accessed 17 June 2019. 
230. Dor, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan,p. 43. 
231. Lacan, Écrits, p. 423. 
232. When Derrida writes ‘there is no nonmetaphoric language’ his understanding of writing is in a broader sense than here. See 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 73. 
233. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, ‘The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System’, Cognitive Science, vol. 4, 
1980, 195‒208, pp. 195‒196. Examples of orientational metaphors like UP‒DOWN include ‘Good is UP’: ‘Things are looking up’, 
‘Things are at an all-time low.’ Ontological metaphors include ‘Ideas are Entities and Words are Containers’ : ‘It’s hard to get that 
idea across’, ‘Try to pack more ideas into fewer words’, and ‘The Mind is a Container’, ‘I can’t get the tune out of my mind’, ‘He’s 
empty-headed’. 
234. George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’, in Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 1. 
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mappings across conceptual domains.’
235
 Lakoff makes reference to Michael Reddy’s 
paper ‘The Conduit Metaphor’, writing: 
 
 Reddy showed, for a single very significant case, that the locus of metaphor is thought, 
 not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, 
 conventional way of conceptualising the world, and that our everyday behaviour reflects 




Lakoff describes everyday language, not ordinarily considered to be metaphorical 
speech, an example being ‘our relationship has hit a dead end’. He points to this as an 
example of LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. Other examples include: ‘We’re at a 
cross roads’, and ‘We may have to go our separate ways’.
237
 He writes: 
 
 What constitutes the LOVE-AS-JOURNEY metaphor is not any particular word or 
 expression. It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source 
 domain  of journeys to the target domain of love. The metaphor is not just a matter of 
 language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is 
 primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference patterns 




Lakoff and Johnson show how multiple metaphors are employed for single concepts. 
Examples include:  
 ‘Ideas are Plants’: ‘His ideas have finally come to fruition’, ‘His ideas died on 
the vine’. 
 ‘Ideas are Resources’: ‘He ran out of ideas’, ‘That idea will go a long way’.  
 ‘Ideas are Food’: ‘What he said left a bad taste in my mouth’, ‘This is the meaty 
part of the paper’. 
They note some metaphors used for the same concept are contradictory: 
 ‘Ideas are Cutting Instruments’: ‘That’s an incisive idea’, ‘That was a cutting 
remark’. 
 ‘Ideas are People’: ‘This concept is the brainchild of one of our finest 
executives’, ‘Edward Teller is the father of the hydrogen bomb’. 
                                                 
235. Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’, p. 1.   
236. Ibid., p. 2.  
237. Ibid., p. 3.  
238. Ibid., p. 6.  
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That people are not also cutting instruments demonstrates that metaphors do not provide 
consistent definitions, however it is this flexibility and breadth of conceptual mapping 




Irving Massey, on The Neural Imagination, writes: 
 
 When thought gropes its way into articulated experience, it has no guide: there is 
 nothing to tell it what forms to assume. On striking the barrier that isolates it from 
 expression, it bursts into a spray of possibilities or images, something like an energetic 




Massey considers a function of creative thought to be advantageous in evolutionary 
terms, as natural selection shows adaptability to have survival advantage. The work of 
art provides a view that is different to ordinary perception.
241
 For him art seeks 
essences, metaphor provides access to essence, and metaphors are ‘incubators of 
ideas’.
242
 Massey acknowledges that dreams are pre-linguistic in evolutionary terms, 
noting that during sleep the linguistic centres of the brain are inactive.
243
 He proposes 
that dream language ‘represents an undertow in all our expression’.
244
 Metaphoric 
perception, that could be aligned with artistic practice, promotes novel associations.
245
 
What Massey calls dream language resembles Lacan’s lalange.  
 
Derrida’s project, Of Grammatology, explores an understanding of writing beyond 
speech and its written form. With reference to J. Gernet he notes the Chinese word for 
writing, wen, designates outside the narrow sense of writing to include veins in wood 
and stone, the tracks of birds and animals, and designs on a turtle’s shell.
246
 In the 
translator’s preface, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak references Nietzsche: ‘Thinking in 
primitive conditions (preorganic) is the pushing through of forms as in crystals.’
247
 
Derrida understands writing in the same sense: ‘the biologist speaks of writing and of 
pro-gram for the most elementary processes of information within the living cell’.
248
 
Spivak clarifies: ‘“Writing,” then, is the name of the structure always already inhabited 
                                                 
239. Lakoff and Johnson, ‘The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System’, pp.199‒200. 
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241. Ibid., p. 43.  
242. Ibid., p. 93.  
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245. Ibid., p. 96.  
246. See Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 134. 
247. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. xli. 





 Spivak uses the term trace to retain an alignment with the original; 
however, she notes that in French the word has connotations of a track and a spoor. 
What Derrida reveals is the absence of anything other than the trace. Derrida writes: 
‘What writing itself betrays, in its nonphonetic moment, is life.’
250
 Spivak notes a 
mainstay of Derrida’s project, ‘the opposition between metaphor and truth ‒ metaphor 
as a detour to truth,  truth as “outside itself” in the borrowed dwelling of a metaphor, but 
also “itself”, since metaphor points at its own truth.’
251
 Here we have an unhomely 
metaphor with the suggestion of the ‘guest’ in a borrowed, transient dwelling. Derrida 
describes metaphor as ‘the process of the idea’.
252
 He writes that ‘[t]he idea is the 
signified meaning, that which the word expresses. But it is also a sign of the thing, a 




David E. Cooper clarifies that Derrida does not present metaphor as a multiplicity of 
meaning from which the reader must decipher the intended meaning, rather it is a 
‘reservoir of meaning’.
254
 The distinction is subtle, to be understood in the manner in 
which Derrida speaks of discourse in general, that denies something ‘present’ to 
consciousness. Cooper highlights Derrida’s emphasis on metaphor as indeterminable, or 
‘undecidable’, and as having ‘incalculable effects’. He writes that ‘metaphors are 
themselves caught up with one another in a vast web, the use of any one of which 
reverberates, as it were, through the whole.’
255
 This understanding builds a bond 
between metaphor and creative practice as inventive, emergent, and flexible. 
 
Derrida’s trace and Lacan’s Lalangue speak of primordial structures.
256
 Massey 
describes metaphor as the undertow of thinking. Metaphor in its broadest sense can be 
viewed as an aspect of this structure, an associative tendency. Massey writes; 
 
 if the purpose of the [...] arts is to encourage me to say what I, and only I, can contribute 
 to human experience, then a private language says it best, even if, paradoxically, no one 




                                                 
249. Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’, p. lix. 
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251. Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’, p. xcvii.  
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253. Ibid. 
254. David E. Cooper, ‘Metaphor and Derrida’s Philosophy of Language’, in Derrida’s Legacies: Literature and Philosophy, edited 
by Simon Glendinning and Robert Eaglestone, Oxon: Routledge, 2008, pp. 45‒53, 47‒8. 
255. Cooper, ‘Metaphor and Derrida’s Philosophy of Language’, p. 48. 
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The psychoanalyst Michael Robbins presents a hypothesis that humans have two 
qualitatively different types of consciousness. In contrast to Freud he stresses these two 
mental states are conscious, not unconscious. Both use language in different ways. 
Robbins identifies ‘primordial consciousness’, that which commences in utero and uses 
the ‘mother tongue’, or ‘motherese’.
258
 From this a second language develops, that of 
‘reflective representational thought’.
259
 He notes that primordial consciousness and its 
language continues throughout adult life and aspects of language may have different 
meaning depending on which mental process is in use. Primordial consciousness is seen 
in dreams, at work in creative practice, and evident in schizophrenia and other mental 
disorders. Robbins writes that primordial consciousness forms evanescent images that 
are concrete, not representations of ideas. It is a language of body expression and 
sensation. Its narrative consists of images linked by affect tones and somatic sensations 
rather than logical sequences. These are stimulus bound, neither abstract nor 
symbolic.
260
 Robbins notes a close correlation between his idea of primordial 
consciousness and Freud’s primary process. Primordial consciousness lacks the 
differentiation of self and other and is the primary mode of early life. In this way it is 
aligned with Lacan’s Lalangue, and the idea of the mirror stage.
261
 Robbins understands 
the modus operandi of creativity to be primordial consciousness. He illuminates his 
theory with reference to Bob Dylan whose lyrics he suggests arise from ‘a concrete 
undifferentiated state of psychomotor actualization of which the words and breath are a 
part.’
262
 In short, the activities and outputs of creative practice are things in themselves. 
They are not symbolic or representational. Interpreting creative outputs in terms of 
reflective representational consciousness requires a process of translation. The actions 
of primordial consciousness are what they are and their meaning is the effect they have 
on their viewer / receiver. They communicate.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari liken nature and art as both combine ‘two living elements’: 
‘House and Universe, Heimlich and Unheimlich’.
263
 They understand the ‘frame’ as the 
                                                 
258. Michael Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self: Psychoanalytic, Linguistic, and Anthropological Explorations of the 
Dual nature of Mind, New York, NY: Routledge, 2018, p. 25‒6. ‘Motherese’ is also known as ‘baby talk’ and IDL or ‘infant 
directed language’. 
259. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, pp. 1‒2. Robbins hypothesises that primordial consciousness begins when REM 
is first detected in utero.  
260. Ibid., p. 12.  
261. There is no single version of the mirror phase and its effects continue into adult life. Similarly primordial consciousness returns 
throughout adult life; however, the initial manifestations of the effects of these stages coincide. These ideas will be further explored 
in chapter 6. 
262. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, p. 43.  
263. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 186. 
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‘umbilicus that attaches the picture to the moment of which it is a reduction’.
264
 
Metaphor abounds in this description of art’s relation to the lived moment; the interior 
body, the exterior universe and the house as a frame that passes between the two. ‘Art 
thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts.’
265
 Deleuze 
and Guattari clarify that affects and percepts are not to be confused with perceptions and 
feelings.
266
 This distinction between the primary material of the creative process, 
‘perceptions and feelings’ and the abstract outcome of affects and percepts (that may or 
may not coalesce around an artefact), points to the plane on which metaphor operates. 
 
In this central chapter I have drawn together ideas towards an understanding of the 
psyche and its relation to language. This has been an exercise in finding associations 
rather than a progressive manoeuvre towards a conclusion. These thoughts on metaphor 
and primordial consciousness provide a foundation to think further about creative 
practice as an affect-led process that communicates and contributes to knowledge in and 
of itself.  
 
Guy Claxton, on the history of the unconscious, writes: 
 
 When we try to look downwards into the ‘darkling pool’ of our own minds, we see only 
 metaphors reflected in the surface. So we need the best, the most accurate, the most 
 helpful images we can find. New images of the relationship between consciousness and 
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PSYCHOTEL, GROUND FLOOR: CHECK-IN 
The Blind Narrator and the Organic Uncanny 
The cry of quail and the whirling plover 
And the blind eye creates 




Psychotel was proposed by my director of studies, Sharon Kivland, who suggested I 
make a filmic equivalent of an academic chapter on the uncanny.
269
 I did not wish to 
make a documentary in which the content of the text was replaced by the spoken voice 
and the uncanny was explained. I did, however, want to refer to the uncanny as a critical 
framework and ‘philosophically significant form of disquiet’.
270
 Nor did I wish to make 
a conventionally narrative film in which the audience experienced the uncanny through 
the surrogacy of the on-screen protagonist. Psychotel explores the uncanny through 
stories, images, sound, quotations, and presents the hotel as a metaphor for the psyche. 
An oddity of the psyche is that the same mechanism observes as well as experiences. 
This mental doubling is presented throughout the film in image sequences and use of 
voice-over. 
 
The working title of Psychotel was The Guest in the Hotel. This was prompted by 
Freud’s comment ‘the ego is not master in its own house’.
271
 Claxton asks ‘is the mind 
like an abattoir, with a clean, bright reception area, and thick sound-proofing to prevent 
the ruckus of suffering from penetrating into the foyer?’
272
 From these descriptions 
came the idea to filmically explore the uncanny through the metaphor of the hotel with a 
front of house reception area and hidden service regions.
273
 I shot footage of rooms and 
corridors I stayed in between 2016 and 2018, including hotels in Helsinki, Oberhausen, 
Brussels, and Liverpool. I later visited the Long Mynd hotel in Church Stretton, 
                                                 
268. T. S. Elliot, ‘Ash Wednesday’, in T. S. Elliot: A selection by the Author, p. 90. Extract. 
269. I was initially resistant as I felt uneasy about filmmaking from a starting point of theory. In chapter 2 I made the point that 
films employing audio-visual language to discuss concepts often engage poorly with cinematic language. 
270. Gordon C.F. Bearn, ‘Wittgenstein and the Uncanny’, Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, vol. 76, no. 1, 1993, 29‒58, p. 
48, referenced in Royle, The Uncanny, p. 4. 
271. Sigmund Freud, ‘A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-analysis’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 
vol. 17. London: Vintage, 2001, p. 143. Similarly, Withy describes the human essence in her account of the uncanny in the work of 
Heidegger: ‘The human being remains inside, or in relation to, its essence, but in such a way that it is off-center or out-of-joint in its 
essence ‒ like a guest in someone else’s home,’ Withy, Heidegger: On Being Uncanny, p. 138. 
272. Claxton, The Wayward Mind, p. 3.  
273. Joanna Walsh draws on similar material in a book that combines psychoanalysis and autobiographical material of life as a hotel 
reviewer. I came across Hotel through recommendation when I was in production with Psychotel. The voice of the hotel in 
Psychotel says ‘I meet your desires so long as you desire what I have to offer.’ Although not a quote, this is close in tone to Walsh’s 
text. See Joanna Walsh, Hotel, London: Bloomsbury, 2017.  
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Shrewsbury, the Grand and the Clifton in Scarborough, and acquired permission to film 
the service regions of the Victoria Hotel in Sheffield.  
I edited the film in blocks and identify three main stages of post-production. Two years 
before I started my Ph.D. I was considering a film that explored the uncanny and 
experimented with a cut and paste text combining ‘Das “Unheimlich”’, and The 
Sandman.
274
 The filming remained as rushes until 2016, due to my lack of the post-
production skills to effectively deal with the footage, and because I was uncertain how 
to approach the film. In 2015 I was involved in a group book project.
275
 My 
contribution, entitled Removed from the Eyes, employed a cut and paste method from a 
wider variety of uncanny texts.
276
 The text produces a halting sensation as it shifts from 
one author to another, and the overall narrative produces a feeling of uncertainty by 
making partial sense. Despite the text being comprised of half sentences, it confers a 
quantity of academic content and the general impression of these uncanny texts 
emerges. The images are green screen video footage combined with photographs of 
mirrors, processed in Photoshop in a method similar to the film post-production. 
  
Fig. 28. ‘Removed from the Eyes’, in The Editions II., Pages 8, 12, and 18, Susannah Gent 
 
                                                 
274. E. T. A. Hoffman (1817), ‘The Sandman’, in Tales of E. T. A. Hoffmann, ed. Leonard J. Kent and Elizabeth C. Knight, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1972.  
275. The Editions II, published by MA Bibliothèque, edited by Sharon Kivland, with contributors from the Ph.D. and MA, ADRC, 
2014/5 cohort from Sheffield Hallam University. Launched at the London Artist’s Book Fair, Whitechapel Gallery 2015, it is in the 
collection of Tate Britain library and archives, the CdLA, France, and has been exhibited at Volumes, Independent Publishing Fair 
in Zurich, the Vox Populi gallery, Philadelphia, and is in the Floating Library collection, Minnesota. 
276. See appendix 2. 
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I used this book as a starting point for another shoot – my head and shoulders against a 
white background and read sections of a new cut and paste text taken from a wider 
range of sources.
277





Fig. 29. Psychotel stills: ‘transgenerational phantom’, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
 
Fig. 30. Un Chein Andalou stills, dir. Luis Buñuel 
 
I have removed the eyes from the faces.
279
 Without being conscious of this at the time I 




The first edit of the film ground to a halt in July 2017. I had edited much of the footage 
and while I was pleased with a few sequences, overall it felt directionless and was oddly 
funny. I am not a good actor and the florid quality of the language used in ‘Das 
“Unheimlich”’, and The Sandman accentuated this melodramatic performance. At this 
stage the position of the eye patches varied, and some showed the eyebrows. These 
sequences were especially comical. As I have worked on the film these sections have 
become reduced and increasingly processed. In an attempt to make the effect more 
subtle I combined the image with an old mirror, reminiscent of the horror films I 
                                                 
277. Bearn, ‘Wittgenstein and the Uncanny’, Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, Masschelein, The Unconcept, Hoffman, The Sandman, Chou 
Ying-Hsiung, ‘Can the Uncanny be Represented?’, The American Journal of Semiotics, 23, 2007, Cixous, ‘Fiction and its Phantoms, 
Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to Literary Genre, 
<http://www2.ups.edu/faculty/jlago/sp411/html/unit1/unit1_01.htm>, accessed 29 June 2015, Royle, The Uncanny, Nicholas 
Middleton, Photography & The Uncanny, 2005, <http://www.nicholasmiddleton.co.uk/thesis/thesis2.html>, accessed 30 June 2015. 
278. Zinnia Gent-Salmon aged 9, Susannah Gent aged 47, and Hilary Gent aged 77. 
279. This was done in Adobe After Effects by motion tracking the face, making a Photoshop file of the cheeks, and ‘parenting’ the 
cheeks to the motion track to fix the cheeks on the face and cover the eyes. 







watched as a young teenager.
281
 As these sequences were originally designed to add 
uncanny content, when reduced they lose their function. Instead these repetitious shots 
produce a shift to an alternate cinematic space and operate as filmic punctuation marks. 
The removal of eyes is a common trope in the supernatural horror genre, or the 
mainstream uncanny. Two examples are Coraline, an animated story about a girl who 
visits an alternate reality where her family have buttons for eyes, and Before I Wake, a 






Fig. 31. Coraline, dir. Henry Selick                 Fig. 32. Before I Wake, dir. Mike Flanagan 
 
I encountered the expression Removed from the Eyes of Strangers as the title of Matt 
Roberts’ second exhibition on the uncanny.
283
 Removed from the Eyes, the title of my 
contribution to The Editions II, played on Roberts’ description of the uncanny and the 
literal removal of the eyes.
284
 Freud writes that ‘we know from psychoanalytic 
experience [...] that this fear of damaging or losing one’s eyes is a terrible fear of 
childhood’.
285
 This suggestion of eye removal as a childhood fear is illustrated in the 




                                                 
281. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Hammer Horror was frequently on-air and I watched plenty of Peter Cushing and Christopher 
Lee. The film reference for the mirror sequence was not a Hammer film however; it was From Beyond the Grave, dir. Kevin 
Connor, Amicus Productions, 1974. 
282. Coraline, dir. Henry Selick, Focus Features, 2009 [on DVD], Before I Wake, dir. Mike Flanagan, Intrepid Pictures, 2016 [on 
DVD]. 
283. See also chapter 1. 
284. As I note in my discussion of Scanner the threat of eye removal in The Sandman is expanded by Cixous who points to multiple 
references to the eyes including the doll Olympia’s eyes and Coppola’s optical instruments. See Hoffmann, The Sandman, and 
Cixous, ‘Fiction and its Phantoms’, p. 547. See also chapter 2. 
285. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 231. 








Fig. 33. Psychotel still, dir. Susannah Gent 
       
Processing the eye clips helped me find methods of approaching the overall look of the 
film. I experimented with layering footage of fire, water, and light, to create texture and 
take the footage away from representing everyday vision. It is perhaps worth noting that 
the format of conventional editing software is designed in a linear style, like a strip of 
celluloid, in which the clip is cut and arranged on a linear timeline.
287
 Layers are 
permitted but they are limited. In After Effects, as in Photoshop, the software is built for 





The use of vignette references early film and the encroachment of black into the image 
signals interiority. For me this is quite literal; my mind’s-eye image is black-edged and 
has no corners. The Super 8 ‘look’ is suggestive of old film, archive film, and 
subsequently of memory and nostalgia. This opens a line of enquiry concerning the 
temporal nature of film and its relation to memory. It is common to think of memories 
as recorded on old technology and as such the style of these recordings influences our 
recollection.
289
 The populist face of hauntology has a downgraded, retro look, and as an 
outmoded style it is now doubly retro and arguably kitsch. With reference to music and 
art, Fisher describes the twentieth century as ‘seized by a recombinatorial delirium’.
290
 
For Fisher, nostalgia is central to the tone of hauntology. Following millennial optimism 




                                                 
287. I use the Abode Premium suite including Premiere Pro for basic editing, After Effects for most of my compositions, Audition 
for sound work, supplemented with Audacity, and Photoshop for stills, titles, and graphic work. 
288. Freud, ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad’, I return to this text with reference to a later sequence in Psychotel.  
289. Childhood memories may be recalled through their representations as well as the original event. My father was a keen home-
cine filmmaker and as such many of my childhood memories are of the cine films, tinted orange and flickering. The techniques of 
adding age and colour filters to flashbacks is common in film, and the seventies will often be orange and the fifties will be brown. 
When young, my daughter asked me if, in the past, it was black and white! 
290. Fisher, Ghosts of My Life, p. 8. 
291. Ibid., p. 21.  
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By shooting televisions in the hotel rooms I create depth in the filmic space, a box 
within a box, a rhizomatic structure, that helps convey the feeling of seeking in dreams. 
In encouraging the viewer to ‘seek’ the narrative, I aim to instil a dream-like experience 
of watching the film.
292
 The reappearance of images on the televisions suggests a 
trauma to which the narrative keeps returning. Derrida notes a ‘certain polycentrism of 
dream representation’.
293
 Spivak, introducing Of Grammatology, refers to a passage 
from Freud whose dream-work and ‘syntax’ of the dream text Derrida examines: ‘The 
dream thoughts [...] cannot [...] have any definite endings: they are bound to branch out 
in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought.’
294
 An earlier line 





The technique of using multiple television screens creates a linear depth to the 
cinematic space by which I wish to suggest different levels of consciousness. The 
intrusion of television images achieves this through the repetition of material seen 
elsewhere in the film. This approach suggests the television acts as memory space. 
Christian Metz explores relations between the cinema and Lacan’s mirror stage, noting 
how cinema ‘encourages narcissistic withdrawal and the indulgence of phantasy’.
296
 
When viewers invest in film, suspend their disbelief and enter the cinematic world, they 
permit a hybrid psychological space to open in which their fantasy and the film 
narrative merge. This experience becomes memory, not only of the film itself, but of the 
experience of viewing. Royle notes the uncanny nature of ‘new technology’, that 
humans are ‘becoming decentred, invaded, mixed up with the strange reality’.
297
 The 
term telepresence refers to the disjointedness of the mind from the body in the digital 
image.
298
 Our ability to engage with virtual reality and avatars demonstrate the flexible 
nature of selfhood.
299
 My strategy of making films within films refers to these relations 
of the uncanny and digital representation. That digital media provides a permanently 
                                                 
292. See Metz, The Imaginary Signifier, pp. 99 ‒143. Metz dedicates a section of this book to drawing parallels between the 
experience of dreaming and cinema spectatorship. His main point is that cinema viewers suspend their disbelief whereas dreamers 
are unaware that they are dreaming. That said, there are a number of similarities including immersion in an alternative world from 
which the viewer awakes and returns to reality. 
293. Derrida, ‘Freud and the scene of writing’, Writing and Difference, p. 273. 
294. Freud referenced by Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. lxvii. 
295. Ibid. Jelly Dolly, my 2004 feature film, is a story about a woman who grows a ring-pull at her navel. The navel operates as a 
metaphorical portal into her dream world. This preceded by many years my knowledge of this reference, or so I believe. 
296. Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema, p. 107.   
297. In noting the uncanny and telepathic implication of ‘shared thinking’, Royle makes the interesting point that the etymological 
root of ‘computer’ suggests ‘think with’(‘com’ from ‘cum’ meaning ‘with’, and ‘putare’ meaning to think, reckon, calculate). See 
Royle, The Uncanny, p. 37, footnote 79. 
298. Jonathan Steuer, ‘Defining Virtual Reality: Dimensions Determining Telepresence’, Journal of Communication, vol. 42, issue 
4, 1992, 73‒93, pp. 76‒78. 
299. This is expanded in chapter 6. 
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open window to the ideology of the other and the superego is suggested through the use 
of televisions; however, a visual representation of anxiety and the manner in which it 
returns was closer to my intention when building these sequences. 
 
The filmic space and the on-screen character occupy an ambiguous territory of presence 
and absence. Roland Barthes intimates all photography is the photography of death.
300
 
Film captures and preserves a moment in time and as such the on-screen image of a 
performer will at a point be the image of a dead person. In this manner film itself may 
be viewed as a harbinger of death, and the captured performances destined to become 
ghosts. Hauntology draws attention to the atemporality of thought and the internet and 
digital archive interferes with historic temporality. Memory today is as likely to be a 
memory of a digital artefact as a referent of external reality. Barthes’s suggestion that 
all photography refers to death came to mind when filming the eyeless narrator 
sequences with my mother and daughter. This process inevitably reminded me of my 
place in a generational timeline. The de-saturated image and use of vignette in these 
sequences references early black and white portraiture. The association of death with 
photography further arises from the Victorian practice of photographing the dead. These 
images have uncanny tones as the dead are often arranged in the family group, propped 
up as though still living. Also referenced is the supernatural horror genre where often a 
ghost from a past age returns. We are reminded of Derrida’s returning spectre whose 
first visit is also a return.
301
 Images of hotels, such as The Grand in Scarborough, now 
shabby but with former glory evident, speak of the passing of time. In addition to the 





Through a process of production followed by reflection, the film gained sophistication 
and progressed my understanding of the uncanny. The initial approach was to gather 
material that related to the uncanny texts. Freud’s principal hypothesis in ‘Das 
“Unheimliche”’ connects the uncanny to the castration complex. Freud supports his 
argument by pointing to evidence of dream analysis in which ‘the substitutive relation 
                                                 
300. Barthes likens  photography to a primitive theatre. He references early theatre and the Cult of the Dead and draws comparison 
between the actor in theatrical make up occupying a place between life and death and the frozen image of the photograph, the made-
up face ‘beneath which we see the dead’. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, London: Fontana, 1984, pp. 30‒32.  
301. Derrida, Spectres of Marx, pp. 10‒11.  
302. Derrida includes ‘elementary processes of information within the living cell’ in his understanding of ‘writing’. Genetic code 
repeats and returns as an originary form of such ‘writing’. See Of Grammatology, 1998, p. 9. 
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between the eye and the male organ [...] is seen to exist’.
303
 He makes reference to 
Oedipus who took out his own eyes following the fulfilment of the prophecy. Freud 
notes that castration would have been a more fitting punishment for his crime.
304
 As we 
know, the Oedipal myth became the narrative in Freud’s theory of early sexual 
development and he claims the power of Hoffman’s story becomes intelligible as soon 
as we replace the Sandman by ‘the dreaded father at whose hands castration is 
expected’.
305
 Castration is referenced in the film through an image relating to penis envy 
and by featuring the female genitals.  
 
 
Fig. 34. Psychotel stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
An image of a penis and a hand are combined with footage of a naked figure filmed 
from above. The image is brief in order that it not appear pornographic, but long enough 
to register that the figure has three hands. This makes reference to the iconic images of 
the three-handed Virgin Mary, as well as Freud’s reference to ‘a hand cut off at the 




            
Fig. 35. Trojeručica, St John Damascen          Fig. 36. ‘Three handed Madonna’307 
                                                 
303. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 231. 
304. Ibid. As noted, this is referenced in the sequence of my daughter with bandaged eyes, shown above. 
305. Ibid., p. 232.  
306. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 244. 
307. There are many iconic images such as this. It is thought that the third hand relates to the story of John of Damascus whose hand 
was cut off as punishment for alleged treachery. His hand was restored following prayer. The first image, Trojeručica, St John 
Damascene, Eastern Orthodox icon, Hilander, early 8th Century, shows the third hand as an additional feature to the mother and 
child. The second image, source unknown, thought to be of 14th century Russian origin, is one of many copies of the earlier image 














Alexandra Kokoli reminds us of the uncanny nature of the female genitalia in the 
psychoanalytic tenet. The first home, the mother’s womb is rendered uncanny by 
repression.
308
 Freud reverses intra-uterine existence, a state initially ‘qualified by a 
certain lasciviousness’, and suggests the process of repression transforms this to the 
terrifying phantasy of being buried alive.
309
 This reversal, or sliding of meaning, echoes 
the transformation that the word ‘uncanny’ has undergone. As Freud notes, ‘among its 
different shades of meaning the word ‘heimlich’ exhibits one which is identical with its 
opposite, ‘unheimlich’.’
310
 Kokoli notes the metaphor of the return of the repressed 
presents an unexpected ally for feminism as a powerful re-emergence of the marginal 
and the oppressed. 
 
Dany Nobus writes: ‘hair is the mother of all fetishes in Freudian theory, because it 
represents the fixed last impression of the female genitals before the anxiety provoking 
confrontation with the absence of a penis’.
311
 With this in mind I recorded some 
genitalia footage. The material was shocking and effective; however, in a quest for 
modesty I replaced the pubic hair with hedgehog spines. The result remains provocative 
but appears surreal, recalling the shot in Un Chien Andalou: a sea urchin appears in an 
armpit. Jack Morgan suggests that ‘the fertile, swampy, sexual river system that brings 
us into the world’ is a source of uncanniness, not only for Freud but shown in 




   
Fig. 37. Poltergeist, dir. Tobe Hooper 313    Fig. 38. Poltergeist, dir. Gil Kenan 314 
                                                 
308. Kokoli, The Feminist Uncanny, pp. 3‒6. 
309. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 244. See also Royle, ‘Buried Alive’, The Uncanny, pp. 142‒71.  
310. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 224.  
311. Nobus, ‘The uncanny displacement of protection - analytic reflections on “ornament in the field of vision”, in Sharon Kivland 
and Marc du Ry (editor), ‘In the Place of an Object’, Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, London: Centre for 
Freudian Analysis & Research, Special issue, 2000, 97‒109, p. 97.  
312. Jack Morgan, The Biology of Horror, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 2002, p. 102. 
313. Poltergeist, 1982, film still showing the ectoplasm, reminiscent of placental jelly. 














Two examples from 1982 are Poltergeist, where the child returns through a supernatural 
portal dripping with slime, and Swamp Thing, one of many examples of organic, 
primordial horror.
315
 Morgan notes the function of the horror film as being to unleash 
contemporary, repressed anxiety. He perceives the ‘organic uncanny’ as repressed 
through Christianity, specifically repressed Pagan rituals in which the organic and the 
physical were celebrated.  
 
Derrida’s ‘impression’ of Freud, deconstructed in Archive Fever, explores the relations 
between the public and the secret in ‘two places of inscription: printing and 
circumcision’.
316
 Derrida opens the question of whether psychoanalysis is a ‘Jewish 
Science’, pointing to circumcision as the symbolic substitute of the castration of the son 
by the primitive father. He notes Freud’s comment on the impression left on the 
uncircumcised by the circumcised, ‘a disagreeable, uncanny [unheimlich] 
impression’.
317
 I reflect upon Freud’s own circumcision by ‘the dreaded father at whose 
hands castration is expected’, and the uncanny effect this may have left on him.
318
 
Royle, in his summary of the uncanny, writes: 
 
 The uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of who 
 one is and what is being experienced. Suddenly one’s sense of oneself (of one’s so-




My relation to my own body, particularly my genitals, becomes uncanny upon reading 
Freud. That they could induce fear or signify loss produces in me ‘a crisis of the natural, 
touching upon everything that one might have thought was ‘part of nature’: one’s own 
nature, human nature, the nature of reality and the world’.
320
 This discrepancy between 
my relation to my body and my understanding of how it is interpreted in Freudian 
psychoanalysis points to the fissure between nature and culture. Royle suggests that ‘[i]t 
may thus be construed as a foreign body within oneself, even the experience of oneself 
as a foreign body, the very estrangement of inner silence and solitude.’
321
  
                                                 
315. Poltergeist, dir. Tobe Hooper, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1982 [on DVD], Swamp Thing, dir. Wes Craven, Swampfilms, 1982, 
[ON DVD]. 
316. Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, translated by Eric Prenowitz, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995, p. 8. Original italics. 
317. Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 46. 
318. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 232. 
319. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 1.  
320. Ibid.  
321. Ibid., p. 2.  
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Spivak writes, ‘we have to go further than the unconscious, we have to reach the body, 
the organism. If the “unconscious” is unknown to us, how much more so the body!’
322
 
While Freud talks quite specifically in his essay on the uncanny of the fear of castration 
as a phantasy of actual damage to the penis, Lacan links the phantasy to the image of the 
fragmented body of the child in the stage of the mirror. These “imagos of the 
fragmented body”, images of ‘castration, emasculation, mutilation, dismemberment, 
dislocation, evisceration, devouring, and bursting open of the body’ are, to Lacan, 





Fig. 39. Psychotel still, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
This ambiguous image intends to explore these ideas.
324
 The extended cleft is 
suggestive of a wound and relates to the idea of woman as castrated. The absence of the 
rest of the body is another form of castration, that of the self, in which the body is a 
sexual organ in its entirety. In the film the voice-over speaks of the room having been 
turned inside-out into a mirror image of itself. This expands the idea of the fragmented 
body to include the hotel, itself a representation of the psyche, as broken up and 
disembowelled. For me this image also brings to mind phantom limbs. Anthony Vidler 
notes that the pre-mirror stage body, the ‘corps morcelé’ or body in pieces, is repressed 
in the unconscious, showing up in dreams and during the psychoanalytic process when 
the individual is threatened by a sense of disintegration.
325
 For Vidler, these processes 
are related to a general spatial uncanny evident in the friction between the home and the 
unhomely, as he explores in relation to architecture.  
 
Damasio introduces the theory of the proto-self; ‘the nonconscious forerunner for the 
levels of self which appear in our minds as the conscious protagonists of consciousness: 
                                                 
322. Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. xliv.  
323. Lacan, Écrits, p. 85. 
324. This image features in the first act of Psychotel. 
325. Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, p. 77. 
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core self and autobiographical self’.
326
 The proto-self, shared with other living, but not 
necessarily conscious organisms, is the system that nonconsciously regulates the 
organism’s body to remain within the homeostatic range required for basic survival. In 
this assembly of neural devices the organism holds a model of the entire organism. For 
Damasio, this ‘strange, overlooked and noteworthy fact is perhaps the single most 
important clue as to the underpinnings of consciousness’.
327
 The proto-self is in essence 
a body map. That images of the fragmented body correspond to a disruption of the body 
map draw together the theories of Lacan and Damasio and contribute a modest 
contribution to knowledge. 
 
The Return of the Repressed and the Uncanny Child 
Yes, and ghosts: how close to the marrow 
Can they come? At night I feel them 




Throughout this first period of production of Psychotel my research focussed on the 
Freudian uncanny and the ‘return of the repressed’.
329
 This well-known definition of the 
uncanny requires an acceptance of the psychoanalytic topography of the mental 
apparatus.
330
 Although repression is described as ‘the corner-stone on which the whole 
structure of psychoanalysis rests’,
331 
the closing remarks of Freud’s chapter on 
‘Repression’ suggest work-in-progress.
332
 In so far as its defensive function is 
concerned, repression does not appear to work. Certainly, in Freud’s account the 
mechanism of keeping both instinctual representatives and distasteful memories from 
consciousness frequently fails.
333
 Repression, for Freud, is the process undergone by an 
instinctual impulse to make it inoperative. A distinction is made between the 
representative of the instinct and the associated affect: the idea can be held in the 
                                                 
326. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 22. 
327. Ibid. This is explored further in the following chapter in relation to the split structure of the psyche. 
328. Vincent Buckley, ‘Ghosts, Places, Stories, Questions’, Twelve Poets 1950‒1970, p. 59. Extract. 
329. In ‘Das “Unheimlich”’ Freud describes the uncanny as that which is ‘in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar 
and old-established in the mind that has been estranged only by the process of repression’. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 13.  
330. The Freudian unconscious is said to be a reservoir of instincts, feelings, memories, and urges formed from repressed psychical 
material. This process begins during early childhood following the resolution of the castration and oedipal complexes. For Freud the 
unconscious is formed from these developmental stages. See ‘Repression’ and ‘The Unconscious’, in Freud, The Theory of 
Psychoanalysis, vol. 11, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Penguin, 1984, pp. 139‒158, and pp. 159‒210. 
331. Sigmund Freud, Editor’s Note, ‘Repression’, The Theory of Psychoanalysis, vol. 11, pp. 139‒158,  141.  
332. ‘The short series of comparisons presented here may easily convince us that more comprehensive investigations are necessary 
before we can hope thoroughly to understand the processes connected with repression [...].’ Ibid., p. 158.  
333. In early works the terms repression and defence are used interchangeably but later the term repression takes precedence. He 
writes: ‘Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation.’ Instincts in themselves 
cannot be known, only their representatives. It is these representatives that are repressed. Freud notes that satisfaction of an impulse 
is always pleasurable thus pointing to the inherent contradiction in the notion of the defensive repression of instinct. He considers 
the states of pain and hunger and notes that the removal of displeasure is pleasurable and that the presence of these negative states is 
experienced as a pressure. Ibid., p. 145.  
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unconscious or can disappear from consciousness but the affect returns in the form of 
anxiety. Freud writes: ‘If a repression does not succeed in preventing feelings of 
unpleasure or anxiety from arising, we may say that it has failed’, yet we only see the 
outcome of the repression, the representatives of the repressed instinct.
334
 Repression, as 
a mechanism designed to prevent unpleasure, is only known by the affective anxiety 
and the obnoxious thoughts it produces. Yet Freud writes: ‘We see that the repressive 
trends may find a substitute for repression in a weakening of what is distasteful.’
335
 He 
also states ‘repression acts, therefore, in a highly individual manner’.
336
 This wavering 
could indicate that the notion of repression is being used to describe too broad a range 
of mental operations. On anxiety Freud writes: 
 
 It is possible for the development of the affect to proceed directly from the system Ucs.; 
 in that case the affect always has the character of anxiety, for which all ‘repressed’ 




The presence of anxiety as conscious affect is emphasised here. Lancelot Law Whyte 
proposes ‘self-eliminating consciousness’ – we are conscious of what requires 
attention.
338
 From this stance anxiety is a priority of consciousness, the presence of 
which has no clear relation to the repression of instincts. 
 
Freud describes primal repression, a first phase of repression, the psychical (ideational) 
representative of the instinct being denied entrance into conscious.
339
 He later refers to 
the ‘repulsion which operates from the direction of conscious upon that which is 
repressed’ suggesting again that repression is a conscious action.
340
 Repression proper 
is described as an after-pressure, where ‘mental derivatives of the repressed 
representative’ are also repressed.
341
 Repression is a constant and dynamic process and 
its two modes, primal and proper, operate together; what was primarily repressed 
reaches towards consciousness and what consciousness finds repulsive is banished, 
returned to what is primarily repressed.  
                                                 
334. Ibid., p. 153.  
335. Ibid., p. 152.  
336. Ibid., p. 150. Original italics.  
337. Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 182.  
338. ‘Thus self-awareness is basically self-eliminating; its biological function is apparently to catalyze processes which tend to 
remove its cause, in each situation. Consciousness is like a fever which, if not excessive, hastens curative processes and so 
eliminates its source.’ Original italics. Lancelot Law Whyte, The Unconsciousness Before Freud, London: Tavistock Publications, 
1962, p. 34. 
339. Freud, ‘Repression’, p. 147. 
340. Ibid.  
341. Ibid.  
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This describes something different from anxiety. In my experience anxiety is something 
that plays on the mind. The revulsion described here is closer to thoughts relating to 
social taboos, which on entering consciousness one would banish as distasteful, for 
example incest. Through his concept of the Oedipal complex Freud suggests that incest, 
specifically desire for the mother, is a normal psychical phase that the human infant 
must overcome. Evolutionary biology has shown us that incest avoidance is observed in 
non-human animals with experimental evidence and field observation gathered from a 
wide range of species including crickets, hamsters, mice, and primates. Kin recognition 
through smell is one such method. The biological advantage of incest avoidance and its 
widespread presence casts doubt on it being a psychical phase as such, although this 
may depend on how Freud is interpreted.  
 
The tenet of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus proposes that psychoanalysis 
reinforces domestication, and individual and social repression.
342
 They question whether 
the human ever desired incest suggesting that ‘psychoanalysis was shutting up sexuality 
in a bizarre sort of box painted with bourgeois motifs, in a kind of rather repugnant 
artificial triangle’.
343
 In this manner ‘the whole of sexuality as production of desire’, 
that they see as ‘the fantastic factory of Nature and Production,’ is transformed into a 
‘dirty little secret’, a family secret.
344
 They suggest psychoanalysis revives an ‘age old 
tendency to humble us, to demean us,’
345
 and point to a mechanism of making the 
unconscious guilty by ‘the sham image’ of Oedipus.
346
 This achieves a ‘cultural 
justification for psychic repression’, in which individual repression, foregrounded 
through the Oedipus complex, shadows social repression, specifically the repression of 




An early version of this chapter was the content of the lecture sequences in Psychotel. 
Given the brevity of the sections that have remained in the final edit, the full content is 
not conveyed to the viewer. Like the blind narrator sequences, the lecture now acts as a 
punctuation mark or a return to an academic space in the film. These sections also 
indicate the capability of the psyche to reflect, to see itself as an object through the 
device of breaking out of the narrative proper, where the film operates primarily in an 
                                                 
342. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 15. 
343. Ibid., p. 53.  
344. Ibid.  
345. Ibid., p. 53.  
346. Ibid., p. 125.  
347. Ibid., p. 126‒7.  
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affective manner, and commenting on the theme of the production. Lastly these 
sequences complicate the relation of the filmmaker / character to indicate a doubling of 
the psyche. 
 
When in production for this section of the film, I was less persuaded by the 
psychoanalytic account of the psyche than I later came to be for reasons outlined in 
chapter 2. This was partly due to the style of language used by Freud, exemplified in his 
discussion of the censor, the executive function that operates the mechanism of 
repression. He writes: 
 
 In the first phase the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs.; if, on 
 testing, it is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase, it 
 is said to be ‘repressed’ and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this testing, 
 it enters the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the second system, which we shall 




Freud’s terminology suggests that repression is deliberate and although not explicitly 
stated, it implies, through the choice of the word ‘censor’ that acceptance or rejection is 
based on a sentient, possibly moral decision. In the case of primary repression, the 
repressed psychical material is not, and never has been, consciously available. This 
anthropomorphic depiction of the neural activity implies a homunculus, a discounted 
description of mind, rejected on account of infinite regress. The implied homunculus 
runs through much of Freud’s discussion of repression, for example when he writes; 
‘the rigorous censorship exercises its office at the point of transition from the Ucs. to 
the Pcs. (or Cs.)’,
 349
 and ‘primal repression, a first phase of repression, which consists 





Notwithstanding this anthropomorphic description of the censor and the inconsistency 
of the nature and action of repression, one of Freud’s major contributions is the 
understanding of the mental apparatus as comprised of distinct operational regions and 
that the actions of these regions may be in conflict with others. Seen this way, 
repression may be the result of the evolutionary course of the brain’s development. In 
very simple terms, the human brain has developed from a central nervous system, to 
                                                 
348. Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 175.  
349. Ibid.  
350. Ibid., p. 147.  
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brainstem structures, to the cortex. What the cortex contributes, in part, is working 
memory space that allows an object or idea to be held in mind. This temporal capability 
allows for predictive analysis. This process of cognition requires that the immediate 
action or reaction of earlier brain regions be suppressed. This is explored by Barry 
Opatow, who proposes psychoanalysis as a theory of consciousness. He states: ‘Freud’s 
deepest concepts of the repressed unconscious and of intrapsychic conflict concern the 
hierarchical inhibition of the lower by the higher modes of mental activity.’
351
 Focusing 
on ordinary adult experience, Opatow considers repression in terms of ‘compromise 
formation’, a Freudian term describing the outcome of conflict between an unconscious 
desire and a repressive act of the conscious ego.
352
 He writes: 
 
 The deepest meaning of conflict pertains to an inhibitory boundary separating two 
 modes of operation in the mental apparatus. This implies that in addition to combining 
 antithetical mental contents, compromise formation must also refer to a functional 





Citing research from cognitive studies and neuroscience, Opatow understands the 
purpose of consciousness as overriding unconscious pressure to enable predictive 
strategy.
354
 If the inhibition of the lower by the higher modes of mental activity were to 
replace the notion of repression, something still needs to be added to the ‘return of the 
repressed’ for it to describe the uncanny. The intrapsychic conflict described here may 
shed further light on Ernst Jentsch’s proposition that the uncanny arises from 
intellectual uncertainty and cognitive dissonance. Freud criticises Jentsch for his 
equation of the uncanny with the novel and unfamiliar, pointing out that not everything 
that is novel or unfamiliar is uncanny. Similarly, if intrapsychic conflict is a normal 
mental activity, there must be something specific to the ‘intrinsic quality which justifies 
the use of a special name’.
355
 Freud later describes the uncanny as that which has been 
‘made strange’ by repression, although he does not expand upon the process of ‘making 
strange’. Opatow implies something similar: ‘When we clinically examine the drives 
                                                 
351. Barry Opatow, ‘The Real Unconscious: Psychoanalysis as a Theory of Consciousness’, Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, 45, 1997, 865‒890, p. 872. 
352. Sigmund Freud, ‘Two Encyclopaedia Articles’ (1923), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, vol. 18, trans. and ed. by James Strachey et al., London: Hogarth, 1955, pp. 233‒59, 242. 
353. Opatow, ‘The Real Unconscious’, p. 874. 
354. Ibid., p. 878, in reference to Benjamin Libet, ‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary 
action’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1985, vol. 8, 529–566, A. Marcel, ‘Conscious and Unconscious Perception’, Cognitive 
Psychology, 1983, vol. 15, 238–300, P. Merikle, ‘Perception without awareness’,  American Psychologist,1992, 792–95. 
355. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 1. 
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and defenses underlying compromise formation, we are bound to emphasize how 




Opatow points to psychoanalysis as devising a new ‘metapsychological language’ to 
address the ‘odd domain in which subjectivity merges with objective mechanism’.
357
 He 
writes that ‘conscious experiences (symptoms and dreams) are governed by laws alien 
to consciousness itself’.
358
 Upholding Opatow’s argument that in ordinary mental life 
there are conflicts between brain functions, the preceding description does not explain 
why certain everyday mental operations are felt as ‘alien’. Further, in evolutionary 
terms these ‘alien laws’ will precede consciousness. Opatow’s understanding of psychic 
conflict as an ‘inhibitory boundary’ separating the higher and lower modes of operation 
might imply evolutionary stages of development.
359
 He notes that primitive contents of 
the unconscious may be prevented from reaching awareness, a point that echoes the 




 It would appear that we invest with a feeling of uncanniness those impressions which 
 lend support to a belief in [...] the animistic attitude of mind, at a time when our 




There is a parallel with Jentsch’s hypothesis of ‘intellectual uncertainty’ and an 
opposition between the so called higher and lower mental functions. Freud elaborates: 
 
 When we, no less than primitive man, project something into external reality, what is 
 happening must surely be this: we are recognizing the existence of two states ‒ one in 
 which something is directly given to the senses and to consciousness (that is, is 
 present to them), and alongside it another, in which the same thing is latent but capable 
 of re-appearing. In short, we are recognizing the co-existence of perception and 
 memory, or putting it more generally, the existence of unconscious mental processes 




Freud draws a parallel between memory and unconscious material without highlighting 
repression and describes it as a primitive mode of thought. The unconscious mental 
process as outlined here is influential and capable of returning to consciousness, and as 
                                                 
356. Opatow, ‘The Real Unconscious’, p. 874. Italics added. 
357. Ibid., p. 867.  
358. Ibid. Original italics.  
359. Ibid., p. 874.  
360. Ibid., pp. 874‒875. Italics added.  
361. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 241, footnote 1. with reference to footnote in ‘Totem and Taboo’ (1913), Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. by James Strachey, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950, vol. 13, pp. 1–100, 86.  
362. Freud, ‘Totem and Taboo’, pp. 93‒4. In this earlier text of 1913 Freud’s understanding of the mental apparatus was perhaps 
closer to Opatow’s before his all-encompassing understanding of repression, as outlined in ‘Repression’ (1915), took hold. 
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discussed above, there is potential conflict between unconscious and conscious thought. 
This description is close to Opatow’s understanding of the mechanism of consciousness 





Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis describes the role played by emotion in decision 
making. Somatic markers result from experiences being ‘marked’ so they provoke a 
repeat sensation in a similar situation. This hypothesis resulted from Damasio’s study of 
brain-damaged patients who presented changes in both emotional response and decision 
making capacity.
364
 Through controlled experiments Damasio and his team established 
that patients with impaired emotional response lacked the capacity to retain and repeat 
emotional response with the consequence of ineffectual predictive strategy.
365
 Damasio 
proposes that the emotional responses to situations encountered are constantly retained 
as neural maps; that is, certain neural configurations are primed and will re-fire when 
faced with a similar situation.
366
 This describes what is commonly called gut reaction. It 
is not uncommon to find that gut reaction is at odds with rational consideration and gut 
reaction usually wins. Damasio writes: 
 
 When a negative somatic marker is juxtaposed with to a particular future outcome the 
 combination functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed 




This description of emotional retention and return has led me to consider the uncanny, 
‘the return of the repressed’, in similar terms. This is both original and speculative. 
Feelings of strangeness have been attributed to the configuration of the mental 
apparatus, specifically conflict between conscious and unconscious thought. Yet it has 
been unclear why in everyday mental processes, certain ‘mental solids’ are distorted or 
                                                 
363. Topology of the mental apparatus is expanded later, however it is worth noting here that Freud understood the cortex to be 
related to consciousness, and memory to be unconscious. Recent neuroscentific understanding, and the view of Opatow, hold that 
the cortex is associated with memory while brain stem mechanisms are largely associated with consciousness. This is a crude 
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364. The somatic marker hypothesis is developed in detail in Damasio, Descartes’ Error. It is damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortices that results in loss of somatic marker formation. See ‘In Colder Blood’, Descartes’ Error, pp. 52‒82, 70. 
365. Using a skin conductance test in conjunction with showing images of a horrific nature alongside control images, it was found 
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366. According to Damasio, emotion is the experience of bodily changes in the organism. As an organism, (I am using the term 
organism as this mechanism is likely to be common across all animals with brains, not a uniquely human mechanism,) receives 
stimuli from the outside world, the brain and body undergo physiological changes, including endocrine release, heart rate, muscular 
response etc. Emotion is the experience of these changes. The somatic marker refers to neural reaction that sets in motion 
physiological changes that were experienced when the somatic marker was first established. Ibid., pp. 127‒34. 
367. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 174. 
81 
 
accompanied by the sensation of strangeness, or put another way: ‘One is curious to 
know what this common core is which allows us to distinguish as “uncanny” certain 




Damasio distinguishes ‘early’ or ‘primary’ emotions experienced in childhood from 
‘adult’ or ‘secondary’ emotions that develop from experience and social interaction. As 
the individual gains experience, what is viewed as fearful gains in sophistication. 
Knowledge and rationality play a part in tempering our reactions; however, the somatic 
marker hypothesis proposes that we retain a latent capacity to re-experience fear. 
Cixous comments on Freud’s introduction of childhood into the uncanny, writing that 
‘any symptom, lapse, and dream has a forked branch which encounters a childhood 
experience or event’.
369
 Fear in childhood may commonly arise when left alone or in the 
dark. As children are vulnerable, the fear response that initiates crying aims to bring a 
parent to ensure safety.
370
 Prior to gaining experience and understanding, in childhood 
many things appear strange – shadows, the way things appear to move in the dark, 
draughts that cause doors to open by themselves. The prevalence of such images in the 
supernatural horror genre, whose aim is to instil a feeling a dread rather than the 
adrenalin-fuelled fear of the thriller, lends weight to this argument. This genre often 
features children, unusual as horror films are not intended for young audiences and in 
other genres, the age of the characters generally reflects the age of the target 
audience.
371
 The presence of children in films such as Amityville Horror, Child’s Play, 
Poltergeist, and Before I Wake, primes the spectator through alignment with the young 




                                                 
368. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 1. 
369. Cixous, ‘Fiction and its Phantoms’, p. 527. 
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372. Amityville Horror, dir. Stuart Rosenburg, 20th Century Fox, 1979 [on DVD], Child’s Play, dir. Tom Holland, United Artists, 




Fig. 40. Before I Wake, dir. Mike Flanagan        Fig. 41. Poltergeist, dir. Tobe Hooper (1982) 
 
According to the somatic marker hypothesis, our emotional reactions coincide with the 
most similar and recent events. This offers an explanation as to the operation of genre, 
that reactions to filmic tropes are built on experience, and although we get used to the 
content of genre films, they continue to impact upon us. The somatic marker hypothesis 
accounts for why we enjoy filmic unpleasure – fear and anxiety. Setting somatic 
markers primes the individual for appropriate response that could carry survival 
advantage. This could be pleasurable in itself. I am not suggesting that viewing film 
necessarily prepares one for future situations, although this is partly true, but the range 
of situations a viewer experiences, especially given that these experiences are largely of 
an emotional nature, suggests a relation between cinematic pleasure and somatic 
markers. 
 
That the uncanny results from somatic markers set in childhood might account for 
Freud’s description, here summarised by Royle, that the uncanny ‘comes above all, 
perhaps, in the uncertainties of silence, solitude and darkness’.
373
 I suggest that it is not 
just the feeling of fear that causes the specific quality we call uncanny, but the oddity of 
the experience in itself. As we gain experience old somatic markers will be superseded 
by new. To re-experience the sensation of childhood fear is additionally unnerving as it 
appears to come from elsewhere. The somatic marker hypothesis only adds a 
neurological aspect to Freud’s account, as seen here: 
 
 An uncanny experience occurs either when repressed infantile complexes which have 
 been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs 
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Anneleen Masschelein outlines the return of the Freudian repressed, in The Unconcept. 
Her description, following the psychoanalytic topology, can be understood in 
neuroscientific terms, where the ‘trace of movements’ and ‘“ghosts” of things’ are close 
to Damasio’s neural maps and somatic markers. 
 
 What happens, then, is the sudden revelation of a remote memory trace – the remainder, 
 not of the repressed thing in itself, but of the trace of its movements in the Ucs – which 
 forms a connection with a recent image or experience in the Cs. The unconscious thing-
 representations are not actual or accurate representations of things; it is perhaps more 




This last sentence features as voice-over in Psychotel. Several quotations of this nature 
feature alongside images of reflections, shot in the second production stage, which I 
discuss in the next chapter. In the film the words take on a different function. Out of 
context they do not outline a train of thought as presented here; rather, they suggest a 
speaking presence in the film, the filmmaker, engaged in the act of research. Less literal 
than the lecture sequences, they re-introduce the voice of the academic as one of the 
many narrators.
376
 As a representation of the psyche, the narrators in Psychotel 
correspond to aspects of thought that interrupt and contradict themselves. 
 
In Royle’s summary he writes: ‘The uncanny has to do with a strangeness of framing 
and borders, an experience of liminality.’
377
 I am reminded of Opatow’s description of 
an ‘inhibitory boundary’ separating conscious and unconscious processes. The manner 
in which the uncanny intrudes with such specificity could be accounted for in the 
description of a childhood somatic marker returning a state of fear that is strongly felt, 
like a gut reaction, when faced with something trifling that the adult mind has long 
since understood as benign. This account contributes to Jentsch’s understanding of the 
uncanny as intellectual uncertainty where the conflict arises from discrepancies in the 
experience of childhood fear alongside adult rationality. He writes that ‘the child has 
had so little experience that simple things can be inexplicable for him and even slightly 
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377. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 2. 
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The psychoanalytic view of the uncanny as ‘the return of the repressed’ attributes the 
uncanny to the early years. Psychical material repressed during the resolution of the 
Oedipal and castration complexes returns to consciousness in a form made strange by 
repression and experienced as anxiety. If the ‘repressed’ is aligned with the 
unconscious, as that which is able to exert influence but of which we are not 
consciously aware, and the ‘return’ is the return of a previously experienced state, the 
somatic marker hypothesis adds neurological description to the Freudian account. The 
relation of the uncanny to the somatic marker, or the gut-experience, is further hinted at 
here: ‘A feeling of uncanniness may come from curious coincidences, a sudden sense 
that things seem to be fated or “meant to happen”.’
379
 Whereas the psychoanalytic view 
proposes that anxiety is the affect of all returning repression, this description of the 
uncanny is a replay of the original feeling. In Freud’s work, what is repressed can be a 
previously lived experience and a representation of an instinct. Although these are quite 
different, it is not clear how the mechanism of repression accommodates these 
differences. Freud describes repression in relation to the infantile complexes of which 
the individual is not conscious in the first place. The somatic marker is a primitive 
device that guides behaviour without the need for consciousness and may operate in 
non-human animals.   
 
The unhomely as the familiar and the forbidden suggests child abuse and prompted the 
bathroom and caravan sequences in Psychotel.
380
 The uncanny as unhomely, both 
familiar and strange, aligns with the quality of childhood fear that occurs in the home 
where the familiar is not always as it should be. Freud draws on Schelling’s description 
of the uncanny, paraphrased by Royle as ‘something that should have remained secret 
and hidden but has come to light’.
381
 Here lies a sinister suggestion of a dark family 
secret. For Freud, the trauma of his circumcision in infancy as noted by Derrida, could 
have shaped his adult psyche. The uncanny, despite its relation to the supernatural, has 




                                                 
379. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 1. This supports the relation of the uncanny to the automatic discussed in chapter 6. 
380. Child abuse, or more specifically, the suggestion of double infanticide is the implied narrative of ‘The Dummy’, that I return to 
in chapter 7. See Nicholas Royle in The New Uncanny, Manchester: Comma Press, 2008, pp. 53‒68. 
381. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 2. with reference to Freud’s ‘The “Uncanny”’, quoting Schelling: ‘“Unheimlich” is the name for 
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382. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’ , pp. 249‒51. With reference to the fairy tale, Freud suggest that the uncanny requires an 
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The bathroom sequence was one of the few sequences that was pre-planned and used 
actors. The action is a straightforward attempt to induce uncanniness by bringing a 
mannequin to life, in line with Jentsch’s formula.
383
 The use of masks follows Jentsch’s 
account: 
 
 In games, children strive by means of grotesque disguises and behaviour directly to 
 arouse strong emotions in each other. And among adults there are sensitive natures who 
 do not like to attend masked balls, since the masks and disguises produce in them an 





It was not my intention at the time of filming that the sequence have sexual tones. It 
may be that any masks on children would have had a similar effect but the shiny quality 
of the black gaffer tape evokes fetish wear. My reference for the mask used on the 
younger child was a horned mask featured in an image of Kanaval Vodou by Leah 





   
      Fig. 42. Kanaval Vodou, Leah Gordon                    Fig. 43. Psychotel still, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
Certainly, on a small child it is incongruous. That the mannequin is dressed only in vest 
and pants adds a provocative layer and the tights, that I initially thought might be comic, 
suggest sexuality.
386
 That I was not fully aware of the tonal quality of this scene at the 
point of shooting gives credence to my argument that much of artistic practice is not 
                                                 
383. Jentsch writes that we feel uncanny when there is ‘doubt as to whether an apparently living being is animate and, conversely, 
doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate’. Jentsch, ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’, p. 11.  
384. Ibid., p. 10. 
385. Leah Gordon, Kanaval Vodou, New Art Exchange, <http://www.nae.org.uk/exhibition/kanaval-vodou-politics-and-revolution-
on/39>, accessed 7 December 2018. Image reproduced with kind permission from Leah Gordon. 
386. It is important for me to note here that the shoot itself was light and playful, wholly unlike the tone of the finished sequence, 
with my daughter and a friend’s younger daughter improvising the action and operating the clapperboard.  
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conscious. The tone of the scene suggests child abuse, a dark family secret, that should 
have remained hidden. Torok and Rand in Speculations after Freud, write:  
 
 What we consider to be the closest and most intimate part of our life – our own family, 
 our own home – is in fact at the closest possible remove and the least familiar to us. The 
 twofold meaning of the word heimlich – belonging to the home, familiar and hidden or 
 secret – defines the contradiction the child must endure in a family with secrets (…) 
 Due to covert manoeuvres to which they are not privy, children can become virtual 




The minotaur, a popular surrealist image painted by Dali, Picasso, Ernst, and Magritte, 
was held at the centre of a labyrinth. The film presents the psyche as a maze. Here 
Greek mythology and the children as sexual beings make reference to Freud. That the 
minotaur is part-animal, part-human is suggestive of the human-animal discussed in 
chapter 7. Minotaur is also the title of the journal published and edited by Albert Skira, 
et al. between 1933 and 1939, in which Lacan’s first essay was published. Referenced 
in this sequence are the ancient practices of augury and haruspicy, premonition from 
bird flight and by studying of the entrails of sacrificed animals and birds. These 
associations were noted after production further indicating the veiled nature of creative 
practice. At the time of filming, during the first production stage of Psychotel, the 
bathroom sequence stood alone. As the narrative progressed the character of the spirit 
guide referenced in this sequence grew into a representation of fantasy life and a playful 





Freud identifies two conditions from which the uncanny arises, one proceeding from 
repressed infantile complexes and the other concerning the question of reality.
389
 The 
description of childhood somatic markers producing uncanny sensations is only 
                                                 
387. Maria Torok and Nicholas Rand, ‘The Sandman looks at “The uncanny”’, in Speculations After Freud: Psychoanalysis, 
Philosophy, and Culture, edited by Sonu Shamdasani et. al., London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 185‒203, 202. 
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Historical and Contemporary Perspectives to Mind’ conference at House of Science and Letters, Helsinki, 2016 where I presented 
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studies bear no relation, however, I did come to view my Ph.D. study as a form of therapy, perhaps a form of personal 
psychoanalysis, less concerned with my life’s events, more in relation to the Ph.D. research process (this is explored further in 
chapter 8 with reference to the work of Patricia Townsend). As such Sharon became a sort of psychoanalyst who I would visit for a 
‘session’ (often fifty minutes). Asking Sharon to voice the spirit guide came from seeing an overlap in the impending closure of the 
academic / psychoanalytic process, and the exorcism of the character of the spirit guide.  
389. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 248‒9. 
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partially explained by the content of the feeling and is additionally born of the 
experience of the neural event itself. It is not only that we find ourselves once more 
afraid of the dark, but also that we have been inexplicably transported back to a long-
forgotten sensation. This draws our attention to the widely accepted but intriguing fact 





SECOND FLOOR: SINGLE OR DOUBLE ROOM?  
Myself and I: the Structure of Selfhood  
‘As time passes, the shadow which survives the grave  
becomes the double which is born with every child.’390 
 
The second period of production of Psychotel took place between May and September, 
2017. The first pass featured events in hotel rooms, the blind narrator, the lecture, and 
the bathroom sequence.
391
 On viewing I felt that these sequences should act as energetic 
and interruptive events between slower sections.
392
 The workshop in the woods and the 
caravan were filmed with the intention of sustaining the shots for a longer duration with 
a text-based voice-over.
393
 The texts from Claxton, Masschelein, and Otto Rank, are 





The following exploration of the shadow, the reflection, and the soul reflects upon 
accounts of doubling in psychoanalysis, philosophy, cognitive psychology, and 
neuroscience, including the Freudian topologies of the psyche and neuroscientific 
accounts of the structures of the brain. The aim is not to show that any of these theories 
are incorrect, but rather to emphasise similarities across these fields to present an 
expanded understanding of the brain, mind, and the subjective experience of uncanny 
doubling. 
 
‘Das “Unheimliche”’ acknowledges Rank’s psychoanalytic study of the double, noting 
effects arising from mirrors, reflections, shadows, and guardian spirits. Rank draws on 
accounts of primitive beliefs including the Kai in New Guinea who are careful not to 
tread on their shadows for fear it will bring harm,
395
 and a saying from the German 
                                                 
390. J. V. Negelein, ‘Image, Mirror, Shadow in Popular Faith’, Archives of Religious Science, vol. 5, 1902, 1‒37, referenced in Otto 
Rank, The Double: a Psychoanalytic Study, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1971, p. 50. 
391. These are discussed in chapter 5.  
392. The first two work-in-progress screenings were to my director of studies, Sharon Kivland only. At the outset I had envisaged 
making a film of about ten minutes in length. The total duration of Psychotel at this stage was about fifteen minutes.  
393. For this shoot I attempted to use a better quality camera, a Sony FS 100. Although the image quality was perceptibly better, the 
camera was large and cumbersome to use. I returned to my DSLR for the remainder of the film. Having a camera constantly to hand 
had become part of my method. Like a documentary filmmaker, I am constantly on the lookout for potential situations to film and 
much of the footage was gathered in this spontaneous manner. As I often film in public places, for example Graves Park where I 
filmed the animal sequences, or when I am on holiday, it is not practical to use a large camera and it draws attention to my activity.  
394. Masschelein, The Unconcept, p. 36, Claxton, The Wayward Mind, p. 58 and p. 80, Rank, The Double, pp. 50‒60.  
395. Rank, Double, p. 58. 
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provinces that stepping on your shadow will bring death.
396
 In Central India pregnant 
women avoid contact with men’s shadows as it may cause the child to resemble him,
397
 
and Fiji islanders believe everyone has two souls, the shadow and the reflection.
398
 
Rank proposes the shadow is the first ‘embodiment’ of the soul. Despite having only 
ever had a rational account of what shadows are, nevertheless I am susceptible to the 
effect of the shadow figures ubiquitous in the supernatural horror genre, such as The 
Babadook, A Nightmare on Elm Street, Nosferatu, and The Shadow People.
399
 
Fig. 44. The Babadook   Fig. 45. A Nightmare on Elm Street          Fig. 46.  Nosferatu 
Also prevalent in both the supernatural horror genre and folklore are mirrors. Rank 
describes the tradition of covering mirrors in houses holding a corpse so the soul does 
not remain in the mirror.
400
 Examples of mirrors in horror films include Candyman, 




Fig. 47. Ring II 
This influenced my decision to film reflections for the middle section of Psychotel. I 
filmed at Rivelin valley when struck by the ambiguity of the image because of the 
clarity of the reflections. Other reflections were filmed on a large television during a 
shoot when the sunlight entering a house produced distinctive light effects. 
                                                 
396. Ibid., p. 50. This text is used in as voice-over in Psychotel. 
397. Ibid., p. 54 
398. Ibid., p. 59. 
399. A Nightmare on Elm Street, dir. Wes Craven, Warner Home Video, 1984 [on DVD], Nosferatu, dir. F. W. Murnau, Jofa-Atelier 
Berlin Johannisthal, 1922 [on DVD], The Shadow People, dir. Matthew Arnold, Infinity Media, 2013 [on DVD], The Shadow 
People, dir. Brian T. Jaynes, Edgen Films, 2017[on DVD], Babadook, dir. Jennifer Kent, Screen Australia, 2014 [on DVD]. 
400. Rank, Double, pp. 62‒3.  
401. Candyman, dir. Bernard Rose, TriStar pictures, 1992, Mirror, Mirror, dir. Marina Sargenti, New City Releasing, 1990, 
Mirrors, dir. Alexandre Aja, 20th Century Fox, 2008, Ring II, dir. Hideo Nakata, Tartan, 1999. See also Top 11 Horror Movie 










Figs 48. Psychotel stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
Rank notes the Homeric conception, that man’s existence is twofold:  
 
In the living human being, completely filled with his soul, there dwells, like an alien  





Here Homer associates the psyche with the soul but suggests another presence. In this 
we may see a forerunner for Freud’s topographies, as well as a relation to the 
unconscious and dreams dating back to the ancient world.  
 
Claxton explores the forerunners to the psychoanalytic account of the unconscious and 
suggests the idea of the soul or spirit offers an explanation for everyday oddities like 
sleep and death. He describes the ancient Egyptian mythology of ‘Ba’ and ‘Ka’: ‘Ka is 
the unconscious life-support system which makes consciousness possible. Ka connects 
‘downwards to the rejuvenating power of Nun and the underworld. Ba connects 
upwards to the world of fancy and dream.’
403
 He also points to the Kalabari division of 
the psyche into the biomgbo and the teme, which correspond to the conscious and 
unconscious mind.
404
 He draws a comparison between the Freudian topology of the ego, 
superego, and the id, and Plato’s tripartite model of the psyche where selfhood is 
likened to a charioteer who struggles to control two fighting horses, a noble white steed 
and an ill-tempered black beast, acknowledging conflicts of interest in the individual 




The tenet of Cartesian dualism is that the mind and body are separate, that the mind is 
immaterial, that it is synonymous with the soul, and is a human feature.
406
 Although 
                                                 
402. Rank, Double, p. 60. 
403. Claxton, The Wayward Mind, p. 58. 
404. Claxton, The Wayward Mind, p. 59. Claxton outlines beliefs he sees as formative of the psychoanalytic unconscious, from 
ancient mythology to neuroscience, tracing a similar development in the progressive stages of thought to that of animism, religion 
and science outlined by Freud in Animism, Magic and the Omnipresence of Thoughts. 
405. Claxton, The Wayward Mind, p. 80. 
406. That animals do not have souls, and by extension do not have minds or consciousness, and therefore do not feel, is an enduring 
and problematic notion. The implication that emotion underpins consciousness suggests a review of the mental life of animals and 
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Cartesian dualism is at the opposite side to monoism in the mind-body problem, 
Descartes’ assertion that the mind is ‘attached’ to the brain by the pineal gland is an 
early step towards an embodied, brain-based understanding of mind. Reflecting on the 
qualities of hunger and thirst in relation to selfhood, Descartes writes;  
 
 I am not [...] lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united 





Daniel C. Dennett unpicks religion in Breaking the Spell, exploring religion as a 
parasite, as an agent in building team-spirit, as a means of protection against the 
consequences of bad decisions, and as a natural phenomenon. As a ‘bright’, godless 
philosopher, he notes that natural phenomena also include war and smoking.
408
 Natural 
or not, religion of some form or other has been part of human life for longer than 
recorded history. It is significant that belief in the mainstream religion has been 
enforced and heresy punishable by death. This is important to consider in the history of 
our understanding of the psyche and it is noteworthy that philosophy is built on a 
foundation of religious belief. This may account in part for the resilience of certain 
notions; however, I argue that the double self, attributed to the soul or understood as a 
division in the psyche, is experiential. In order that we can say ‘I am sick of myself’, we 
must, in some sense, be two. Derrida writes that ‘[w]e must be several in order to write, 
and even to “perceive”’.
409
 He denies the existence of a ‘subject’ who writes, rather a 
‘system of relations between strata’.
410
 He notes that ‘[w]riting is unthinkable without 
repression,’ implying that repression is information that may exert influence.
411
 In his 
commentary on Freud’s metaphor of the mystic writing pad, Derrida discusses the idea 
of ‘breaching’. Breaching, or path-breaking is suggestive of neural networks that hold 
potential to re-fire. It is through stored information that we are able to perceive, that the 
past informs the present as Bergson tells us. Although Derrida’s terminology is 
                                                                                                                                               
our use of them is long overdue. This is referenced in Psychotel. The error that Damasio addresses in the title of his book Descartes’ 
Error, is concerned with the primacy of rational thought. As discussed in the previous chapter, Damasio proposes that emotion and 
consciousness are closely linked neural mechanisms, that it is emotion, not cognition, that underpins decision making, and that 
consciousness is principally generated in brain stem structures, not cortical mechanisms as previously assumed. 
407. René Descartes, ‘Meditations on First Philosophy: Meditation VI’, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, trans. by 
Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 192. I came across this reference in 
Raymond Tallis, The Kingdom of Infinite Space, London: Atlantic Books, 2009, p. 47. 
408. Daniel C. Dennett,  Breaking the Spell, London: Penguin, 2006, pp. 21‒6. Dennett uses the term ‘bright’ to describe those who 
do not believe in God. He argues unconvincingly that similarly to the terms ‘gay’ and ‘straight’, his use of the term ‘bright’ does not 
mean he considers believers to be ‘dims’. 
409. Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, in Writing and Difference, pp. 246‒91, 284. 
410. Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, p. 285. 
411. Ibid.  
92 
 





Maurice Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘double sensation’ to refer to the discrepancy 
between the ‘seer’ and the ‘seen’ as the structure of selfhood that is an ‘ambiguous 
mode of existing’.
413
 He acknowledges an interrelationship between an inner, affective 
perception and an outer view of the self as an object. He suggests that,  
 
[...] a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and because between my body looked at           
and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or   




I attempt a literal representation of doubling at the start of Psychotel using an 
improvised relationship scenario that explores the executive role played by the 
unconscious, with the conscious mind, or the ego complaining of feeling like an 
appendage.  
 
Fig. 49. Psychotel still, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
In The Feeling of What Happens Damasio gives an account of consciousness that 
explores the ‘problem of self from a biological perspective’.
415
 He outlines evolutionary 
stages of consciousness, constructing a topology of the neural underpinnings of 
consciousness and self. Briefly, these are core consciousness, which is shared by all 
conscious organisms, dealing only with the here and now, and extended consciousness, 
which requires memory, and while not exclusively human, is enhanced by language. 
Damasio insists that consciousness is ‘not a monolith’, that extended consciousness is 
built upon a foundation of core consciousness, indicating the former cannot be present 
                                                 
412. Ibid.  
413. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 230. 
414.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968, p. 123‒24. 
415. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 12. 
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without the latter, and that this is the result of an evolutionary process developing from 
the survival advantages of consciousness.
416
 From these two tiers of consciousness stem 
three subsets of ‘self’; the proto-self, core self, and the autobiographical self. From core 
consciousness comes core self: ‘a transient entity, ceaselessly created for each and every 
object with which the brain interacts’.
417
 Damasio thinks this is common to all 
conscious organisms and, like core consciousness, it exists solely in the dimension of 
the here and now. The autobiographical self depends upon ‘systematised memories of 
situations’; it provides the organism with a sense of history and imagined future, and 
retrievable information about the organism’s existence.
418
 The proto-self is a primitive, 




Catherine Malabou reflects on the position of Derrida, Deleuze, and Damasio in relation 
to what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘touching-touched’.
420
 She summarises Derrida’s 
position that auto-affection coincides with the inner voice, that it is a kind of touch, the 
call and response of an individual ‘as if there were two persons in one’.
421
 For Derrida 
auto-affection is always hetero-affection, that is, being affected by the other. She 
summarises that ‘the one who is affected in me is always the other in me, the unknown 
“me” in me’.
422
 With reference to Damasio, Malabou notes ‘a biological alterity of the 
self to itself’, wherein the background condition of selfhood, homeostasis, is 
nonconscious.
423
 Malabou sees a correlation between Damasio’s proto-self and 
Derrida’s idea of hetero-affection. That the proto-self is nonconscious means it stands 
outside selfhood, denying the existence of a combined subject-object, as proposed by 
Merleau-Ponty. Equally, according to Deleuze, there is always a separation between the 
touching and the touched, a ‘plane of immanence, a projective surface that prevents 
immediate contact.’
424
 For Deleuze affects exist on this ‘zone of indetermination’.
425
 
The relation of the body to the psyche, of experiential phenomena to the functioning 
organism could be seen as existing in ‘zones of indetermination’, regions of 
interpretation, traces of operation, of regulation, and representation. Deleuze and 
                                                 
416. Ibid., p.16.  
417. Ibid., p. 17.  
418. Ibid.  
419 Ibid., p. 22.  The proto-self is introduced in the previous chapter in a discussion of Lacan’s notion of the fragmented body.  
420. Malabou and Johnston Self and Emotional Life, p. 64‒67, with reference to Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 
p. 92. 
421. Malabou and Johnston Self and Emotional Life, p. 20. 
422. Ibid., in reference to Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 165. 
423. Malabou and Johnston, Self and Emotional Life, p. 64. 
424. Ibid., p. 67. 
425. Ibid.  
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Guattari suggest there is a ‘multiplicity dwelling within us’.
426
 With reference to H. P. 
Lovecraft they consider the horror of the multiplicity, the loss of distinction from others, 
to merge with nothingness. They write that ‘[...] to know that one is no longer a definite 





Robbins’s hypothesis, introduced in chapter 4, understands two modes of 
consciousness, primordial consciousness that is affect and impulse-driven, and 
reflective representational consciousness. For Robbins primordial consciousness uses ‘a 
language of global unity where there is no separation between self and other’.
428
 He 
writes that primordial consciousness does not recognise the passage of time and is 
concerned only with the here and now.
429
 This description shows correlation between 
Robbins’ hypothesis, Damasio’s core consciousness, and the ‘timelessness’ of the 
Freudian unconscious.
430
 These observations show developing lines of thought from 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience, which, while they do not fully 
correspond, indicate a convergence of ideas.  
 
Damasio proposes that extended consciousness is an evolutionary late comer and 
suggests that much of human action happens nonconsciously or at the level of core 
consciousness. This is supported by findings in cognitive psychology, including the 
work of Benjamin Libet, whose work on free will demonstrated the discrepancy 
between action initiation and perceived volitional response. This established that the 
impression of free will results from sensory feedback after motor activities have already 
taken place, and which led to the understanding of consciousness as ‘post-hoc 
confabulation’.
431
 The degree to which actions are largely unconscious motor responses 
should not be underestimated. John A. Bargh and Melissa J. Ferguson note that over the 
last ten years there has been a shift from environmental determinism of everything to 
                                                 
426. Deleuze, and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 280.  
427. Ibid.  
428. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, p. 12. 
429. Ibid.   
430. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, p. 12. Core consciouness is discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis. For a full 
account see Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 17. For an in-depth account of time and the Freudian unconscious see Kelly 
Ann Noel-Smith, Freud on Time and Timeless: The Ancient Greek Influence, Ph.D. thesis, Birkbeck: University of London, 2014. 
431. Benjamin Libet, ‘Do we have free will?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, <www.imprint-academic.com/jcs>, accessed 15 
February 2016. At the New Scientist ‘Consciousness’ conference held at the British Library, London, 2015, the cognitive 
neuroscientist Patrick Haggard showed that when an experiment involved choice as well as intention the discrepancy between action 
initiation and perception of the start of the operation was reduced. Although in both instances mechanical action preceded intention, 
the choice, for example, between moving a lever to the right or to the left as opposed to a simple button press test, showed an 
increase in higher cognition processing.   
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environmental determinism of very little.
432
 They cite William James, who noted that it 
is rare for a choice to precede an act as ‘thinking was doing’.
433
 With an impressive 
review of studies across the schools of behaviourism and cognitive science, they 
conclude: ‘much of an individual’s complex psychological and behavioural functioning 




Automaticity, its appearance, as well as the idea that the conscious self is not running 
the show, might account for experiences of the uncanny. Freud refers to ‘feet that dance 
by themselves’ as especially uncanny, not only because of their separation from the 
body, but their independence of movement.
435
 Jentsch extends his account of the 
uncanny to include the ‘sight of the articulations of most mental and many nervous 
illnesses’, including epilepsy, the ‘sacred disease’. On the impression of witnessing the 
automaticity that underlies consciousness he writes that ‘the dark knowledge dawns on 
the unschooled observer that mechanical processes are taking place in that which he was 
previously used to regarding as a unified psyche’.
436
 This point is made in Psychotel 
with reference to epilepsy in the ‘lecture’, a literal image of a twitching hand. The shot 
is repeated later during the ‘haruspex’ sequence. With reference to the spirit guide, the 
narrator says ‘she used my hands’. The statement is ambiguous but implies 
uncomfortable possession or control. Possession is referenced in the automatic writing 






Fig. 50. Psychotel stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
Withy’s meticulous study of the uncanny in Heidegger’s work reveals the very essence 
of the human being to be uncanny. She proposes that Heidegger’s understanding of 
                                                 
432. John A. Bargh and Melissa J. Ferguson, ‘Beyond Behaviourism: On the Automaticity of Higher mental Processes’, 
Psychological Bulletin, vol. 126, no. 6, 2000, 925‒45. 
433. Bargh and Ferguson, ‘Beyond Behaviourism’, p. 929. 
434. Ibid., p. 941.  
435. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 14. 
436. Jentsch, ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’, p. 13‒14. 
437. The over-writing in this sequence is intended as a reference to the mystic writing pad, a toy drawing implement in which a wax 
pad receives an impression of writing from the page above. To Freud this resembled a theoretical layering of information in the 
psyche. Freud, ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad’, pp. 51‒55.  
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human ‘openness to meaning’ is uncannily structured.
438
 At the core she describes a 
‘counterturning’ between ‘absencing’ and ‘presencing’ in Dasein as fundamental to this 
structure. Heidegger’s project examines the nature of ‘being’ from a standpoint that 
differs from philosophical approaches aiming to understand the nature of the human 
being in terms of selfhood or consciousness. Heidegger’s term Dasein is discussed as a 
‘being-in-the-world’ that experiences objects as ‘ready to hand’, understood by the 
fluidity of action rather than as intellectual understanding. I see a correlation with 
Damasio’s account of the transient core self, which exists in the here and now, 
responsive to an external environment where it is situated. Yet, Dasein is also a being 
that questions being. For Damasio, the autobiographical self, an evolutionary latecomer, 
built on the core self, experiences temporality with recalled past and projected future. It 
is assumed (although not known) that a higher cognitive capacity, with the addition of 





Withy summarises Heidegger’s being: ‘In outline, it holds that the human being is a 
self-constituting and polemic turning between openness and finitude, transcendence and 
thrownness.’
440
 She clarifies Heidegger’s observation that when the human being 
becomes reflective and self-aware, or ‘presences’, the essence of being is concealed, or 
‘absences’.
441
 This suggests a double mode of being between which the individual 
shifts. She writes: 
 
 Recall that the unity of the human being’s double uncanniness means that being cast out 
 of the essence belongs to the human essence. When being throws the human out of the 
 homely, when the human essence expels itself from itself by yielding the non-essence 
 (concealment), this is not simply the human being’s departure from what is essential to 
 it. Rather, it is what is essential to it. The claim is that the human being first has an 




This suggests that the essence of the human being lies in this dual state. Implicit in this 
understanding of being is an innate or primitive state of being, pre-reflective, and 
automatic. It suggests that the outcome of communication across brain regions is 
experienced as switching modes of thought and shifting of attention, and that the 
                                                 
438. Withy, Heidegger: On Being Uncanny, p. 241. 
439. I question this assumption further in chapter 7. 
440. Withy, Heidegger: On Being Uncanny, p. 149. 
441. Ibid.  
442. Ibid., p. 148.  
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operational aspect of the being occurs behind the scenes as it were. Withy describes the 
human being is an ‘ontico-ontological entity’, explaining that to be an entity the human 
being must ‘show up to itself’.
443
 Although phrased differently, in his consideration of 
consciousness, Damasio identifies the problem of understanding how ‘the brain [...] 
engenders a sense of self in the act of knowing’.
444 Freud, in a discussion of the double 
in terms of primary narcissism, refers to a mental facility that allows for self-
observation, able to ‘treat the rest of the ego like an object’.
445
 In these we see 
similarities in the questions posed by psychoanalysis, philosophy, and neuroscience.  
 
That the human is able to see itself as an object has been at the centre of a number of 
recent experiments from cognitive psychology. At the New Scientist ‘Consciousness’ 
conference, Lara Maister presented a paper on ‘The Self’,
446
 including the rubber hand 
illusion.
447
 The experiment is designed to trick the brain into thinking that a rubber hand 
is the participant’s own through simultaneously stroking the false limb and the real 
limb, which remains hidden from view. The brain sees and feels this stroking and 
connects the two, thus demonstrating that our world view is a construction of best-fit 
scenario.
448
 Maister referred to similar experiments showing bizarre results, such as 
simultaneous facial stroking causing the participant to think that the stroking of 
someone else’s face they are witnessing accounts for the sensation of being stroked that 
they are feeling.
449
 Virtual reality technology allows for other unusual experiments 
including the VR mannequin / body swap, and the gender body swap.
450
 These 
experiments demonstrate that the most basic convictions we hold, such as the 
recognition of our own faces and body parts, are flexible and constructed from a dual 
perspective of internal feeling and external perception.
451
 
                                                 
443. Ibid., p. 140.  
444. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 9.  
445. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 235.  
446. Lara Maister, ‘The Self’, New Scientist Live, ‘Consciousness’ conference, The British Library, 2015. 
447. The Rubber Hand Illusion, Horizon: Seeing is Believing? BBC 2, a short extract from the programme demonstrates this 
illusion, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sxwn1w7MJvk>, accessed 26 November 2015. 
448. This has led to the use of a mirror box as a simple but pioneering treatment for amputees suffering from phantom limb pain, 
which allows the patient to trick their brain into ‘seeing’ movement, and subsequently experiencing relief in the phantom limb 
through the manipulation of the existing limb. 
449. Further experiments show that this can affect the view of the other person being stroked, including that participants 
subsequently believe the face of the other more closely resembles their own, that they are more attractive and that their opinions are 
to be valued more than was found in control groups. 
450. The VR body swap experiment uses linked VR headsets to give a participant the impression that their body, viewed through the 
headset, is that of a mannequin. Similar to the rubber hand experiment, the participant rapidly accommodates the idea that the plastic 
body is their own. There are many examples of this on-line, also gender swapping. See an example of mannequin body swap here: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tn2nsJAfDfQ>, accessed 12 October 2017, and gender body swap here: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i51Xd9VzzxY>, accessed 12 October 2017. 
451. These experiments are reminiscent of Lacan’s ‘inverted bouquet experiment’, or ‘optical model’ (modèle optique), an optical 
illusion, first referenced in 1954, that describes the nature of human identification, or, according to Evans, ‘the structuring role of 




A repulsive experiment performed on a frog is described here by Wilson, recounted 




Imagine a decapitated frog. This frog has lost cerebral control of its body, yet its 
muscular and peripheral nervous systems function normally: appropriately stimulated, 
the frog’s limbs will move in a manner not unlike that of an intact frog. Imagine now 
that a drop of acid is placed on the thigh of this decapitated frog. The acid irritates the 
skin. The headless frog responds to this stimulant in an uncanny manner; employing 
behaviour that is routine for a normally functioning frog, it uses the foot on the 
affected leg to wipe the acid away. Imagine finally that this foot is amputated. The 
decapitated frog struggles for some time to remove the acid in the same manner (i.e., 
with its footless leg). Eventually, after reflecting on the fruitlessness of this method, 





This experiment shows that the nervous system is thoughtful.
454
 It is a disturbing 
experiment to imagine because of the unreasonable treatment of a frog and due to the 
uncanny sensation that arises on witnessing automaticity; especially relevant here is 
Jentsch’s account of uncanniness stemming from doubt over a creature’s living status.  
 
Freud notes that a ‘person’s own body, above all its surface, is a place from which both 
external and internal perceptions may spring’.
455
 Jon Sletvold draws attention to Freud’s 
proposal that feelings of internal perceptions are more primordial than external 
perceptions and the root of the ego and the id are to be found in these bodily 
sensations.
456
 He identifies an organic basis to the Freudian ego that presaged a bodily 
understanding of subjectivity found in contemporary neuroscience. He concludes: ‘For 




Freud’s subtle distinctions between internal and external perception of the body imply 
an evolutionary perspective:  
 
                                                                                                                                               
For a reconstruction of the experiment see Stijn Vanheule, ‘Lacan’s Construction and Deconstruction of the Double-Mirror Device’, 
Frontiers in Psychology, 2011, vol. 2., p. 209, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3171787/>, accessed 3 June 2019. 
452. Charles Darwin The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animal, London: John Murray, 1872. 
453. Wilson, Psychosomatic, p. 63. 
454. In the chapter ‘Emotional Lizards’, Wilson describes Paul MacLean’s model of the ‘triune brain’, a theory of a limbic system 
in the brain that mediates emotion. MacLean’s model divides the human forebrain into reptilian, paleomammalian (the limbic 
system), and neomammalian. Although now disputed by neurobiologists for detailed inaccuracy, for Wilson, this hierarchy of three 
brains in one, remains a useful conceptual model.  
455. Freud, ‘The Ego and the Id’, p. 364.  
456. Jon Sletvold, ‘The Ego and the Id revisited: Freud and Damasio on the body ego / self’, The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, vol. 94, 2013, 1019‒1032, pp. 1022‒23. 
457. Sletvold, ‘The Ego and the Id revisited’, p. 1026. 
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 Internal perceptions yield sensations of processes arising in the most diverse and 
 certainly also the deepest strata of the mental apparatus. Very little is known about these 
 sensations and feelings [...] They are more primordial, more elementary, than 




Solms, founder of neuropsychoanalysis, reminds us that Freud writes:  
 
 The id, cut off from the external world, has a worldly perception of its own. It detects 
 with extraordinary acuteness certain changes in its interior, especially oscillations in the 





Solms notes a similarity between Freud’s id and Damasio’s correlation of emotion and 
consciousness. He distinguishes two different modes of perception in relation to the 
consciousness of the body: 
 
 The internal type of consciousness consists in states rather than objects of 
 consciousness. The internal body is not an object of perception unless it is 
 externalised and presented to the classical senses; it is the subject of perception. It 




Solms proposes a complete reversal of the psychoanalytic tenet of conscious and 
unconscious. For Solms it is the id that is conscious and the ego unconscious. He 
proposes two aspects of the body are represented in the brain, the internal and the 
external body. These are associated with different brain regions and different aspects of 
consciousness: 
 
 Very broadly speaking, the brainstem mechanisms derived from the autonomic 
 body are associated with affective consciousness, and the cortical mechanisms 




The ‘body image’ that Solms equates with the external body is thought to be produced 
from cortical maps, ‘projections of sensory receptors on the surface of the body’, 
equated with the homunculus body map.
462
 Freud wrote of the ‘“cortical homunculus” 
of the anatomists’ as an ‘anatomical analogy’ of the ego as a projection of the body’s 
                                                 
458. Freud, ‘The Ego and the Id’, p. 360.  
459. Solms, ‘The Conscious Id’, p. 8.  
460. Ibid., p. 7. Original italics.  
461. Ibid., p. 5. This reference forms part of the voice-over in Psychotel.  
462. This homunculus map refers to the location of sensory receptors as relating to specific parts of the body. It does not refer to the 
notion of the homunculus as a small sentient entity that does the thinking, discussed previously in relation to Freud’s description of 
censorship. The homunculus map is noted in Scanner in relation to the close proximity of the feet to the genitals, referenced by 





 Solms draws attention to how closely this resembles Freud’s accounts of the 
mental apparatus, reminding us that for Freud the ego was ‘a bodily ego [...] ultimately 
derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the 
body’.
464
 The mechanism that represents the external body also represents other external 





Solms tells us the internal body is autonomic, concerned with the internal milieu, and is 
located in brain stem structures, not the cortex. Through upper brainstem arousal 
mechanisms the internal body employs the external body in meeting vital needs. He 
points out that this is a hierarchical relationship, that although there is a two-way flow 
of information, ‘the cortex (external body) is contingent upon brainstem (internal body) 
activation [...] and, moreover, the internal aspect is prerequisite for the external 
aspect’.
466
 This is shown by the guaranteed loss of consciousness resulting from 
brainstem damage but the reverse, cortical damage or obliteration, does not necessarily 
result in the same. The example Solms gives is the case of hydranencephaly, the in 
utero destruction of the cortex which is re-absorbed and replaced with cerebrospinal 
fluid. Hydranencephalic people have no functioning cortex, yet they have distinct levels 
of consciousness including sleep and waking cycles, seizures and recovery, and show 
emotional responses. The presence of their primary (affective) self ‘proves that affective 
consciousness is both generated and felt subcortically’.
467
 The generation of 
consciousness in the upper brainstem, called the ‘reticular activating system’, has been 
demonstrated in brain imaging studies.
468
 Freud believed the cortex to be the seat of 
consciousness and considered the logical position for the outfacing layer to be at the 
border between the inside and outside of the mental apparatus. That consciousness is 
cortically generated is a formally widespread assumption, and the association of 
consciousness with brainstem mechanisms is relatively new.
469
 Solms insists he has 
only added anatomical detail in his account of the ego and the id and their 
corresponding cortical and brainstem location, noting Freud’s embodied conception of 
                                                 
463. Freud, ‘The Ego and the Id’, 1984, pp. 364‒5.   
464. Solms, ‘The Conscious Id’, p.8, referencing Freud, ‘The Ego and the Id’, p. 364, including footnote.  
465. This is relevant to Lacan’s mirror stage, discussed in chapter 4, where the self is seen as an external object. 
466. Solms, ‘The Conscious Id’, p. 6. Original italics. 
467. Ibid., p. 11.  
468. Ibid. Solms refers to Moruzzi and Magoun in 1949 as first demonstrating this by EEG. 
469. This has huge but unsurprising implications to animal consciousness and theories of self-hood. 
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the mental apparatus and the accuracy of his association of the id with instinctual 
emotion. He summarises: 
 
 Consciousness is not generated in the cortex, it is generated in the brainstem. Moreover, 
 consciousness is not inherently perceptual; it is inherently affective. And in its primary 




Therefore the id is conscious and the ego is not. Although this appears to be a complete 
reversal, Freud said ‘the ego is also unconscious,’ and the second topography sees the 
ego as spanning both systems Cs. and Ucs.
471
 Solms’ conclusion is that because we 
normally think of ourselves as conscious we can overlook the fact that we are 
conscious, and as such ‘the primary subject of consciousness is invisible’.
472
 This 
returns us to Heidegger whose structure of ‘presencing’ and ‘absencing’ Withy shows to 
be uncanny. 
 
Opatow understands the psychoanalytic unconscious as an original mode of 
consciousness. This supports the proposal that the divisions of the psyche result from 
the evolution of the brain: 
 
 Rather than being a preliminary activity that causes a conscious event, the unconscious 
 helps constitute the inner structure of experiencing consciousness. Each increase in 
 external objectivity reflects an intensification of subjective inwardness and inner 





Slavoj Žižek objects to Damasio’s account of selfhood, rejecting the proposal that 
primary and second-order neural mapping produces conscious selfhood on two counts. 
The mapping of the relation between an organism and an object (primary mapping), and 
the subsequent mapping of the change in the organism resulting from that encounter 
(second-order mapping), would, for Žižek, produce two levels on mapping, not the 
integrated arrival, through the complexity of these two systems, of self-reflective 
consciousness, or self in the act of knowing that Damasio claims. Žižek points to the 
apparent contradiction of ‘the storyteller who, paradoxically, emerges through telling 
                                                 
470. Solms, ‘The Conscious Id’, p. 12. 
471. Freud, ‘The Ego and the Id’, p. 362.  
472. Solms, ‘The Conscious Id’, p. 16. As a brief aside it is worth noting the recent interest in mindfulness and the renewed interest 
in meditation in the West. I suggest this is in response to the ceaseless attention required by the digital age but speculate that the aim 
of these activities is the connect with the ‘primary subject of consciousness’. 
473. Opatow, ‘The Real Unconscious’, p. 880. 
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the story, who exists only within his own storytelling’.
474
 Žižek insists that he is never 
only his body, ‘in spite of all the subtle phenomenological descriptions à la Merleau-
Ponty that try to convince me to the contrary’.
475
 What he is, he states, is ‘the pure One 
of an empty Self which remains the same One throughout the constant change of 
autobiographical narratives’.
476
 Žižek relates this to Kant’s ‘pure subject of 
transcendental apperception which is just an empty point of self-relating.’
477
 He 
suggests this empty pure subject is Lacan’s . This subject, barred by language, 
alienated, is the self before the mirror phase, before the subject is formed in relation to 
the other.
478
 Žižek describes  as ‘the subjective correlative to emotions prior to 
feeling: it is only through feelings that I become the “full” subject of lived 
experience’.
479
 Lacan’s  is the subject of the unconscious, a ‘pulsation’ that 
‘manifests itself in daily life as a fleeting irruption of something foreign or 
extraneous’.
480
 Žižek’s language suggests something faintly uncanny about this ‘pure 
One of an empty Self’. He describes a primitive state that could be aligned with the 
notion of affective consciousness arising from brain stem structures, or the ‘conscious 
id’, and the pre-mirror stage subject, barred by (reflective representational) language, 
corresponds to Robbins’s primordial consciousness. 
 
In this section I have outlined ideas from different disciplines that appear to describe the 
same mental phenomena. There is a correlation between Damasio’s core-consciousness 
and Robbins’s primordial consciousness. Both are concerned with the here and now. 
This timelessness is an aspect of the Freudian unconscious. There is correlation with 
Solms’s conscious and affect-driven id. These primary or primordial mental states are 
described as foundational while others, Damasio’s extended consciousness, Robbins’s 
representational consciousness, Freud’s ego appear to be later developments both in 
evolutionary terms and in the development of the individual. The extent to which these 
conscious states are present may be culturally determined. I return to this in chapter 7. 
Making these interdisciplinary connections is a new contribution to knowledge. In the 
                                                 
474. Žižek, The Parallax View, p. 224. 
475. Ibid., p. 227.  
476. Ibid.  
477. Ibid.  
478. For a detailed account see Fink, The Lacanian Subject, pp. 35‒48.  
479. Žižek, The Parallax View, p. 227. 
480. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 41. 
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context of this research it is relevant where it furthers an understanding of the uncanny 
and creative practice which I shall return to in the conclusion.  
 
The Uncanny Double: Otherness and Automaticity  
The women gathering stray wisps from their napes 
‒ Baggy amphibians play a sombre chess 




The opening sequence of Psychotel features reverse action of a pebble hitting a pond, 
ripples flowing back towards a point of stillness.
482
 Disrupted physics as a method of 
creating unease in the audience and reverse-motion photography is a common trope of 





Fig. 51. Ring, dir. Hideo Nakata 
 
Although not apparent in these still images, this sequence is unnerving in part due to the 
woman’s weird movement which I believe to be performed backwards and reversed. 
Her hidden face contributes to the uncanny quality; hair over the face has become 
synonymous with Asian horror. The sequence below is from Andrei Tarkovsky’s 
Mirror, which pre-dates Ringu by over twenty years.
484
 Although not a horror film, 
Mirror might be interpreted as occupying a subjective landscape and the sequence 
below feels like a dream. The decaying building with collapsing ceiling is dream-like 
although I cannot explain why dreams of derelict interiors are common. The strangeness 
of the sequence may be accounted for by the inappropriate lack of reaction in the 
                                                 
481. Bruce Dawe, ‘The Frog Plague’, Twelve Poets 1950‒1970, p. 113. Extract. 
482. When I shot this sequence I intended only to make a piece of reverse action, however a friend who viewed an early edit of the 
film said it reminded her of the myth that birds overwinter at the bottom of ponds. I did not know of this as a former belief but I had 
come across reference to it in a short story, ‘Swallows Sleep in Winter’ by Adam Marek in a compilation of uncanny tales about 
birds, edited by Nicholas Royle, Murmurations: An Anthology of Uncanny Stories about Birds, Outer Hebrides: Two Ravens Press, 
2011, pp. 1‒9. 
483. Ring, dir. Hideo Nakata, Tartan, 1998 [on DVD]. Ringu was the original title of this film that was first in a trilogy. A US 
version of the film was also made, Ring, dir. Gore Verbinski, Universal Pictures Video, 2003 [on DVD]. 






character to the falling ceiling.
485
 I am inclined to situate Tarkovsky’s work in the 
sphere of the ‘spiritual uncanny’ that will be expanded later. 
 
 
Figs. 52, Mirror, dir. Andrei Tarkovsky 
 
The sequence in Psychotel featuring reversed speech is an attempt to represent the effect 
the psyche can have upon one’s environment. My post-concussive syndrome, addressed 
in Unhomely Street, made it seem as though the world in which I had previously dwelt 
was stained with grief, as though the environment had been sprayed by a dark viscous 
substance (especially cloying on tarmac and concrete). This shifting of the very fabric of 
the world is, I suspect, a common experience for those suffering mental illness, acting 
as a reminder that our environment is a flexible, constructed reality, not a fixed, 
unchanging state. The sequence is positioned in the central section where the narrative 
changes narrator and shifts from hotel to train. The movement from one mental world to 
another seemed relevant here as well as the splitting of the narrator/character as 
indicated in the voice-over.  
 
 
Fig. 53. Psychotel stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
Another brief sample of reversed speech used in Psychotel is taken from the 1960s 
television programme Mister Ed. Played backwards the words ‘someone sang a song for 
Satan’ can be heard.
486
 Reverse motion features in Jean Cocteau’s Le Testament 
                                                 
485. I attempted something similar for Psychotel but the sequence was not included in the final film as it felt like a weak pastiche.  
486. I came across this reference when researching for the National Centre for Popular Music in 1998. I was undertaking an 
installation on the subject of ‘Heaven and Hell’. The Mister Ed theme music was featured in a television programme that covered 
the Judas Priest trail in which the band were investigated for including subliminal message in their music that led to the suicide and 






d’Orphée; David Lynch’s Lost Highway and Twin Peaks use both reversed action and 
speech in the exploded shed and Laura Palmer’s ‘dwarf dream’.
487
 My use of reversal is 
closer in affect to these art-house films than to the Asian extreme example, although all 




   
Fig. 54. Le Testament d’Orphée still  Fig. 55. Lost Highway still   Fig. 56. Twin Peaks still 
 
This mechanism is related to Massahiro Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis, which 
proposes that inanimate objects with a human appearance, such as robots with eyes, are 
appealing until they become so like human beings that instead of noticing what is 
human-like, we notice what is not, such as the disturbing slow blink of humanoid 
robots.
489
 This is fear of the unknown at a very basic level. Our sensory systems alert us  
that something not being as it should is a potential threat. In evolutionary terms, 
humankind’s main threat was from itself. Reading aggression rather than amity in the 
face and body language of another primes the individual for defensive behaviour; 
however, when the behaviour cannot be interpreted in the normal way threat becomes 
uncanny. Uncanny valley and corrupted physics are threatening due to the suggestion of 
the mechanical in the human, like the uneasy feeling on witnessing seizures as noted by 
both Jentsch and Freud.
490






                                                                                                                                               
on the streets of Istanbul. The use of backwards sounds are common in the supernatural horror genre, and featured specifically in 
The Exorcist, dir. William Friedkin, 1974. 
487. Le Testament d’Orphée, dir. Jean Cocteau, BFI, 1960 [on DVD], Lost Highway, dir. David Lynch, CiBay 2000, Asymmetrical 
Productions, 1997 [on DVD], Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me, dir. David Lynch, Universal Pictures, 1992 [on DVD]. 
488. ‘Intellectual uncertainty’ being the main cause of the uncanny sensation according to Jentsch, ‘On the Psychology of the 
Uncanny’.  
489. Masahiro Mori, ‘The Uncanny Valley’, trans. by Karl F. MacDorman and Takashi Minato, Energy, vol. 7, issue 4, 1970.   






I could not sleep with her in the room 
Like a death in the desert. I was  




In 2018 I visited Istanbul. The material shot there reveals filmmaking as a means of 
uncovering unconscious feelings. I could not sleep while in Istanbul, largely because I 
was over-stimulated by the environment and woken regularly during the night by the 
call to prayer at dawn. I stayed in a hotel next to the Blue Mosque, and the other guests 
got up to pray, so four-thirty in the morning was one of the hotel’s busiest times. On one 
such night the light from the window looked spooky so I got up to film it. Without a 
great deal of thought I put on a black headscarf and stood against the window so I 
appeared as a shadowy figure. When I assembled the sequence I became aware that the 
potent element of the shot, the punctum, was for me the headscarf rather than the 





Fig. 57. Psychotel, dir. Suannah Gent 
 
The sequence is orientalist in nature, indicates a feeling of otherness, and demonstrates 
how spontaneous filmmaking can reveal problematic aspects of the individual psyche 
and broader society.
493
 Michael Foucault, in his ‘Preface’, summarises that Anti-
Oedipus asks ‘[h]ow do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behaviour?’
494
 
Because, as translator Mark Seem reminds us, ‘[...] we are sick, so sick, of ourselves!’
495
   
                                                 
491. Vincent Buckley, ‘Give me time and I'll tell you’, Twelve Poets 1950‒1970, p. 56. Extract.  
492. The Woman in Black, dir. James Watkins, Hammer Film Productions, 2012 [on DVD]. The ghostly figure in The Woman in 
Black wears a veil indicative that she is mourning. 
493. Orientalism, the term given to patronising western representations of the East is coined and expanded in Edward W. Said, 
Orientalism, New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1978. The overall tone of Psychotel is intended to promote multispecies unity. In this 
section of the film I used the voice-over to suggest a knowing position in the narrator of the connotation of the image to reveal 
territorialism and uphold a move beyond ingrained reaction. The sequence voice-over is intended to question the threat of otherness 
presented by the woman and by cultural difference. 
494. Michael Foucault, ‘Preface’, in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. xv. 
495. Mark Seem, ‘Introduction’, in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. xxiii. 
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I came to reconsider this sequence further following a viewing of The Exorcist, which I 
had not watched for thirty-five years.
497
 The film opens with scenes from Al-Hadar in 
Iraq and establishes a narrative wherein the East is portrayed as the dark, mysterious 
homeland of evil. I consider this was also a stimulus in the Istanbul sequence and serves 






Fig. 58. The Exorcist, dir. William Friedkin 
 
The revelation that this film footage contained these ideas was similar to my surprise 
that the bathroom sequence might have sexual overtones, demonstrating how 
psychoanalysis operates as an analytic framework for discussing works of art. In 
psychoanalytic terminology my experience when filming could be described as the 




It is worth noting that when filming the window sequence I caught sight of myself in a 
long mirror. For a moment I considered how frightened I would be if I moved and the 
reflection did not. Granted it was the middle of the night and I was very tired ‒ but still I 
have to admit to being momentarily afraid of my own reflection. I am reminded of 
Freud’s description of seeing his reflection in the mirror on a train door and assuming it 
to be another ‘elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a travelling hat’.
499
 Avery 
Gordon re-evaluates this passage from ‘The “Uncanny”’ noting that Freud ‘thoroughly 
                                                 
496. The desire to uphold political correctness in accepting other cultures and to avoid the patronage of the Western view towards 
the plight of the Eastern woman are reasons enough to avoid commentary on such matters, however; political correctness may also 
serve as a form of social repression. 
497. The Exorcist, dir. William Friedkin, Warner Bros., 1974 [on DVD]. 
498. I must also note possible influence from the Islamophobic bias of mainstream Western media in recent years. 








 She suggests that the uncanny is leading Freud away from 
himself noting:  
 
 There is no expectation that Freud could turn his attention to the colonialism that 
 partially underwrites his distaste for the spectre of primitive thinking inhabiting his 




Instances of misrecognition of reflections are commonplace references for the uncanny 
but do they relate to repression and can they be said to come from the unconscious? 
Freud writes: 
 
 It would appear that we invest with a feeling of uncanniness those impressions which 
 lend support to [...] the animistic attitude of mind, at a time when our judgment has 




My momentary belief that my reflection might move could be accounted for by Freud’s 
description above. I am inclined to consider that the close resemblance of the mirror 
image to a horror film caused my reaction, a somatic marker; however, when watching 
film one suspends disbelief in order to engage with the on-screen narrative. This 
suspension of disbelief might be viewed as a form of repression, corresponding to 
Freud’s idea of an ‘animistic attitude of mind’. In instances of misrecognition of mirror 
images, such as Freud describes, the surprise at being caught out is a reminder that the 
brain constructs reality, that we hold an internal and external perception of the self.  
 
We have all experienced forgetting something while knowing, or rather feeling it is 
below the surface. Not long ago I forgot the name of a band I used to listen to. I recalled 
that I used to listen to the band in my twenties, along with another band, and felt sure 
that if I remembered this second band I would remember the first. The name of the 
second band arrived, it was Portishead. I immediately remembered the original band 
name, Radiohead. I had assumed that I would recall the first following the second 
because of proximity of time when I listened to the music but I suspect that the 
similarity of name had connected but remained below consciousness. Fink writes:  
 
 Thus according to Lacan’s interpretation of Freud, when repression takes place, a word, 
 or some part of a word, ‘sinks down under’, metaphorically speaking. The word does 
 not thereby become inaccessible to consciousness, and it may indeed be a word that a 
                                                 
500. Gordon, Ghostly Matters, p. 54. 
501. Ibid. 
502. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 241, footnote with reference to ‘Totem and Taboo’ (1913). 
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 person uses perfectly well in everyday conversation. But the very fact of being 
 repressed, that word, or some part thereof, begins to take on a new role. It establishes 





Here we see a description of repression according to Lacan that closely resembles my 
account of forgetting Radiohead, although I do not consider my forgetting in this 
instance to be an act of repression. The ‘complex set of connections’ could refer to the 
temporal and locational associations with the two bands as well as the linguistic 
connection. As Fink continues, his description of the unconscious grows more general: 
 
 the unconscious is nothing but a ‘chain’ of signifying elements, such as words, 
 phonemes, and letters, which ‘unfolds’ in accordance with very precise rules over 




That the unconscious specifically consists of repressed material loses traction in this 
quotation. We do not know of the structural complexities that underpin brain activity 
but it is likely that it will operate according to simple laws that rapidly gain complexity 
due to the extent of connectivity it possesses.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the experience of intuitive filmmaking is that material seems 
to arrive from elsewhere. Instances of mental material coming into consciousness, that 
make us aware that nonconscious processes are controlling our actions, especially when 
these instances strike us as uncanny, may be said to have come from the unconscious. In 
clinical situations where words or mannerisms reveal thoughts that are occurring at a 
sub-behavioural level, the unconscious is said to be at work. In altered states of 
consciousness such as dreams, information is exchanged, reminding us of things 
forgotten, or rather, reminding us that things are not forgotten. If we care to look we are 
constantly reminded of behind-the-scenes operations. Instances relating to the 
unconscious seem to be accompanied by a moment of recognition, a particular feeling. I 





                                                 
503. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 8.  




THIRD FLOOR: LIFT GOING UP 
The all-seeing narrator and the harbinger of death 
There is one who remembers the way to your door: 
Life you may evade, but Death you shall not. 




In making a film that explores the uncanny I had to bear in mind that ‘[i]n the realm of 
fiction many things are not uncanny which would be so if it happened in real life’, as 
Freud notes.
506
 During the production of Psychotel I had a dream about a motorbike 
razzing about on a patch of wasteland near some flats. Behind the bike on a rope was a 
grey, medieval head. The effect of the dream was extremely uncanny and I tried to re-
create the scene. As I might have predicted, the effect in the film does not fully capture 
the tone of dream; however, it contributes narrative ambiguity, and surreality. Other 
dream references include the text in which the ‘points’ are disappearing accompanied by 
a voice-over stating ‘there’s no point!’, and the spoken story that plays over the 
spawning fish.
507
 The inclusion of dreams in the film is a reference to the dream-work 
of psychoanalysis and points the viewer to interpreting the film as a representation of 
psychic life. Derrida tells us dreams are a path back to ‘a landscape of writing. Not a 
writing which simply transcribes, a stony echo of muted words but a lithography before 
words: metaphonetic, nonlinguistic, alogical.’
508
 Robbins claims that dreams are the 
first manifestation of primordial consciousness, commencing in utero in the third 
trimester with the appearance of REM sleep.
509
 He argues that dreams are conscious and 
the confusion has arisen as they occur during physiological unconsciousness. Dreams 
are not part of reflective representational thought; rather, they are ‘concrete, situational 
or stimulus-bound, affect or impulse-driven imagery’.
510
 On waking the dreamer moves 
to reflective thought and reviews the dream in the language of symbolism.
511
  
                                                 
505. T. S. Elliot, ‘Choruses from “The Rock”’, T. S. Elliot: A selection by the Author, p. 114. 
506. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 250. 
507. I had the ‘there’s no point!’ dream when I was recovering from post-concussive syndrome and I have understood it to contain a 
double meaning; there is no point attempting to ward off potential disaster (in my state of mind at the time this related to climate 
change) as it was inevitable, but also that the inevitability meant there was no point in worrying about it either. The tone of the 
dream on waking was one of mild relief. Unlike its representation in the film, the dream comprised of algebraic symbols, as well as 
sentences of text in which the ‘points’ were missing. The dream that is recounted over the spawning fish, that plays on the words 
‘consulate’ and ‘consummate’, came after I went to sleep with the ‘intention’ of dreaming an ‘answer’ for a section of the film. 
Although the meaning is obscure I included it in the film as it came as an ‘answer’ and contains a play with words that is common 
within psychoanalytic dream-work.  
508. Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, in Writing and Difference, p. 259. 
509. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, pp. 25‒6. 
510. Ibid., p. 21. 




‘This is only a dream.’ Akira Mizuta Lippit begins his chapter that explores Derrida’s 
commentary on Freud’s dreamwork. ‘There and not there, the voice is folded into the 
dream as a trace of exteriority, inside and out, inside-out.’
512
 I use this quotation in 
Psychotel, in the sequence that features a house with large television and piano. This 
text is combined with a section from The Sandman. My intention is to create an 
ambiguity that references the dream, both by the shifting narratives of the voice-over 
and the shifting plane of focus in the image. Lippit refers to Jean-Louis Baudry who 
suggests ‘cinema offers an artificial psychosis’.
513
 Cinema, like the dream, simulates 
reality in a fusion of interior and exterior perception. The house is my parents’ house in 
which I grew up. The fact of this was, once again, not considered when filming. This 
reference is unknown by the viewer and therefore perhaps not relevant, except the 
reference to the father’s room in Hoffman’s story contributes to the reading of this space 
as a domestic dwelling not a hotel. For me this house is layered with memory and 
infused with feeling and I suspect this prompted me to approach filming the space in a 
manner that was unlike the visual treatment of the hotel rooms that I surveyed as an 
external viewer. In my parents’ house I experience a fragmentation as objects, light 
falling a certain way, cause me to recall past moods, return me to childhood and 
adolescence, remind me of the fragmented and constructed nature of the self. 
Filmmaking in one’s childhood home, rather than an affirmation of one’s roots and 





In my experience of dreaming, I am often moving through rooms and corridors, looking 
for something, often an exit. The seeking function of the mind is still active during 
sleep, accounting for the tendency in dreams to be searching. Psychotel attempts to 
convey this feeling through the use of interior space, returning imagery, and train 
journeys to unspecified locations. Filmmaking is used to produce imagery that can be 
likened to the dream and that is influenced by the experience of dreaming. Whether this 
employs a primordial consciousness as Robbins suggests or engages an unconscious 
                                                 
512. Akira Mizuta Lippit, ‘The Only Other Apparatus of Film’, Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis, ed. by Gabriele Schwab, New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 171‒191, 171. 
513. Jean-Louis Baudry, ‘The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema’, in Narrative, 
Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Reader, trans. by Jean Andrews and Bertrand Augst, ed. by Philip Rosen, New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1986, pp. 299‒318. This reference by Lippit is made in an endnote 4. Lippit, ‘The Only Other Apparatus of Film’, 
p. 188. 
514. Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, p. 289. 
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that is unknown but exerts influence is a point I return to in the conclusion; however, 
both are modes of thought that differ from reflective consciousness (Robbins) or 
ordinary consciousness (Freud). Robbins’s hypothesis of dual consciousness is founded 
on Freud’s primary and secondary processes, the differences being that Robbins’s 
understanding is that both are states of consciousness, and are not underpinned by the 
Freudian childhood complexes.  
 
Although Psychotel does not have a central protagonist in the manner common to 
conventional narrative fiction, as filmmaker and performer I am the protagonist, the 
narrator, and the author. I attempt to play with this multiplicity in the film. In doing so, I 
make reference to ‘Das “Unheimliche”’ in which Freud is the reader, the analyst, the 
psychologist, and the ‘writer of the present contribution’.
515
 As noted by Cixous, this 
doubling introduces uncanny uncertainties in the text. These ‘doubtful elements in the 
text necessarily engender doubt in the reader’, and contribute to the uncanny quality of 
Freud’s essay.
516
 In the ‘Afterword’ of Quilt, Royle describes Reality Literature, a term 
used to reflect the playful space of the novel.
517
 Referring to the opening line of Quilt: 
‘In the middle of the night the phone rings over and over, but I don’t hear it,’ as an 
example of acceptable contradiction found in the novel, he emphasises the weirdness of 
the narrator who can speak of things he does not know.
518
 There is an uncanny doubling 
at work here, as well as ‘the resonances of prophecy, fate and clairvoyance’.
519
 Royle 
describes the novel as a space of ‘quilted thinking’, in which what is covered and 
uncovered is revealed. As a play on the constructed nature of Reality TV, Reality 
Literature ‘invites us [...] to be wary of such constructions and narrow-mindedness. It 
seeks to question and complicate, to dislocate and interfere.’
520
 Keeping in mind the 
ideas underpinning Reality Literature, and the uncanny quality conveyed by an 
ambiguous narrator, I wrote the voice-over ‘story’ in two halves, the first from the point 
of view of the hotel and the second narrated by the character’s ‘other half’. I had used a 
combination of first and third person narration in Unhomely Street to unsettle the 
position of the narrator and indicate the doubling of consciousness. In Psychotel I use 
first, second, and third person narration to further complicate the position of the viewer 
                                                 
515. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 220. 
516. Cixous, ‘Fiction and its Phantoms’, p. 526. 
517. Nicholas Royle, Quilt, Brighton: Myriad Editions, 2010, pp. 156‒7. 
518. I am reminded of the unreliable narrator in American Beauty, who speaks of his own death. American Beauty, dir. Sam 
Mendes, Dreamworks, 1999 [on DVD]. 
519. Royle, Quilt, p. 157. These ideas are explored in ‘The ‘telepathy’ effect: notes towards a reconsideration of narrative fiction’, 
The Uncanny, 2003, pp. 256‒276. 
520. Royle, Quilt, 2010, p. 158. I am reminded of Lacan’s ‘quilting points’ discussed in chapter 4. 
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in relation to the character and their duality. ‘The Dummy’, a short story by Nicholas 
Royle, switches between first and second person viewpoint to great effect and was 
influential in this decision.
521
 Second person narration in film is rare but is used by Lars 
Von Trier in Europa, a film referenced in the hypnotic countdown at the start of 
Psychotel. The effect is enhanced in film as the viewer is instructed in their viewing: 




Robbins suggests the personal pronoun ‘I’ implies a state of reflective representational 
thought, and second and third person pronouns further imply a differentiation between 
self and other. He notes differences in how pronouns are used and understands this 
difference as showing the speaker to be using primordial consciousness or reflective 
representational thought. An everyday example is the phrase ‘you know’ spoken as a 
confirmation following something said that the listener does not know.
523
 Implicit in 
this style of speech is an assumed omnipresence that Robbins claims is a continuation of 
the undifferentiated state of being shared between infant and mother. The language 
characteristic of primordial consciousness, found in the instinctual exchange between 
mother and infant often has an abstract and musical quality.
524
 Its role differs from the 
factual, referential language of reflective representational thought, as its mode is to 
convey emotional tone. Reflecting on my choice of language in the voice-over of 
Psychotel, I believe the phrase ‘sunbeams clung to her body, and tiny birds’, is an 
example of primordial language that conveys affect not meaning. 
In the narrative of Psychotel, the ex-partner dies and the character vacates the hotel and 
leaves her other self behind. This abandoned ‘self’ becomes the narrator and so conjures 
a ghost as the character leaves her former self. The intention is that the older self will 
                                                 
521. Royle, ‘The Dummy’, pp. 53‒68.  The two Nicholas Royles, both writers, court ambiguity. I first came across both Royles in 
The Uncanny, in which there is an image of the two men. The caption reads ‘Nicholas Royle and Nicholas Royle’ without indicating 
which is which. When establishing that Nicholas Royle (born in 1957) was the author of Quilt, a book about grief following the 
death of a father, a review of the book was accompanied by an article featuring Nicholas Royle (‘63) wearing his deceased father’s 
clothes. Their identity is complicated by the ‘bird books’. Nicholas Royle (‘63) is the editor of Murmurations: An Anthology of 
Uncanny Stories about Birds, Outer Hebrides: Two Ravens Press, 2011, in which there is a short story by Nicholas Royle (‘57). 
This short story reappears in the novel by Nicholas Royle (‘57), An English Guide to Birdwatching, Oxford: Myriad Editions, 2017, 
ostensibly written by someone else. In order to include a reference to this uncanny doubling in Psychotel I asked Royle (‘63) to 
voice the first line of this short story by Royle (‘57) entitled Gulls. Other instances of their courted mistaken identity can be found in 
Royle’s ‘The Double’, The Uncanny, pp. 187‒202. 
522. Europa, dir. Lars Von Trier, Alicéléo, Det Danske Filminstitut, 1991 [on DVD]. 
523. Robbins gives examples from president Trump’s speeches in which Trump’s personal (and racist) viewpoints are expressed 
using ‘we’ and ‘they’ to indicate an extension of his viewpoint to others. Robbins suggests Trump is speaking from a position of 
primordial consciousness and is not distinguishing between self and other. See Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, pp. 
37‒38. 
524. It is perhaps worth noting that this style of language is often used when speaking to animals. 
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haunt the re-born personality.
525
 These narrative mechanisms point to the indestructible 
nature of the trace, those elements of life’s narrative that complicate and cling.
526
 In 
neuroscientific terms, the neural pathway is a trace, like land written over by feet and 
hooves, like a ‘mystic writing pad’.
527
 I intend the film to hint at re-birth, to open the 
question of the potential for change. The narrators reference doubling and evoke 
spectrality, the self as ghost and the double as a harbinger of death. 
Freud cites our relation to death as causing feelings of uncanniness and suggests that 
‘no human being really grasps it’, stating ‘our unconscious has as little use now as ever 
for the idea of its own mortality’.
528
 This conflict between the intellectual understanding 
of death and the inability to comprehend it supports Jentsch’s notion of uncanniness 
arising from cognitive dissonance. Royle writes that ‘the uncanny can be a matter of 
something gruesome or terrible, above all death and corpses, cannibalism, live burial, 
the return of the dead’.
529
 Here again is the ‘organic uncanny’, alongside death as the 
‘incomprehensible uncanny’. In ‘Das “Unheimliche”’, Freud tells us we experience the 
uncanny ‘in the highest degree in relation to death and dead bodies’.
530
 Masschelein 
reminds us Freud ‘posits that the unconscious cannot represent its own death because 
the unconscious doesn’t know negation’.
531
 A biological and neuroscientific 
interpretation might be that an organism is made of cells that individually strive for life. 
In this attempt to maintain the homeopathic regulation that enables life, the cells 
undergo changes that in turn are felt by the organism as a whole. In Fear, Joanne 
Bourke describes changing cultural attitudes to death, suggesting that death is not feared 
because it is ‘nothing’, rather because it is ‘other’.
532
 This conscious consideration of 
death requires that the imagination form an image of something of which it has no 
experience.  
                                                 
525. I was curious to read Counterparts, the first novel by Nicholas Royle, after developing this narrative. His story similarly plays 
with an ambiguous doubling of a central character. See Nicholas Royle, Counterparts, London: Penguin, 1995. 
526. The film may not deliver the complexity of this narrative to all viewers. It is sufficient that the film troubles the notion of a 
fixed identity. Following two pregnancies and a lengthy bout of mental illness resulting from brain injury I am aware of the fluid 
nature of the thing we call personality. In referring to the ‘trace’, I note that a trace is never a fixed entity, it is always the remains of 
what remains, a trace of itself. Abraham and Torok’s transgenerational phantom is such a trace.  
527. This reference to a toy memory aid also provoked the sequence in which text is written and over-written in a notebook. See 
Freud, ‘A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad’, pp. 51‒55. 
528. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 242.   
529. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 2  
530. Freud accounts for this by our strength of emotion and lack of scientific understanding of death. I am unconvinced by the role 
played by science, and strength of emotion is an unsatisfactory reason; why do we have such a strength of emotion? Freud, ‘The 
“Uncanny”’ p. 241. 
531. Masschelein, The Unconcept, p. 39. 
532. Joanna Bourke Fear: A Cultural History, Berkeley, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 2006, p. 49. This reference to death and 
‘otherness’ rather than ‘nothingness’ is taken from Kurt Riezles, ‘Social Psychology of Fear’, American Journal of Sociology, xlix, 
6, May 1944, 489‒498, p. 492. Bourke carefully traces changes in the nature of fear in the western world from hell fire to 
nothingness or otherness with the loosening of belief in the after-world. Similarly she describes how a very real fear of live-burial in 




Royle’s chapter ‘Mole’ explores the metaphor of burrowing into texts, and towards 
death. The moles in Psychotel disturb the spirit guide in the grave and ‘dream of other 
holes’.
533
 Royle, with reference to Derrida, questions the human relation to death as 
compared with that of the animal.
534
 Lacan writes of a thought exercise he asks of his 
students:  
 
 In the introductory phase, one can illustrate the effect of enunciation by asking a student 
 if he can imagine the unconscious existing in animals, unless they have some degree of 
 language ‒ human language. If he indeed agrees that this is the condition that would 
 allow him to at least consider the possibility, you have verified that he distinguishes 




Lacan emphasises the distinction between humans and animals on the basis of the 
unconscious existing through language. While I uphold the psychoanalytic unconscious 
as a framework through which to view the human, it is the question of the human as 
mammal, territorial and operating according to instinct, which I wish to broach in 
Psychotel. As suggested in the film, I am interested in the ‘human animal’, and my 
interest in neuroscience in part arises from wishing to consider the evolution of the 
mammalian brain and the psyche.
536
 I consider it a contemporary problem that we are 
unwilling to recognise in capitalism, the underpinnings of mammalian behaviour. Lacan 
clarifies: ‘The unconscious is a concept founded on the trail (trace) left by that which 
operates to constitute a subject.’
537
 This account understands the human as subject and 
not the animal. This statement by Lacan illustrates how Robbins’s theory of primordial 
consciousness coincides with the psychoanalytic unconscious, as an undifferentiated 
state prior to gaining reflective thought, a mental facility that allows the individual to 
view themselves as an object in a relation with others ‒ to be a subject.  
Deleuze and Guattari criticise psychoanalysis for producing man in the abstract, as an 
ideological construct. They write:  
                                                 
533. The idea of using a mole was introduced by Royle’s chapter ‘Mole’, in The Uncanny, pp. 241‒255. I had a mole in the freezer, 
awaiting a taxidermy project but my interest in taxidermy had waned following a bout of vomiting after skinning a putrid badger. 
Royle’s mole is ‘dreaming of a completely new tunnel,’ ibid., p. 242. This follows Derrida, ‘after a mole-like progression’, in 
discussing Freud’s metaphor of ‘pathbreaking’ in relation to the trace or impression in the unconscious that builds rather than 
uncovers pathways. See ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, in Writing and Difference, p. 269. 
534. Royle, ‘Mole’, The Uncanny, p. 251. ‘Derrida suggests that man has no more of a relation to death or to the ‘name’ of death 
than animals have’, with reference to Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 
76. 
535. Lacan, Écrits, p. 707. 
536. This is noted in chapter 6. For further reading on this subject see Joanna Bourke, What it Means to be Human: Reflections from 
1791 to the Present, London: Virago, 2013, and Oxana Timofeeva, The History of Animals: A Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2018. 




 [t]he question of the father is like that of God: born of abstraction, it assumes the link to 
 be already broken between man and nature, man and the world, so that man must be 
 produced as man by something exterior to nature and to man.
538  
 
The question of animal subjecthood is gathering pace with applications for habeas 
corpus for chimpanzees and elephants by the Nonhuman Rights Project in the US and 
the Animal Welfare Amendment Bill brought about by the Animal Sentience Campaign 
in Australia.
539
 The rise of animal studies has grown in part from the animal liberation 
movement, gaining traction as an academic discipline since Derrida’s The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, with an increasing focus on biodiversity loss and environmental issues 
with writers including Haraway, Bourke, Mel Y. Chen, Vincian Despret, Oxana 




Damasio’s proto-self, a map of the body within the brain, suggests consciousness is 
founded on the organism’s physical boundary.
541
 The linguistic capability of asking 
questions such as ‘what am I?’ should not exclude all other experiential understanding 
of selfhood of a non-linguistic nature. Animal communication and kinship is evidence 
of a sophisticated comprehension of self and other. The insistence on the human being 
as other (divine as opposed to animal) has influenced a focus on the ‘higher’ aspects of 
consciousness such as language. Freud has been instrumental in proposing we are 
governed by basic instincts such as sex acquisition and death avoidance, and 
contributions from animal studies are redressing an imbalance inherited from the 
historic presence of religion in philosophy.  
 
I have learned that a subtle, nuanced play on reality produces a sensation of the uncanny 
to a greater extent than explicit footage that employs visual effects. I did not find 
watching the geese in the pond uncanny when I was shooting the material but in the 
                                                 
538. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 118. 
539. The Nonhuman Rights Project in the US has made several unsuccessful attempts to apply for habeas corpus but persist. 
Animal Welfare Amendment Bill, introduced in Australia in 2015 recognises sentience in animals. See 
<https://www.nonhumanrights.org/ >, accessed 15 February 2019, and <https://rspca.org.au/campaigns/nt/animal-sentience>, 
accessed 15 February 2019. The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights was made public in 1989 by the International League of 
Animal Rights, See Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 87. 
540. For a brief overview see <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/10/earths-sixth-mass-extinction-event-already-
underway-scientists-warn>, accessed 3 July 2019. See also Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction, also Joanna Bourke, What it Means to be 
Human: Reflections from 1791 to the Present, London: Virago, 2013, Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and 
Queer Affect, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2012, Vinciane Despret, ‘The Becoming of Subjectivity in Animal Worlds’, 
Subjectivity, 2008, 23, pp. 123‒129, and What Would Animals Say If We Asked the Right Questions?, trans. by Brett Buchanan, 
2016, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2016, Oxana Timofeeva, The History of Animals: A Philosophy, London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, Lynn Turner et. al., The Edinburgh Companion to Animal Studies, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2018. 
541. In considering what consciousness is for, the capacity to remember where food can be found, adaptability to prey response, 
mate selection, may point to qualities of selfhood and consciousness being present in animals that move. 
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film, in the context of animal consciousness, the footage works by using voice-over and 
editing to give the geese a voice. They have not become ‘talking animals’ yet they do 
‘speak’. Freud notes this discrepancy between what would in reality be uncanny, 




Derrida’s writing on the animal or animot was influential here and is referred to in the 
film.
543
 Derrida suggests the gaze of the animal offers ‘the abyssal limit of the 
human’.
544
 I went to a local petting farm with the intention of filming an animal’s gaze. 
My failure seemed fitting and the animals’ refusal to perform to camera makes a louder 
statement. When Emmanuel Lévinas writes of Bobby, the dog that recognised the man 
in the dehumanised environment of a Nazi prison camp, he tells us the ‘face’ of the dog 
presents a lesser ethical priority. For Lévinas the ‘face’, the gaze, is the site of human 
responsibility to the other.
545
 Derrida questions Lévinas, as well as Descartes, Kant, 





Deleuze and Guattari write of ‘becoming-animal’. They stress this is not an act of 
imitation, rather their ‘becoming’ involves a deconstruction of identity itself, a 
synthesis. They use the example of a wasp that by pollination becomes a part of the 
orchid’s reproductive system.
547
 For Derrida the ‘becoming-animal’ is affect in itself, 
‘the drive in the person’, and represents nothing.
548
 He writes that for Deleuze ‘[...] it is 
always a question of humanity [...], it’s a question of the becoming-
anthropomorphically-animal of man’.
549
 Derrida points out that the prevailing belief 
among philosophers is that the animal cannot say ‘I’.
550
 Anyone attempting to take a 
bone from a cat is likely to discover it has a sense of ‘mine’. Derrida tells us that ‘[...] it 
is enough to admit that the living being is divisible and constituted by a multiplicity of 
                                                 
542. See Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 246.  
543. ‘Animot’ is a term used by Derrida to draw attention to the manner in which the word animal draws together all the species 
without recognition of diversity, with reference to the operation of language in designating all animals to this position of 
homogenised otherness. With reference to Genesis and Ish, the first man, he traces man’s authority over the animals to the God-
given power of naming them. See The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 15 and p. 39. 
544. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 12. 
545. Emmanuel Lévinas, ‘The Name of a Dog, or Natural Right’, in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judasim, Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1990, pp. 151‒153. Lévinas prioritised responsibility to the human but considered ethical consideration 
should extend to all living things. Derrida indicates that Lévinas’ positions the animal ‘outside of the ethical circuit’. See Derrida, 
The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 106. 
546. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 14. Derrida writes of his discomfort, standing naked with his cat asking to be fed.  
547. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 342. 
548. Jacques Derrida, ‘The Trancendental “Stupidity” (“Bêtise”) of Man and the Becoming-Animal According to Deleuze’, ed. by 
Erin Ferris, in Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis, ed. by Gabriele Schwab, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 
171‒191, 39. 
549. Ibid.  
550. Ibid., p. 57.  
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Robbins, writing on the relation of primordial consciousness to creativity, makes 
reference to the work of Martin Prechtel, a writer who grew up in native American tribal 
culture. For Prechtel, writing is a form of becoming. To write about a horse is to write it 
into view, onto the soul of the reader who must stand back as it charges toward them.
552
 
Primordial consciousness, as an undifferentiated and affective state, involves becoming 
other. Robbins draws a distinction between socio-centric and self-centric cultures, the 




Haraway writes of the practice of Vinciane Despret, a philosopher who ‘thinks-with 
other beings, human and not’.
554
 In the essay ‘Responding and suffering bodies in 
human-animal worlds’, Despret discusses Temple Grandin, whose autism enables her to 
see things as animals do.
555
 Grandin, who designs humane slaughter systems, does not 
claim to be able to feel what animals feel; rather, she is able to notice the details that 
threaten them.
556
 The attitude of mind that draws Haraway to Despret involves a shift of 
perspective, a ‘being-with’ that ‘entangle[s] people, critters, and apparatuses.’
557
 
‘Sympoiesis’, meaning ‘making-with’ is a keyword in her ‘tentacular thinking’ that 
aims to break down the boundaries of the researcher as outsider looking in, a practice 
that allows the researcher to be changed by the research, involved, open-ended.
558
 This 
attitude of research echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic approach to 
conceptualising knowledge, which attempts to avoid a privileged viewpoint, in contrast 
to the ‘arborescent’ approach that has a centre, a beginning, middle, and end.
559
 They 
write that ‘[a] fibre stretches from a human to an animal, from a human or an animal to 
molecules, from molecules to particles, and so on to the imperceptible.’
560
 Their 
                                                 
551. Ibid., p. 58.  
552. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, p. 43. 
553. Ibid., pp. 12‒13. In ‘Primordial consciousness, language, and cultural difference’, Robbins makes reference to Piraha and 
Maori culture, suggesting there is continued use of primordial consciousness as a dominant mode in these socio-centric cultures. 
The Piraha do not use personal pronouns and constrict communication to the here and now, pp. 47‒52. 
554. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, p. 126. 
555. Vinciane Despret, ‘Responding and suffering bodies in human-animal worlds’, 
<http://www.vincianedespret.be/2010/03/responding-and-suffering-bodies-in-human-animal-worlds/> accessed 7 June 2019. 
556. It is arguable whether an industrial slaughter system can be called humane. 
557. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, p. 129. 
558. Ibid., p. 5.  
559. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 1‒18. 
560. Ibid., p. 291.   
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approach, which here situates the human as a biological organism is a universal system, 
expands the notion of ‘being-with’ discussed above to include the inanimate. 
 
Through ‘messing about with dead things’ I have discovered a feeling of biological 
kinship with mammals that I experience to a lesser extent with birds.
561
 I find birds 
uncanny in the way they differ from mammals; their weight, the delicacy of their bones, 
the skin so thin it is a wonder it can hold the quills, and their smell is ‘other’, perhaps 
reptilian. When attending the New Scientist ‘Consciousness’ conference I was 
disappointed the panel was not prepared to state that animals were conscious, despite 
discussing higher mental function such as problem solving.
562
 For me, consciousness is 
visible when an animal ‘sees’ you.
563
 Ambiguity over living status abounds in films, 
accounting for the uncanny quality of the zombie movie, tales of possession, and the 
ghost story. Derrida’s spectre knows this ambiguity, not only by its position between 
life and death, but also by its temporal ambiguity.
564
   
 
  
Fig. 59. Psychotel stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
 
Birds, both alive and dead, feature in the film, including a reference to the ancient 
Roman practices of augury and haruspicy that relate to what Freud calls the ‘animistic 
attitude of mind’.
565
 This uncanniness that accompanies a return to previously discarded 
                                                 
561. I use the term ‘messing about with dead things’ to describe my taxidermy in The Reynard Diary, dir. Susannah Gent, 2010, 
<https://vimeo.com/78277557>. This term is appropriate as my work with dead animals is not a craft activity aimed at making a 
‘quality’ taxidermy specimen; rather it is an exploration of my feelings when faced with the dead. The phrase clearly bares a relation 
to ‘Playing with Dead Things’, the essay by Mike Kelly in ‘The Uncanny’ exhibition catalogue; however I did not make this 
connection at the time. Mike Kelley, ‘The Uncanny’, exhibition catalogue, Arnham: Gemeetenmuseum Arnham, 1993. 
562. At the New Scientist, ‘Consciousness’ conference, 2015, a presentation on animal intelligence focussed on the corvus family. 
As we know these birds can learn to perform operational sequence, for example to open a box to retrieve food. Holding more than 
one thought in mind is what is required for cause-effect thinking and is likely what consciousness is for. Without this evidence I 
would have no difficulty in saying that a bird was conscious by the way we can share a look.  
563. The exchange of looks is elegantly discussed by Derrida in The Animal That Therefore I Am. The absence of the exchange of a 
look relates to one of the most frequently referenced instances of uncanniness, when one is in doubt as to whether something is alive 
or dead. Jentsch writes: ‘Among all the psychical uncertainties that can become a cause for the uncanny feeling to arise, there is one 
in particular that is able to develop a fairly regular, powerful and very general effect: namely, doubt as to whether an apparently 
living being really is animate and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate’ Jentsch, ‘On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny’, p. 8, referenced in Freud ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 233. 
564. Derrida notes that haunting is both the ghost’s arrival and return. This atemporality underpins the critical framework of 
hauntology, explored in Spectres of Marx. 
565. ‘It would seem as though each one of us has been through a phase of individual development corresponding to that animistic 
stage in primitive men, that none of us has traversed it without preserving certain traces of it which can be re-activated, and that 
everything which now strikes us as “uncanny” fulfils the condition of stirring those vestiges of animistic mental activity within us 
and bringing them to expression.’ Freud ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 240. 
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beliefs is also a form of intellectual uncertainty and draws Freud closer to Jentsch than 
he cared to admit. During the second attempt to edit this film I returned to reading 
fiction.
566
 I read two books: Murmurations: An Anthology of Uncanny Stories about 
Birds, and An English Guide to Birdwatching, which primed my association with birds 
and the uncanny.
567
 A starling murmuration featured in Unhomely Street and some of 
the footage was included in Psychotel, as well as a ‘murder’ of crows, in folklore said to 
foreshadow death. Flocking birds and shoals of fish employ a means of communication 
or a comprehension of proximity that does not currently have a scientific explanation.  
 
In my earlier discussion of Unhomely Street and filmic intuition I described dance as a 
primitive, non-linguistic form of communication.
568
 Dance can be peculiar. Rather than 
‘seeing’ body language, the experience can be closer to ‘feeling’ presence, as though by 
vibration, in which the surrounding space adopts a material texture ‒ like swimming. 
Phenomena occupying this grey area are often attributed to primitive belief systems 
although it may be that the phenomena simply lack a scientific explanation.
569
 Freud 
writes: ‘One of the most uncanny and wide-spread forms of superstition is the evil 
eye.’
570
 Here the look has the power to harm. This is referenced in Psychotel with an 
image taken in Istanbul of the Nazar, an amulet believed to protect against the evil eye. 
Again one is reminded of the motif of looking in The Sandman. The expression ‘the 
eyes are the windows to the soul’ suggest the eyes are more than the biological organs 
of sight.
571
 The appearance of the eyes is an indicator of life or death and ambiguity of 




                                                 
566. This was September 2017‒January 2018. I had read almost no fiction for the four years since starting the Ph.D. I was taking a 
break from writing to work on the film and I felt that a different ‘diet’ might help the edit.  
567. Royle, An English Guide to Birdwatching, Royle (editor) Murmurations: An Anthology of Uncanny Stories about Birds, See 
footnote 521 for an untangling of the Royles. 
568. See chapter 3. 
569. Another such example is the sense of being stared at. Expressions including ‘his eyes bore holes in the back of my head’ are 
common and suggest a widely experienced phenomenon. I have on several occasions felt that I responded to being stared at and 
have intuitively felt someone has reacted to my unseen attention. This ‘sense’ has been scientifically investigated by biologist 
Rupert Sheldrake whose statistical data demonstrates the existence of these unexplained reactions. Sheldrake has been pilloried by 
the scientific community for this work. His statistical data shows only a small increase above chance in controlled experiments in 
which participants guess if they are being stared at. He claims that although the results appear unimpressive, the volume of data he 
has collected demonstrates beyond doubt that we have a sense of being stared at. A factor he considers when analysing his results is 
that the mechanism used to notice attention at a distance is likely to be nonconscious, (empirical evidence supports this) whereas his 
experiments involved conscious attention to the phenomenon. He reports that Second World War fighter pilots were instructed not 
to stare at enemy pilots when taking aim as the stare would alert their attention. See Rupert Sheldrake, The Sense of Being Stared At: 
And Other Aspects of the Extended Mind, London: Arrow Books, 2004, p. 125. 
570. Freud ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 240. 
571. The origin of this phrase could be biblical, see <https://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/41/messages/1097.html>, accessed 
20 September 2018. 
572. Black Eyed Children Let Me In, dir. Justin Snyder, Cyfuno Ventures, 2015 [on DVD]. Ouija dir. Stiles White, Universal 
Pictures, 2014 [on DVD]. See also chapters 2 and 5 for commentary on eye removal. Facial manipulation is one of the categories in 





             Fig. 60. Black Eyed Children Let Me In, dir. Justin Snyder.    Fig. 61. Ouija dir. Stiles White. 
 
The feelings associated with phenomena that cannot be explained are usually strong. 
They can be the basis of religious experience or suggestive of a special intimacy 
between people. The intuitive feeling that cannot be dispelled by the lack of explanation 
suggests these experiences are important. I am not religious but I consider spirituality, 
as a state of mind, to be worth promoting. To live with the attitude that we are part of 
something bigger, be it a species, the ecosystem of the planet, or the universe, helps to 
keep one’s perspective in proportion and encourages consideration beyond one’s 
immediate world. An outlook that is open to the sublime may be rewarded by feelings 
of rare pleasure. It was with this attitude that I approached the ending to Psychotel. 
 
Spirit level and the quantum uncanny 
The robin knows nothing of quantum physics but through its effects it knows the way home.573 
 
For Royle, the uncanny can be ‘also be a matter of something strangely beautiful, 
bordering on ecstasy’.
574
 The ending of Psychotel was informed by this view of the 
uncanny, coupled with a desire to make a more up-beat film than Unhomely Street. In 
recovering from post-concussive syndrome one of the most noticeable improvements 
was enjoying the uplifting effects of sunlight. Haraway, whose persuasive texts helped 
by making me feel I had a responsibility to think positively about the future, occupies 
an optimistic, uncanny space. Although her insistence that ‘it matters what thoughts 
think thoughts’ largely refers to the cultural field, there is the suggestion of telepathy, 
that a positive future is built from favourable expectation.
575
 Freud cites telepathy and 
                                                                                                                                               
highest for this section however overall this section was not judged very ‘eerie’, most likely because of its obviously constructed 
nature. Facial mutilation including extreme piercing and tattooing scored far higher. See appendix 1 for image set.  
573. Written with reference to Peter Hore, ‘The Quantum Robin’, <http://hore.chem.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/The_Quantum_Robin.pdf>, 
accessed 7 March 2019. 
574. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 2.  







the omnipresence of thought as a source of the uncanny.
576
 He describes telepathy as 
‘mental processes leaping from one [...] to another’.
577
 In his deconstructive text on 
‘Telepathy’, Derrida considers the theme of telepathy in Freud’s writing, translated by 
Royle who writes a deconstructive text on Derrida’s text.
578
 Here telepathy is 
considered as a ‘foreign body’ within psychoanalysis.
579
 Derrida writes that it is 
‘difficult to imagine a theory of what they still call the unconscious without a theory of 
telepathy.’
580
 According to Lacan, as previously noted, the unconscious is the discourse 
of the other.
581
 With reference to the ‘telepathy effect’ Royle describes the novel as ‘a 
kind of weird telephone exchange’.
582
 Royle’s Regicide uses telephones impressively to 
make eerie contact across psychical dimensions.
583
 In Derrida’s text are references to 
telephones. The media theorist Friedrich A. Kittler expands on an analogy drawn by 
Freud between psychoanalysis and the telephone, in which the psychoanalyst tuning in 
to the patient’s unconscious is likened to process whereby sound waves are transformed 
into electronic oscillations.
584
 Kittler notes that one of Edison’s proposed applications 
for the phonograph was to record the last words of the dying. He suggests this is only a 
small step away from using telephone cables as a means to link the living and the 
dead.
585




Royle aligns the term and concept of telepathy with the emergence of telemedia and the 
decline in the belief in God. The reference by both Royles to telephones was influential 
in my resolving the central section of Psychotel. Coincidental was the randomly 
selected text by Nietzsche on our decline in belief in God that follows the exorcism of 
the spirit guide.
587
 Further, in ‘Telepathy’ Derrida introduces lakes. He proposes the 
                                                 
576. Freud ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 240. 
577. ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 234.  
578. Derrida, ‘Telepathy’, pp. 496‒526, and Royle, ‘The Remains of Psychanalysis (1): Telepathy’, in McQuillan (editor), 
Deconstruction, pp. 361‒369. 
579. Royle, ‘The Remains of Psychoanalysis’, p. 369. Royle notes that for Derrida telepathy ‘has to do with both assimilation and 
vomit’, that this ‘foreign body’ is both assimilated and rejected ‘without being able to make up its mind’, p. 365.  
580. Derrida, ‘Telepathy’, p. 505. 
581. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. xi. As noted in chapter 4, Fink writes: ‘Other people’s views and desires flow into us via 
discourse. In that sense, we can interpret Lacan’s statement that the unconscious is the Other’s discourse in a very straightforward 
fashion: the unconscious is full of other people’s talk, other people’s conversations, and other people’s goals, aspirations, and 
fantasies’, yet he specifies, ‘in so far as they are expressed in words’, see Fink, The Lacanian Subject, pp. 9‒10. Original italics. 
Another interpretation of Derrida’s statement is a telepathy effect resulting from the split nature of the psyche in which aspects of 
the self are veiled. See chapter 6 for an expansion of these points. 
582. Royle, Quilt, p. 157. The ‘telepathy effect’ refers to the novel’s ability to speak the inner thoughts of a character. ‘The 
‘telepathy’ effect: notes towards a reconsideration of narrative fiction’, The Uncanny, 2003, pp. 256‒276. 
583. Nicholas Royle, Regicide, Oxford: Rebellion Publishing, 2011. 
584. Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz, Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 88. Kittler’s comments follow Freud, ‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-
Analysis,’(1912), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 1962, vol. 12, pp. 109‒120, 115‒16.  
585. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 12. 
586. I bought an old dial telephone from a junk shop and demonstrated to my son how calls used to be made. I was myself 
astonished at how long it took for the dial to return and noted how time runs quicker these days. 
587. Fredrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans by R. J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1973, p. 81. 
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word [lac] suggests a force, ‘plunging down head first’ in reference to suicide by 
drowning (a return to inter-uterine existence?). I am reminded of the start of Psychotel, 
shot three years previously; however, the question ‘what’s at the bottom of the lake’ has 
been posed in many films, often by the murdered body as in Hitchcock’s Psycho. The 
déjà vu effect I experience when reading Derrida’s text on telepathy, with references to 
dead birds, lakes, omens of death, telephones, hearing a text in several languages, and 
fear of the apocalypse, struck me as uncanny.
588
 I am keen to avoid ‘the ultimate 
naïvety’ of sliding into pseudoscience and am reminded of Freud’s reference to the 
uncanniness of repeatedly seeing something such as the number 62.
589
 The number 62 is 
included in Psychotel as a repeated number on the paternoster and in the check-out 
sequence. Derrida notes that science keeps telepathy at bay.
590
 Indeed that which lacks a 
scientific explanation must remain outside sensible discourse, yet science ‘can have this 





Primordial consciousness, according to Robbins, is a state of fusion between self and 
other. He identifies the continued dominance of primordial mentation as responsible for 
feelings of omnipotence and access to the thoughts of others that is present in 




From American psychoanalysis, ‘field theory’ describes a method of practice in which 
the clinical session is conducted in an interpersonal field, a creative space constructed 
between the analyst and patient. This space is often viewed as a dream space in which 
the unconscious minds of both participants communicate. Surface conversations can 
take place but there is deeper activity at play, another scene in which symbolic scenarios 
                                                 
588. Derrida, ‘Telepathy’, pp. 496‒526, dead birds, p. 500, lakes, p. 503, omens of death, p. 503, telephones, p. 503, hearing a text 
in several languages, p. 497, fear of the apocalypse, p. 497. These references each relate to components of my films.  
589. Derrida writes: ‘the ultimate naïvety would be to allow oneself to think that Telepathy guarantees a destination which “posts 
and communications” fail to provide’, ‘Telepathy’, p. 506. In the original write up of this chapter before it was combined with the 
rest of the thesis, this footnote was number 62. For Freud’s reference to 62 see Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 237. Our brains  are 
primed to pattern recognition so that once we become primed to notice something we tend to see it everywhere. 
590. Derrida, ‘Telepathy’, p. 504‒5. 
591. Ibid., p. 506.  
592. Robbins uses essays written by patients in long-term treatment who have become able to recognise in their language, evidence 
of primordial consciousness. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, pp. 83‒100. It is perhaps worth noting with reference to 
Robbins’s theory of primordial consciousness, the mother infant bond, and telepathy, that when I had pre-school-aged children and 
regularly attended playgroups, a frequent topic of conversation was the instinctive tendency among mothers of young children to 
attempt to make their minds blank when their children awoke in the night. It was felt that thinking about the child caused them to 
fully waken. The technique discussed was similar to that used at the end of Village of the Damned, dir. Wold Rilla, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, 1960, [on DVD], based on the novel, The Midwich Cuckoos, by John Wyndham, London: Penguin Books, 1957.  
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are enacted. Psychoanalyst Donnel B. Stern, writing on the field theory of Harry Stack 




Telepathy is defined as ‘touch at a distance’.
594
 Quantum entanglement, named ‘spooky 
action at a distance’ by Einstein, occurs when particles, such as photons, are split (for 
example by a laser beam). The split pair of particles is entangled meaning that the state 
of one simultaneously effects its pair. This occurs regardless of the distance separating 
them.
595
 This ‘spooky action’ presents uncanny possibilities for how information 
circulates. Rui Freire Lucas writes of the ‘quantum unconscious’, noting how the birth 
of quantum physics removed the certainty from the scientific world of Newtonian 
physics. He draws the connection between Bergson’s account of pure duration, that ‘the 
only way of expressing genuine temporality is in the individual inner experience’, and 
the role played by the observer in the double-slit experiment in which measurement 
defines reality.
596
 The discoveries of the twentieth-century demonstrate not only that 
reality is not what is seems but that we should be wary of certainties. 
 
The understanding of telepathy as ‘mental processes in one person ‒ ideas, emotional 
states, cognitive impulses’, leads Royle to consider telepathy as the essential secret of 
literature.
597
 He reconsiders the term ‘omniscience’ as a description of the narrator or 
author who can see into the mind of characters suggesting that telepathy is a more apt 
metaphor to describe the odd states of revealed subjectivity in literature. He notes: 
‘Derrida’s understanding of “being two-to-speak” is a telepathic structure that entails an 
‘uncanny logic.’
598
 McQuillan’s definition of deconstruction, of allowing the other to 
speak, is by definition impossible as ‘whenever we think we are hearing the other speak 
we are always reducing its otherness to the self-same’.
599
 Notwithstanding this 
problematic point within the ambition of deconstruction generally, I propose a 
                                                 
593. Donnel B. Stern, ‘Field Theory in Psychoanalysis, Part 1: Harry Stack Sullivan and Madeleine and Willy Baranger’, 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, vol. 23, issue 5, 2013, 487‒501, p. 489. Stern explores differences in field theory according to texts from 
the analysts named in the title, with reference to ‘Bionian field theory’ and ‘interpersonal and relational field theory’. 
594.  Derrida, ‘Telepathy’, p. 504. 
595. Karl Tate, ‘How Quantum Entanglement Works’, Live Science, 2013, <https://www.livescience.com/28550-how-quantum-
entanglement-works-infographic.html>, accessed 8 March 2019. 
596. Rui Freire Lucas, ‘The Quantum Unconscious and the Observant Consciousness’, Psychology, 7, 2016, 836‒63, p. 844. Lucas 
notes ‘consciousness is a function of the unconscious’ according to Bergson’s understanding of consciousness as concerning the 
present moment of an emergent reality from which a continuous ‘unconscious’ past builds, p. 845. The double-slit experiment, 
which demonstrates how a photon can behave as both a wave and a particle, displays the strange phenomena that prior to 
observation, the photon exists in a ‘pure undefined nature’, p. 846, original italics. Lucas draws a correlation between how objective 
reality was brought into question with the quantum revolution and how the positivist vision of the mind has been challenged by Jung 
and Bion. 
597. Royle, ‘The Remains of Psychoanalysis’, p. 368 and Royle, ‘The Telepathy Effect’, The Uncanny, pp. 256‒276. See also 
‘Reality literature’ in this chapter, with reference to the ‘Afterword’ of Quilt, pp. 152‒159.  
598. Royle, ‘The Telepathy Effect’, p. 267. 
599. McQuillan Deconstruction: A Reader, p. 6.  
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deconstructive encounter is arguable in my filmmaking between the act of shooting 
rushes and the point of editing the material into a narrative. As discussed in chapter 6, in 
relation to the material shot in Istanbul, I am motivated to capture material and rarely 
consider why I am drawn to a scene, or later realise that I have considered one aspect of 
what I was shooting and upon reflecting in the editing suite I find a whole other 
interpretation is possible. This other meaning was likely present all along at an 
unconscious level, or was not available to reflective consciousness. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe writing as an act of ‘becoming’, with writers being sorcerers whose 




The ending of Psychotel was made early in production. The footage is largely 
constructed from an insect-infested tree in Hamburg. The white silvery film from the 
caterpillars is quite beautiful though damaging or deadly to the tree. The scale of the 
infestation demonstrates the power of nature, although in the context of the film, this 
could equally refer to the power of human nature. The music is mainly ambient tones 
with a strain of ‘Oh Danny Boy’, a song about love and death. The sequence, although 
ambiguous, has a note of optimism. 
 
Freud associates the uncanny with primitive belief, specifically the sensation that arises 
when old, surmounted beliefs resurface.
601
 Through research and filmmaking I explore 
an interpretation that closes the gap between the primitive and the scientific. A 
connection between quantum physics and Eastern spiritual belief is drawn by Gary 
Zukav in The Dancing Wu Li Masters.
602
 Zukav outlines quantum physics for the 
general reader noting that the Taiwanese for physics, Wu Li, translates as ‘patterns of 
organic energy’.
603
 Although he acknowledges the differences between Buddhism and 
Hinduism, he proposes that at the heart of these Eastern philosophies are ideas that are 
compatible with quantum mechanics:   
 
 the philosophical implication of quantum mechanics is that all of the things in our 
 universe, (including us) that appear to exist independently are in fact parts of one all-
                                                 
600. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 280. 
601. ‘It would appear that we invest with a feeling of uncanniness those impressions which lend support to a belief in the 
omnipotence of thoughts, and to the animistic attitude of mind, at a time when our judgment has already rejected these same 
beliefs.’ Freud, ‘Totem and Taboo’, pp. 77–8. 
602. Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu-Li Masters: An Overview of New Physics, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1979. 
603. Zukav, The Dancing Wu-Li Masters, p. 5. 
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 encompassing organic pattern, and that no parts of that pattern are ever really separate 




Enlightenment is ‘to experience a pure, undifferentiated reality which is “that-which-
is”’.
605
 Eastern religions ‘allow the mind to escape the confines of the symbolic’, to feel 




Robbins identifies a continued prevalence of primordial mentation in socio-centric 
cultures, and recognises in Buddhist and Hindu philosophy a principle of reduced 
differentiation between self and other. He writes that ‘[p]rimordial consciousness is 
simply a different way of organising self and cosmos, one that can be constructive and 
creative, or disturbed and pathological, depending both on the context in which it is 
used, and its relationship to reflective representational thought’.
607
 Thus, the uncanny is 
contextual and likely to surface through events and beliefs that are at odds with the 
dominant mode of thought within a culture. 
 
The difference between the macro and the micro world is itself most uncanny. We 
know, as inhabitants of the macro world, that for us matter exists in a real way. 
Although we discuss electrons, neutrons, baryons etc. as though they were units of 
matter, actual ‘things’, subatomic particles describe properties, states, or forces. The 
crucial boundary that distinguishes one organism from another falls away at the micro 
level.
608
 Haraway captures something of this in her use of the terms holobiont as an 
unbounded term for a being.
609
 She writes: 
 
 I use holobiont to mean symbiotic assemblages, at whatever scale of space or time, 
 which are more like knots of diverse intra-active relatings in dynamic complex systems, 




                                                 
604. Ibid., p. 52.  
605. Ibid., p. 342.  
606. Ibid., p. 343. The distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘symbolic’ echoes Lacan insofar as the ‘real’ is an unattainable other 
and ‘symbolic’ refers to the construction of meaning. Shinto, the traditional religion of Japan, has been translated as ‘spirit path’, 
however the translation from the kanji is open for interpretation. ‘Spirit’ could mean essence and Shinto understands ‘energy 
generating phenomena’ in rocks, rivers, trees, people that share an ‘interrelated complexity’, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinto>.  
Shinto resembles Paganism in many ways. Both Hinduism and Buddhism believe in a cycle of rebirth, and a divine that penetrates 
everything; people, animals, rocks, and rivers, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinduism>, 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism>,  accessed 28 March 2019. 
607. Robbins, Consciousness, Language, and Self, p. 14. 
608. The language used in quantum physics, for example, ‘spooky action at a distance’, Einstein’s description of the simultaneous,  
nonlocal interaction of entangled particles, <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427174/einsteins-spooky-action-at-a-distance-
paradox-older-than-thought/>, accessed 28 March 2019, and ‘strangeness’, the name given to a property of particles by Murry Gell-
Mann, < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strangeness>, accessed 28 March 2019, reflect the uncanny qualities that require a wholesale 
re-evaluation of what has been understood as the fundamental laws within the framework of Newtonian physics.   
609. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, p. 60, with reference to Lynn Margulis. 




Deleuze and Guattari write: 
 
 We do not become animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity. A 
 fascination for the outside? Or is the multiplicity that fascinates us already related to a 




What these attitudes present is a progression of the traditional Western viewpoint 
towards an expanded outlook that draws it closer to science and eastern philosophy as 
discussed above. 
 
Quantum physics can describe but not explain behaviours of subatomic particles. 
Eastern philosophy posits the existence of a state that can be known (experienced) but 
not described. Penrose proposes a quantum description of consciousness. Although his 
view is controversial in the neuroscientific community, quantum theory has recently 
been proposed as an explanation for the magnetic compass of migratory birds.
612
 The 
relation between quantum theory and the brain sciences is in its infancy; however, as a 
universal law of physics, at a fundamental level, we are quanta. These ideas informed 
the sequences in the latter quarter of Psychotel, in which the micro-world is referenced. 
I suggest a relation between entropic disorder and the Freudian death-drive. It is likely 
there is a correlation between cellular activity and behaviour of the organism as a 
whole. Deleuze and Guattari write of the cerebral state that ‘cells die without being 
renewed, making the brain a set of little deaths that puts constant death within us’.
613
 
Freud suggests the death-drive is a desire to return to an inorganic state. This could 




The uncanny sensation arises with certain audio tones. Prevalent in the supernatural 
horror genre are deep bass tones. I venture that low resonance mimics the ocean, 
thunder, and volcano eruption, and that there is a hard-wired reaction to be wary of 
these sounds.
615
 That this is a primitive response corresponds to accounts of the 
uncanny already discussed. The sound track of Psychotel makes use of low resonant 
                                                 
611. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 280. 
612. Peter Hore, ‘The Quantum Robin’, <http://hore.chem.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/The_Quantum_Robin.pdf>, accessed 7 March 2019.  
613. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 216. 
614. Entropy refers to the degree of randomness in a system, or a measure of disorder. The term was introduced in 1850 by Rudolf 
Clausius as a mathematical way of testing the second law of thermodynamics; that total entropy in a system cannot decrease over 
time. See <https://www.britannica.com/science/thermodynamics/Isothermal-and-adiabatic-processes#ref258544>, accessed 7 March 
2019. 
615. As an innate response I speculate that this has a neurological correlation. However this is not known. 
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hums that provoke a response of unease and are the stock material of the supernatural 
horror genre. The science sequence referenced above uses two voices in a call and 
response that could be likened to a preacher and congregation except the flat delivery 
and musical notes makes the sequence more like an avant-garde audio work. The use of 
rhythm and chant is designed to enliven the viewer and invite them to commit further to 
the cinematic world and at other times to relax and beguile. Many religious practices 
involve meditation, or chanting and prayers that employ vibration through resonant 
humming and rhythmical, repetitious phrases. It is a matter of opinion whether these 
activities take one closer to the divine, but they occupy the language centres of the 
brain, as does transcendental meditation through the repetition of a mantra while 
encouraging a focus on the breath. Although the aim is to achieve a higher state of 
consciousness (whatever that may be), the rhythmical nature of these practices, attuning 
the heart with the breath, brings the mind into an awareness of the embodied moment.  
 
Mavromatis, in his academic study of hypnagogia, notes that meditation involves 
turning the attention inwards, and has physiological aspects including decreased oxygen 
consumption, heart rate, and blood lactate. Initial alpha rhythm brain wave activity 
progresses to the alpha-theta range, then to pure theta rhythm that can be measured by 
EEG.
616
 Mavromatis draws comparisons between meditation, creativity, hypnagogia, 
and schizophrenic mentation. He notes a defining characteristic of hypnagogia is the 
loosening of ego boundaries, observing that schizophernia is often characterised by a 





With reference to R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari describe schizophrenia as a 
‘transcendental experience of the loss of the Ego [...]’.
618
 They discuss feelings, affect, 
as ‘intensive qualities that form material for hallucinations and deliriums’.
619
 Their term 
‘schizoanalysis’, rather than retaining connotations of mental illness, aims to 
demonstrate their rhizomatic attitude of mind.  
 
                                                 
616. Mavromatis, Hypnogogia, p. 110. 
617. Ibid., p. 175.  
618 . Ibid., p. 93. With reference to R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, New York, NY: Ballantine, 1967, pp. 154‒55. 
619. Ibid., p. 93. 
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Robbins coined the term ‘schizophenese’ for the language of schizophrenia, which he 
uses to demonstrate the different ways in which primordial and reflective consciousness 
use language. His patient Caroline describes an impromptu game of pool: ‘I had time to 
kill. Rack it up and pocket ’em. Sock it and rock ’em. Clear the table. The only table 
that had monkey business to it.’ The alliteration in combination with the lack of specific 
information bears similarities to some of the voice-over used in Psychotel. The line; ‘its 
energy was adding to the folding of the city, the blackness was pushing upwards 
through the floating crap’, contains comparable rhythm and a lack of concrete 
specificity.
620
 The voice-over below was written following a dream.  
 
 I dreamed I was on a train and I told my daughter that I was the minister because of the 
 rape. I didn’t mean minister I meant consulate...because of consummate...because it was 
 non-consensual. Consulate contains the word slut. And then I saw all the languages, I 
 saw it written in all the languages like in an instruction manual. 
 
This text contains the contents of the dream but is not verbatim dream-speak. In this can 
be seen condensation and displacement as well as alliteration and perhaps a faint rhythm 
of a train. These examples lend weight to the idea that creative practice employs the 
unconscious or, to follow Robbins, engages primordial consciousness and thus bears a 
relation to dreaming and schizophrenic mentation. Reflective representational (Robbins) 
or extended (Damasio) consciousness has a temporal aspect, allowing for past 
experience to inform future prediction. Although as a mode of consciousness this type 
of mentation might imply being present, it distracts from the lived moment.
621
 It is the 
assumption of presence that Derrida challenges through his critical framework of 
hauntology that emphasises the temporal quality of thought of the spectralised 
individual and the historical trace in the social field.  
Temporal thinking may be associated with anxiety, being characterised by worry about 
the past or future. An interconnected group of brain structures known as the default 
mode network (DMN) has been identified as active during times when the brain is not 
paying particular attention, at rest but awake.
622
 These connected brain structures, a 
                                                 
620. Another example already mentioned is ‘sunbeams clung to her body and tiny birds’, that conveys tone by repetitious sounds 
and abstract content. 
621. This is the distinction made by Withy when she discusses absencing and presencing in Heidegger. Withy, Heidegger: On Being 
Uncanny, p. 149, see also chapter 6. 
622 Default mode network (DMN) is a widely used term but its function is not fully understood and research into this collection of 
interconnected brain regions is relatively new.  
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complex construct of interconnectivity, are associated with creativity.
623
 This 
correlation of day-dreaming and creativity supports my experience that creative 
challenges require rumination.
624
 The DMN is thought to be associated with the 
construct of self-hood and the means by which we build personal narratives.
625
 
Increased activity in the DMN is associated with depression whereas decreased DMN 
activity is reported in meditation practitioners, and psilocybin and LSD use shows 
desynchronised DMN operation.
626
 In meditation and psychoactive drug use, like 
schizophrenia, ego dissolution is frequently reported. Neidich considers contemporary 
use of social media and other online activity may reduce daydreaming and hence time 
when the DMN is active. Neidich considers this may have a negative impact on human 
creativity.
627
 Research is underway to correlate these findings and better understand the 
DMN.
628
 A relation between DMN and primordial consciousness could be inferred from 
the types of mentation cited; however this is speculative. 
It is possible that having a meditation practice and engaging in non-direct thinking when 
engaged in creative tasks may have supported periods of productivity.
629
 Meditation has 
influenced the content of the work, specifically the counting down and up at the start 
and finish. These sequences, the kaleidoscopic effects during the spirit guide exorcism, 
and the ending are intended to be hypnotic. It may be that these sequences promote 
fluctuations in DMN activation in the viewer but this cannot be predicted. 
                                                 
623. See Beaty, et al, 2018 for brain imaging study of 163 participants in classic divergent thinking task, Brenner for summary of 
recent studies of DMN and creativity, and Stark for correlation of DMN and well-being. Roger. E. Beaty et al, ‘Robust prediction of 
individual creative ability from brain functional connectivity’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U S A.  vol. 115, 
no. 5, 2018, 1087–1092. See <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5798342/>, accessed 21 September 2018. Grant 
Hilary Brenner, ‘Your brain on creativity’, Psychology Today, 2018, 
<https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/experimentations/201802/your-brain-creativity>, accessed 21 September 2018, See 
Eloise A. Stark, et al, ‘Music, dance, and other art forms: New insights into the links between hedonia (pleasure) and eudaimonia 
(well-being)’, Progress in Brain Research, vol. 237, 2018, 129‒152. 
624. Creative rumination will be returned to in chapter 8.  
625. For a study of the neural representations of self see Ray and Davey for a brain imaging study of self in relation to the DMN. 
Rebecca D. Ray et al, ‘Interdependent self-construal and neural representations of self and mother’, Social, Cognitive, and Affective 
Neuroscience, vol. 5, 2010, 318‒323, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2894675/>, accessed 21 September 2018. 
Christopher G. Davey et al, ‘Mapping the self in the brain’s default mode network’, NeuroImage, vol. 132, 2016, 390‒397. 
626. See Lou for study of meditation and neural correlates of consciousness and Garrison for meditation and DMN activity. Hans C. 
Lou et al, ‘The Mental Self’, Progress in Brain Research, vol. 150, 2005, 197‒204. Kathleen A. Garrison et al, ‘Meditation leads to 
reduced default mode network activity beyond an active task’, Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioural Neuroscience, vol. 15, issue 3, 
2015, 712‒720, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4529365/ >, accessed 20 September 2018. 
627. Warren Neidich, Transmission Lecture, Sheffield Hallam University, 2014. 
628. There is a correlation between creativity, mediation, and schizophrenia draw by Mavromatis, referenced previously. The 
relation of the DMN to creativity and meditation is unclear, however creative practice varies considerably. Painting for example, is 
likely a different type of mental activity to character-based writing in which the use of a system involved in building personal 
narratives may be beneficial. These comments are speculative and contribute to an in-progress picture of brain rest and 
contemporary digital life. 
629. I have practised several forms of meditation and have had a short course of hypnotherapy. I have Sufi friends and occasionally 
join them for a zikr. While they are praying, I would describe what I am engaged in as group meditation. I have done short courses 
in mindfulness and Buddhist meditation. Through an interest in the filmmaker David Lynch I explored transcendental meditation. 
Although it is trade‒marked ‒ something I find extraordinary for a meditation practice ‒ and its ‘secrets’ carefully guarded to protect 
profit (TM courses are very expensive) there is information available and it is quite simple in principle. On occasion when I have 
been engaged in creative practice (editing), and have meditated according to routine, I have found I am already ‘there’, that is, the 





Fig. 62. Psychotel stills, dir. Susannah Gent 
In The Brain as a Screen, an interview with Cahiers du Cinéma, Deleuze suggests that 
cinema resembles spiritual life. He defines spiritual life as ʽthe movement of the mindʼ. 
Rather than relating to dream or fantasy, he specifies it is ʽthe realm of clear-headed 
decision making, a kind of absolute stubbornness, the choice of existence’.
630
 Deleuze 
stresses that thought is molecular, and the biology of the brain is relevant as ‘cinema 
puts the image in motion, or endows the image with self-movement, it is forever tracing 
and retracing cerebral circuits’.
631
 The connection Deleuze draws between cinema, 
spirituality and ‘clear-headed decision making’ appears counter-intuitive, however; as 
discussed in relation to somatic markers, decision making is an emotionally driven 
process. 
The idea of moving deeper – or lower – into the mind, as Freud’s term unconscious 
suggests, is a widely held spatial metaphor for the architecture of the psyche. I filmed 
lifts in the hotels, a dumb waiter, and the paternoster at the Arts Tower of the University 
of Sheffield.
632
 All present the possibility of something that should not be there 
appearing as the lift rises or descends. As noted, this choice was influenced by the 
opening sequence of Lars Von Trier’s Europa, featuring a shot of a track taken from the 
front of the train. The countdown in this film and in Psychotel draws the audience into 
the unique narrative space. 
The state of mind attained through mediation and chant may be aligned with Damasio’s 
core-consciousness that is associated with the here-and-now. This state of mentation, 
which could be likened to Robbins’ primordial consciousness, lacks the temporal 
dimension of extended consciousness or reflective representational thought. The 
                                                 
630. Gilles Deleuze, ‘The Brain is a Screen’, in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975‒1995, ed. by David 
Laloujade, trans. by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, New York, NY: Semiotext(e), 2006, p. 40. 
631. Ibid., p. 41.  
632. I was surprised how many hotel employees had never heard of the dumb waiter. I have a sinister association with dumb 
waiters, which I think stems from a film I watched in childhood but have very little concrete recollection. 
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movement between extended- and core-consciousness, or primordial- and  reflective 
representational consciousness may correlated to the absencing and presencing 
described by Withy in relation to the uncanny nature of Dasein. Perception and 
consciousness, rather than being means of revealing what there is, are means by which 
reality is constructed. That reality is polymorphous is itself uncanny. That we 
experience different states of being, many of which are in conflict with Western 
ideology and the positivist vision of reality, suggests there is wisdom in primitive 






























CHECK OUT: EXIT 
Chance: the magic book shop  
Be helpless, dumbfounded, 
Unable to say yes or no. 




I live in Nether Edge, Sheffield, in the centre of which is an Oxfam bookshop. It has a 
shelf for philosophy and religion, a combination that irks me every time. Although the 
selection is small I have bought Écrits by Lacan, Creative Evolution by Henri Bergson, 
and many science books including the works of Penrose. When I wanted a copy of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus I ordered it from Amazon but it never arrived and 
the seller contacted me to say it was not available. Then on my birthday I went into 
Oxfam and there it was. I am not superstitious but as I am doing a Ph.D. on the subject 
of the uncanny I feel there is space for primitive belief. Since then I have used the 
bookshop to guide my reading. I do, of course, follow references suggested in other 
texts and take recommendations from my supervisors and contemporaries; however, the 
magic bookshop method is surprisingly good. The method, if I may call it that, is not 
quite bibliomancy, the use of books for divination, but there are correlations.   
 
One of the first books I read after starting the Ph.D. was Claxton’s The Wayward Mind: 
An Intimate History of the Unconscious, an historical book about changes in attitude to 
mind and psyche since the Ancient Egyptians. And towards the end of my reading for 
this project, I find his work, Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, in the bookshop. He argues:  
 
 Allowing the mind time to meander is not a luxury that can safely be cut back as life or 





One of the advantages of undertaking this practice-based Ph.D. has been to experience 
the benefits of academic and creative ‘space’, in danger of being eroded through 
contemporary time-compression and work intensification.
635
  
                                                 
633. Rumi, Zero Circle, <https://www.poemhunter.com/poem/zero-circle/comments/>, accessed 29 March 2019. 
634. Guy Claxton, Hare Brain Tortoise Mind, London: Fourth Estate, 1998, p. 2.  
635. In 1989, David Harvey proposed ‘space-time compression’, to reflect the contemporary shrinkage of distance that brings about 
the ‘global village’. Harvey’s ‘space-time compression’ describes an ‘imperative to reduce the circulation time of capital’ following 
Marx’s theory of the ‘annihilation of time and space’ that refers to the requirement of cheap transport and communication for 
capital-based production. See Aejaz Ahmad Wani and Mohd. Rafiq Wani, ‘Time, Space and Capitalism’, International Journal of 




In a central sequence of Psychotel that features text from Kristeva referring to 
Florence’s dream, the confusion over basin and basement is a Freudian slip.
636
 That this 
has become a feature of the scene stems from a method of working that is open to 
chance. The spawning fish are successful – that they are largely concealed beneath the 
water is suggestive of the psychoanalytic unconscious. I did not expect to see them 
when I set out to film on that day. The sequence in which the spirit guide is exorcised 
was one of the last sections to be shot. The film had to reach sixty minutes. Nietzsche 
was taken from the bookcase at random. His work had not formed part of the Ph.D. 
literature at that stage. After a brief and unsystematic perusal, the section was recorded 
and in the edit within fifteen minutes.
637
 Although this could happen in a scripted 
project for commission, it would be less unlikely. Not only is the conscious (extended / 
representational) mind not the main player in creative practice but it could serve as a 
hindrance. I have instinctively known this as a filmmaker but it has been less prominent 
in my role as a lecturer. 
 
I initially asked Sharon Kivland to perform a few words of voice-over to vary the vocal 
texture in Psychotel.
638
 I knew she spoke French and a text by Kristeva seemed to ask 
for an accent. The repetitious and pronounced delivery of these words brought to mind a 
French teacher. Both my mother and grandmother were French teachers. This made a 
link between my relationship with my supervisor and the transgenerational phantom, 
already suggested in the film with the footage of myself, my mother, and my daughter. 
The position of mother / (m)Other in psychoanalysis, as a relationship requiring 
resolution, tempted me to bring Sharon Kivland further into the content of the film and 
have her perform the voice of the spirit guide. In the final act of the film the spirit guide 
is ‘flushed out’, intended as a metaphor for moving on, engaging with transference, 





                                                 
636. I intended to say ‘basin’ with reference to where Florence vomited up the head of her mother. Instead I said ‘basement’. 
Kristeva, ‘Psychoanalysis in Times of Distress’, p. 21‒2. 
637. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 81. 
638. For convenience I did most of the voices myself in the early stages of the film. The recording of voice-over and managing 
performance became a major task of the latter stages of this production.  
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Reception: creative-practice research 
On my accustomed bench of augury, 
Whither all tribes of fowl after their kind 
Always resort, heard a strange noise of birds 




That intelligence is measured largely in terms of intellect, what Claxton calls ‘d-mode 
thinking’, that involves deliberation and analysis, could arise from the comparative ease 
of measuring this mental mode.
640
 He writes that ‘d-mode is much more interested in 
finding answers and solutions than in examining the questions’,
641
 and suggests 
‘modern Western thinking has [...] neglected the intelligent unconscious [...]’,
642
 
stressing that ‘[k]nowing, at root, is implicit, practical, intuitive.’
643
 For Claxton, 
creative and intuitive thinking occurs in the ‘undermind’, below the threshold of 
consciousness and benefits from periods of ‘gestation’.
644
 The space and time for 
thinking I appreciated during the course of this study, that I valued when I was a 
student, is eroded in the contemporary workplace and the educational setting through 




My research and practice, to use a filmic metaphor, operate through an intercutting of 
responsive, thoughtful questioning that builds a network of relations between the film 
and the text. As the main revelation in the practical component has been the affirmation 
of creative practice as employing a dialogue between different modes of thinking 
(conscious and unconscious or primordial and reflective representational) and a 
confidence gained through understanding the methods of this approach, it seemed 
appropriate to allow the narrative content of the film and the scenario behind the film to 
have a porous quality. 
 
Craig Batty and Marsha Berry discuss the ‘playful space’ of the creative practice 
research degree. They suggest the research space is in a state of ‘flux’, that a dialogue is 
                                                 
639. Sophocles, Antigone, Ontario, Dover Thrift Editions, 1993, p. 38. 
640. Claxton, Hare Brain Tortoise Mind, p. 2. 
641. Ibid., p. 7.  
642. Ibid. 
643. Ibid, p. 19.  
644. Ibid., p. 7.  
645. In 1993 I undertook a three year MA course in Film and Television Production. I now teach on a similar course that offers an 
MA after one year’s study. Since the introduction of the fee system I have observed a change in attitude in under-graduate students 
from taking a course to allow themselves space to play and develop, to being anxiously focused on their final grades wanting to 




built between the theory and the practice, and the creative artefact and the thesis are 
often ‘braided and fictocritical’.
646
 They consider creating a dynamic space as vital for 
creative practice research but also vital for the academy. They write:  
 
 It is a space of constellations and connections where practices, methods and 
 understandings  meet and shape new methodologies: an environment that serves as a 




This ‘space’ of the research degree is ‘a complex entanglement of connections and 
relationships’.
648
 On the relationship between candidate and supervisor they write: 
‘When candidates try to organise ideas and practices into neat boxes, and those boxes 
leak, supervisors play an important role in making sure the content does not collapse.’
649
 
The relationship between art practice and mental health, discussed with reference to 
Unhomely Street, led me to consider the creative ‘space’ of the creative practice 
research degree and the psychoanalytic space as having parallels, in which the analyst 
and supervisor both assist the patient or candidate in  uncovering psychical material. 
 
My Director of Studies and the Ph.D. student cohort continually gave me permission to 
go further into the research or the practice. Although subtle, this open and permissive 
experience was quite unlike other instances of sharing work-in-progress.
650
 The process 
of making was at times highly vexing and noncompliant; however, although I did not 
know what the outcome of the work would be, I intuitively understood the method. It is 
only at this stage that I feel confident in describing the process as one that is open to 
chance. While this fits quite comfortably with the subject of the uncanny, it is at odds 
with the assumed rigour of academic research. 
 
When I began the behavioural study to gain an image set for the fMRI project, a 
colleague asked me if that was my method; did I intend to use images that were 
demonstrated as being uncanny as a starting point to my film? I did not, and felt the 
notion most unappealing, although it would be easy to write-up: I could defend this 
method as objective and scientific, but this would entirely miss the point. The method of 
filmmaking employed has enabled the content to emerge in a state of flux. The films 
                                                 
646. Craig Batty & Marsha Berry, ‘Constellations and Connections: the Playful Space of the Creative practice Research Degree’, 
Journal of Media Practice, vol. 16, issue 3, 2015, 181‒194, p. 185. 
647. Ibid., p. 182.  
648. Ibid., p. 192. 
649. Ibid., p. 181.  
650. Usually this is in the context of a commissioned project in which the commissioning editor or series producer will have input 
and shape film during the script or edit stages. Inevitably their focus is on popularity rather than innovation. 
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make both literal and oblique references to texts read during the course of the research, 
and permit the influence of dreams, themselves likely arising in part from aspects of the 
research.  
 
The dual aspect of the psyche in various guises across disciplines has been the central 
focus, itself arising from an investigation of the double and its relation to the uncanny. 
In sum, this doubling is discussed in terms of: the neuroscientific conscious and 
nonconscious mind; Damasio’s core- and extended-consciousness; Freud’s conscious 
and unconscious mind and the more subtle and complex divisions of the ego, super-ego 
and the id; Solms’ revision of the Freudian topology that designates consciousness to 
the id and unconsciousness to the ego; Opatow’s evolutionary view of inhibitory 
suppression of brain regions; Claxton’s conscious d-mode thinking and the undermind; 
Robbins’s states of primoridal consciousness and reflective representational 
consciousness and Heidegger / Withy’s observation of presencing and abscencing. My 
experience of filmmaking is that it engages mental processes that are different to 
rational and logical thought. The mode of mentation is often affective and associations 
are metaphorical and lateral rather than literal and logical. The picture is far from clear 
however. Past experience and memory come into play with creative practice that would 
be aligned with extended and reflective consciousness whereas correlations are seen 
between creativity and primordial consciousness, which bears a resemblance to core-
consciousness. The associations made between creativity, dreams, and schizophrenic 
mentation suggest primordial consciousness is engaged. Loosening of ego boundaries is 
reported in schizophrenia, meditation, psychoactive drug use, and hypnagogic 
experiences. Schizophrenia, meditation, and psychoactive hallucination are associated 
with decreased DMN activity, while creativity is linked to DMN activation.
651
 I propose 
the activity I am engaged in when working creatively could be likened to the 
interpersonal field of psychoanalysis, whereby the two psychical elements are regions of 
the mind. A fuller understanding of the mental operations that underpin creative practice 
is required before a conclusion can be drawn. It is certain that there is no simple answer, 
like a switch that can be flipped to a mode that relates to all creative practice. But I am 
convinced that creative thinking requires space and time that need recognition and 
protection in the face of an increasingly d-mode culture. 
 
                                                 
651. DMN function is presented as sharing similarities to sleep as a requirement for the operation of other mental processes.  
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Intuition and affect 
You have tasted the fire on your tongue 
till it is swollen black 
with a prophetic joy: 
Burn with me! 
The only music is time, 




This research does not conclude – rather, it builds on past and future work. It has 
provided a structure through which to develop previous attempts at representing 
subjectivity and further understand, in the broadest terms, how humans think, but in a 
narrower sense, how the filmic image may contribute to the field of human thought. At 
this stage of this complex endeavour, I have clarified, to a certain extent, my own 
understanding of thought, through the interdisciplinary approach taken. This has 
involved drawing together threads from psychoanalysis, neuroscience, psychology, and 
philosophy. To summarise – I uphold the view that the human psyche is fragmented as 
presented by Freud and Lacan, and uncanny according to Vidler’s interpretation and 
Withy’s reading of Heidegger. The dual aspect of the psyche, summarised above, shows 
consistency across disciplines, and the evolutionary account found in the work of 
Damasio and Robbins is persuasive. The correlation between Lacan, Robbins, and 
Damasio points to a tiered structure of consciousness both in evolutionary terms and in 
the development of the individual. That action initiation is mainly instinctual but 
involves the repression of actions by inhibitory mechanisms draws together Libet and 
Opatow who both extend Freud’s account of censorship and the influence of the 
unconscious. Solms demonstrates that consciousness is primarily an affective, brainstem 
mechanism. This adds weight to Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis by which I 
progress an understanding of cinematic pleasure. The somatic marker hypothesis 
describes an affective neural configuration that is formed through experience and ‘fired’ 
when a similar experience is presented. This neuroscientific hypothesis is not at odds 
with the psychoanalytic view that sees the past influence the present in affective terms. 
Bergson and Deleuze’s complex and subtle accounts complement Freud, Damasio, and 
Solms who augment our understanding of the relation of the present to the past that 
underpins the framework of hauntology. Bergson describes a process by which ‘we 
detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in 
                                                 
652. Stanley Kunitz, ‘King of the River’, <https://www.poemhunter.com/poem/king-of-the-river-3/>, accessed 29 March 2019. 
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general, then in a certain region of the past [...] like the focusing of a camera’.
653
 
Intuitive filmmaking involves a rich and largely nonconscious interplay between the 
lived moment, its imagined representation, and associations in the form of feelings 
arising from both. I use an affective response to sound and image with post-hoc 
reflection to consider what is at play during the creative act. Through research of the 
psychoanalytic, neuroscientific, and philosophical views of selfhood and being, I have 
formed an in-progress view of how I understand the psyche. I do not claim that this 
view is complete or accurate; rather it is a working model that informs my filmmaking. 
In sum this model is suggested by the uncanny in so far as our mental life is comprised 
of consciousness, and unconscious and nonconscious processes that are veiled from 
each other, to use a shadowy metaphor, or perhaps imperfectly networked.  
 
The quality of feeling in terms of thought, that amounts to a type of knowing, rather than 
the explicit knowing normally associated with d-mode thought, has become an area of 
specific interest in my filmmaking, that is, the capacity to make an audience feel that 
they have understood rather than to comprehend a narrative in conventional story 
terms.
654
 Townsend suggests that ‘the artist has gone through a training in intuition so 
that her perceptions are increasingly refined and increasingly attuned to responding to 
elements which will carry her work forward’.
655
 My report on such matters builds on 
Townsend’s project. The concurrence among Townsend’s interviewees indicates this 
artistic attitude of mind is a specific form of consciousness, or engagement between 










                                                 
653. Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 56. 
654. On this point, although in derisory terms, Christian Metz writes of avant-garde or experimental films: ‘as the enlightened 
audience knows, it is appropriate at once to understand and not to understand (not understanding being the better way to understand 
and too much effort at understanding being the height of misunderstanding, etc.). These films, whose objective social function, at 
least in some cases, is to satisfy a certain kind of intellectual’s naïvely desperate desire not to be naïve, have integrated within their 
institutional regime of intelligibility a certain dose of elegant and coded unintelligibility, in such a way that their very 
unintelligibility is, as a result, intelligible.’ Although couched in negative terms, it is this type of knowing that is of interest; 
however I do not see it as naïve, rather as relating to affective knowing as opposed to intellectual knowing. See Psychoanalysis and 
Cinema, p. 121.  
655. Townsend, ‘A Life of its Own’, p. 105. 
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Behind the curtain: the uncanny unconscious  
‘Macabre narratives are symbolic forms bearing the configuration of  
the life – Life – that generated them.’656 
 
Psychoanalytic repression, reviewed in chapter 5, is aligned with Damasio’s somatic 
marker hypothesis. While this builds on a neuropsychoanalytic understanding of the 
psyche, the description generalises the idea of repression into the operation of neural 
structures and does not account for why certain experiences are uncanny, i.e. the return 
of the repressed, and others are commonplace recollections. Not only does something 
need to be added to the uncanny to distinguish it from other types of fear, but something 
needs to be added to the unconscious to distinguish it from the nonconscious. Given that 
most mental activity that drives our actions is nonconscious, the uncanny element 
cannot arise from the automatic nature of our operation per se; rather, I suggest it arises 
from instances of our awareness of it. I propose the psychoanalytic unconscious better 
describes a process and an experience, not a brain region or mechanism. Claxton, on the 
history of the unconscious mind, writes: 
 
 The ‘unconscious’ of the subliminal perception is not the same as the ‘unconscious’ of 
 creativity, or of Freudian neurosis, or of a momentary mystical meeting with the 
 Godhead. The truth is that, after millennia of story-telling, we have inherited a glory-




This is problematic if one adopts the receptacle model of the unconscious. If the 
unconscious is viewed as a process, the disparate nature of Claxton’s ‘glory-hole’ 
disappears. In this sense the unconscious could be seen as a curtain, perhaps a plastic 
curtain as one would find in an abattoir, through which the factory floor is glimpsed. 
This re-reading of the unconscious brings it closer to the uncanny. A reversal can be 
seen: rather than the unconscious being nonconscious, the unconscious is a state of 
coming into consciousness. While this may sound far-fetched, the uncanny is described 
as the return of the repressed and the unconscious is the location of the repressed. If the 
problematic notion of a location is changed to a process then the two concepts overlap. 
Masschelein, in The Unconcept, writes: 
 
 It has often been remarked that Freud produces a seemingly never-ending stream of 
 images  and motifs in his attempt to grasp the uncanny. This is consistent with a 
                                                 
656. Morgan, The Biology of Horror, p. 225. 
657. Claxton, The Wayward Mind, pp. 11‒12. 
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 conception of the uncanny as an essentially unconscious phenomenon. However, as a 





Although my argument runs against the grain of this quotation, Masschelein indicates 
the uncanny is a feeling of arrival into consciousness.
659
 Instances of awareness of the 
nonconscious operator and manifestations of primordial consciousness including 
primitive beliefs, feelings of omnipotence and telepathy, and aberrant use of language 
and Freudian slips, are cited as inducing feelings of uncanniness and are discussed in 
terms of the Freudian unconscious. Freud explains that we only ever experience the 
outcome of repression, the representative, that arrives in the form of anxiety. Deep 
resonant tones, coincidence and repetition, instances of corrupted physics and 
obscuration of features that deny an accurate reading of affect indicate older mental 
mechanisms.
660
 This seems to suggest that what we find uncanny is the awareness of 
switching registers as it were. The unconscious only exists in our awareness of it and 
this awareness is uncanny. 
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari write that ‘the unconscious itself is no more 
structural than personal, it does not symbolize any more than it imagines or represents: 
it engineers, it is machinic’.
661
 They suggest Freud turned the unconscious into a 
theatre, a ‘classical theater, the classical order of representation’, making it cease to be 
what it is: ‘a factory, a workshop’.
662
 They understand drives as desiring-machines.
663
 
For them ‘the unconscious does not mean anything’, rather it ‘constructs machines’, 
‘machines of desire’; it does not speak, rather ‘it engineers’, ‘it is not expressive or 
representative, but productive’.
664
 Here is an understanding of the unconscious closer to 
Robbins’s primordial consciousness and the nonconscious of psychology and 
neuroscience. They suggest the psychoanalytic unconscious only knows how to express 
itself in myth, tragedy, and in dream.
665
 Their criticism of psychoanalysis is that it 
constructs guilt. It detracts attention from the social and environmental and places 
                                                 
658. Masschelein, The Unconcept, p. 36. 
659. This makes the relation of the unconscious to the nonconscious resemble Freud’s understanding of the relation of the ‘pre-
conscious’ to the unconscious of the first topography. As Freud’s pre-conscious is an awkward term that he supersedes I have not 
included it herein.  
660. Seemingly hard-wired fear responses to deep resonant tones may form part of older neural structures and may suggest the 
uncanny relates to awareness of changes in the register of psychical modes. This is speculative.  
661. Deleuze and Guattari, p. 60.  
662. Ibid., p. 62. I am reminded of the theatre curtain at the end of Psychotel. 
663. Ibid., p. 37.  
664. Ibid., p. 197.  
665. Ibid., p. 61.  
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responsibility on the individual. The awareness of dual aspects of the psyche that is 
experienced as uncanny and that the unconscious announces could be seen as relating to 
disharmony between the individual and the socio-cultural machine. If the unconscious is 
said to be uniquely human perhaps this is due to the way humans live ‒ in a state of 
disharmony. 
 
Freud’s complexes, on which the unconscious is founded, relate to the management of 
breeding, incest, family and group dominance, and anxiety over the wholeness of the 
physical body ‒ these are mammalian concerns. Throughout this thesis I have returned 
to the human-animal. Perhaps the history of human as an individual, as ‘whole’ rather 
than fragmented, as in God’s image, as opposed to mammalian, as independent of 
thought, as free, not one of an interconnected species that operates according to certain 
laws, opens a pathway to understanding why we find ourselves, our mental life, 
uncanny. The unease implicit in the Freudian unconscious draws it closer to the 
uncanny than other models of the psyche. Buried in the two knotted concepts is the 




Visitor’s book: filmmaking in precarious times 




Royle’s ‘uncanny paradox’ concerns the problem that we ‘understand ourselves so 
profoundly and yet still organise our world so badly’.
668
 Dennett writes: ‘There is really 
no reason to suppose that animals have a clue about why they do what they instinctually 
do, and human beings are no exception.’
669
 Freud proposed two groups of primal 
instincts; ‘the ego, or self-preservative instincts and the sexual instincts’.
670
 He points to 
conflict between the two instincts, whereby the purpose of biology goes beyond the 
individual to the preservation of the species, and he beautifully describes the individual 
                                                 
666. One could write at length about what is wrong with humankind; however, it is sufficient to cite the 2018 world nuclear forces 
report from SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, that the warhead inventory exceeded 14,000, 
<https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2018/06>, accessed 26 August 2019. I must confess to having a mild uncanny response upon 
noting this footnote number in relation to this reference. Six hundred and sixty-six, said to be the number of the beast, is a numerical 
anomaly in Greek. 666 or χξϛ in Greek is not able to be represented by the repetition of 6 or ϛ repeated three times, i.e., ϛϛϛ, is not 
six hundred sixty-six, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Number_of_the_Beast> accessed 3 October 2019. 
667. ‘There are no birds in the underworld’, is a line of voice-over at the start of Psychotel. I was introduced to this notion by Royle 
with reference to Virgil, who in Aeneid calls the underworld Avernus meaning birdless. See Nicholas Royle, ‘Hide 15’, in An 
English Guide to Birdwatching, p. 321. 
668. Royle, The Uncanny, p. 3.  
669. Dennett, Breaking the Spell, p. 159. 
670. Freud, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ p. 120.  
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as ‘a temporary and transient appendage to the quasi-immortal germ-plasm’.
671
 This 
quotation is used at the close of Psychotel, indicating of how I intend the film to be 
understood.  
 
Although the human operates with the same underlying concerns as other mammals, we 
have the ability to make strategic choices in our behaviour. From Deleuze and Guattari 
we gain schizoanalysis to nurture the artistic-machine, the analytic-machine, and the 
revolutionary-machine. From Haraway we learn of a possible future of inter-species 
collaboration and an expanded understanding of kinship. From Derrida we learn there is 
only the trace, and that our present it haunted. Each points to a revolution of thinking. 
In these precarious times, facing potentially catastrophic environmental changes that our 
action has brought about, exercising our capacity to make informed choices for the 
benefit of the species, and one would hope, the planet and other species, should take 
priority. For me, a huge step in human thinking would be to stop believing that we are 
angels.
672
 Haraway’s Chthulucene, ‘[...] a kind of timeplace for learning to stay with the 
trouble of living and dying in reponse-ability on a damaged earth’ remains a potent 
reminder of how conceptual approaches can change lives.
673
 Terry Castle suggests that 
the uncanny is an eighteenth-century invention arising as a function of enlightenment. 
She writes that ‘[...] the aggressively rationalist imperatives of the epoch ‒ also 
produced, like a kind of toxic side effect, a new human experience of strangeness, 
anxiety, bafflement, and intellectual impasse.’
674
 The twenty-first-century, with its 
endgame narrative of the anthropocene and the simultaneous veneration and suspicion 
of technology is producing a new uncanny in which the previously held certainties of 
humankind’s continuous presence blur and tremble. 
 
The environmental message is a contemporary anthem that is in danger of losing 
meaning through reiteration. One of my claims to knowledge is that the style of 
presentation used in Psychotel makes this message an underlying theme. The film 
speaks of ‘care’ and this intention is presented by direct address to the audience. This is 
                                                 
671. Ibid., p. 121‒22.  
672. It is noteworthy that in the face of current environmental issues one response is to step up space exploration with the hope of 
finding another planet to occupy when this one is used up. Although it is perhaps not unreasonable to have such ambitions I cannot 
help but feel it indicates a perception that we are ‘not of this world’, as well as a shirking of responsibility towards this planet. 
Underpinning much religious doctrine is the belief that the world is God’s gift to humankind to do with as they wish. 
673. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, p. 2. As previously mentioned, Haraway’s positive approach alleviated my anxiety in the 
latter stages of post-concussive syndrome by providing an alternative attitude with which to contemplate the future. 
674. Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer: 18th Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995, p. 8. 
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an unusual approach and as this message needs to be unearthed by the viewer it avoids 
the polemic tone.  
 
Emotion, as has been demonstrated, is the means by which we make decisions. Film 
entertains us by providing the space, for a set duration, to explore and expand our 
emotional states. This activity has wider implications for the individual and society as a 
whole.
675
 Films are seen primarily as entertainment by most consumers. Films outside 
this arena, such as my own, occupy a marginal position. But the work is unusual and 




Unhomely Street, while not explaining hauntology in a straightforward manner, 
following Fisher draws connections between capitalism and mental illness. The 
narrative introduces the idea of anxiety for the future due to past events and makes 
reference to Spectres of Marx. Psychotel explores and represents ideas about the 
uncanny and the structure of selfhood outlined in the thesis. While neither film provides 
a clear explanation of either hauntology or the uncanny, both contribute to the subjects 
as they would enhance an understanding if viewed in a research setting with 
accompanying texts. Standing alone, the films deliver affect and an introduction to the 
ideas in the thesis without being information driven (d-mode). Both films are 
provocative. They cause the viewer to think and feel. Scanner presents the survey while 
playing with the form of scientific documentary. Unhomely Street, as a representation of 
a state of mental illness provides a starting point for discussion, a point of comparison, a 
potential site for sharing. Psychotel, as evidenced in small test screenings, evokes 
feelings of disharmony and alienation at the start that give way to feelings of optimism 
and belief in potential unity. I argue that the three films, as original artworks, are a 
contribution according to a logic that emotion is knowledge. The films invite the viewer 
to engage their imagination. This is especially true of Psychotel. Much of what is 
described in the voice-over is not portrayed in the image, or at least it is a vague and 
incomplete version. That the viewer must complete the picture means that what is 
uncanny is to some extent generated in their own minds. The uncanny is first and 
                                                 
675. There is still no agreement as to whether film violence produces a more violent society or whether it operates as a ‘valve’. 
Certainly the attitude of a society is reflected in the films they produce and consume, however I would argue this is a two-way 
process; we make what we like and we are what we view. There is not space in this thesis to do justice to this subject of the various 
film ‘products’ produced and how they arise. In the government supported film funding sector of the UK, formerly the British Film 
Institute and currently the UK Film Council, there are frequent moves to support under-represented groups, women filmmakers, 
films from the regions etc; however the bottom-line of these funding bodies is that the film is commercially viable. 
676. For the distribution plan for Psychotel and Scanner and the ongoing plan for Unhomely Street see appendix 3. 
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foremost a feeling. As demonstrated through the fMRI survey outlined in Scanner and 
discussed in chapter 2, exploring the uncanny in an image is a reductive endeavour. The 
uncanny is something revealed, something that has come to light, yet as many horror 
films demonstrate, its effects are most powerful when it remains partially veiled. As 
discussed the uncanny concerns the psyche, a foreign body within the self. To cause the 
image to occur in the mind of the viewer rather than safely on-screen is the logic behind 
the approach taken in Psychotel. Other films that employ this approach include 
Pontypool, a zombie film set in a radio station in which the zombies are only 
experienced through the audio reports, and the central section of Hunger in which the 
Bobby Sands character, played by Michael Fassbinder, describes a childhood memory 
of killing a foal.
677
 These examples highlight how film, rather than presenting a given 
image for the viewer to absorb, engage the imagination in a rich network of fantasy and 
spectacle. 
 
When first approaching Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia, I was 
intrigued by the recommendation that the book be read as one would listen to a 
record.
678
 Without comprehending this from the outset, I found the work continued to 
take shape long after my first baffled reading. This knowledge following ‘gestation’ 
corresponds to invention in creative work. For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy is 
concerned with the creation of concepts.
679
 The creative act undertaken here, although 
not a concept, contributes to knowledge through invention. I am not about to claim that 
my films contribute to knowledge by the simple fact that they result from a creative 
process, but rather by taking an experimental or essayist approach, in which the viewer 
lacks a map with which to read the film, the information and opinion, the questions 
posed by the film’s unconventional narrative, operate on the viewer in a manner which 
may result in a ‘gestation’. In the simplest terms Unhomely Street and Psychotel ask 
whether the fragmented and veiled nature of the psyche of the human mammal 
contributes to the inability to act effectively in the face of the global crisis and the 
precarious state of planet Earth’s ecosystem. If there is a solution to this problem it will 
                                                 
677. Pontypool, dir. Bruce McDonald, Kaleidoscope Entertainment, 2008 [on DVD], Hunger, dir. Steve McQueen, Film 4, 2008 [on 
DVD]. 
678. Brian Massumi, ‘Translator’s Forward, Pleasures of Philosophy’, in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, p. vii, with reference to Giles 
Deleuze in ‘Deleuze and Claire Parnet’, Dialogues, Paris: Flammarion, 1977, p. 10. Sharon Kivland suggested a similar approach, 
that I should let it ‘wash over me’, when reading Derrida, Of Grammatology. 
679. ‘Concepts are only created as a function of problems which are thought to be badly understood or badly posed.’ See Deleuze 





 I will not over-egg the potential impact of an essay film, but 
I do feel questions indirectly asked by means of allegory, that require a ‘gestation’ into 
meaning, may be enduring in a climate of rhetorical saturation. At the most basic of 
levels, sound and image, as sensory inputs, are ‘written’ onto the psyche.
681
 If the input 
is novel, new associational networks are initiated.  
 
‘Sensation is no less brain than the concept.’
682
 Here Deleuze and Guattari uphold 
sensation as a form of knowledge. They add: ‘Knowledge is neither a form nor a force 
but a function: “I function”.’
683
 By this logic I argue that a contribution to knowledge 
through this research is the knowledge I have gained and demonstrated in the process of 
filmmaking, as well as the more conventional understanding of a Ph.D. contribution as 
knowledge ‘given’, that is, in terms of the films, in the form of sensation which is 
disseminated, sensed, and intuited. 
 
Claiming a work of art as a contribution to knowledge is not without controversy and 
the nature of this ‘new’ knowledge that is accountable to institutional and governmental 
academic standards has been under review since the onset of the creative-practice 
research degree. Arthur J. Deikman writes that ‘the human organism has two basic 
modes of function: the receptive mode orientated toward the intake of the environment, 
and the action mode orientated toward manipulation of the environment’.
684
 Mavromatis 
describes hypnagogia as a ‘receptive mode’, similar to a ‘field’ (such as an 
elecromagnetic field).
685
 Stern and Sullivan speak of an interpersonal field, an 
unconscious form of communication. Deikman describes ‘deautomatization’ as ‘an 
undoing of the usual ways of perceiving and thinking’. With reference to meditation, 
‘deautomatization’ is expressed as ‘withdrawing attention from thinking and reinvesting 
it in percepts ‒ a reverse of the normal learning process’.
686
 A contribution of this 
project has been the reflection on a ‘receptive’ mode of research that is in danger of 
erosion in the current climate, in education and beyond.  
 
                                                 
680. Here I refer to the closing voice-over of Psychotel. 
681. I use ‘writing’ here in the Derridean sense as outlined in Of Grammatology. 
682. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 211. 
683. Ibid., p. 215.  
684. Arthur J. Deikman, Bimodal Consciousness, Archives of General Psychiatry, vol. 6, 1971, 481‒9, p. 481. Deikman’s article is 
referenced in Mavromatis, Hypnogogia, p. 67. 
685. Mavromatis, Hypnogogia, p. 75. 
686. Ibid., p. 113.  
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Deleuze and Guattari describe a work of art as ‘a bloc of sensations [...] a compound of 
percepts and affects’.
687
 They suggest that percepts are independent of their creator; 
they are beings.
688
 They discuss vision in terms of ‘becoming’, and art practice as an act 
of becoming.
689
 ‘Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man.’
690
 The artist 
(or novelist) is ‘a seer, a becomer’ who ‘composes the percepts of that life’. These 
views are useful in assessing what I have achieved in filmmaking in a research context. 
What sort of contribution to knowledge can I claim? Certainly throughout the thesis I 
have indicated small but clear contributions to knowledge including:  
 drawing a new parallel between texts of Freud and Ramachandran (chapter 2),  
 the co-authored, repeatable scientific survey with original data (chapter 2),  
 bringing together Lacan, Lakoff, Massey, Robbins, and Derrida towards an 
expanded understanding of metaphor (chapter 4), 
 bringing together Lacan’s ‘body in pieces’ and Damasio’s proto-self or body 
map as related concepts (chapter 5), 
 the interpretation of the ‘return of the repressed’ according to Damasio’s somatic 
marker hypothesis and an account of why children feature in horror films 
(chapter 5),  
 the proposition that the somatic marker hypothesis could explain narrative 
unpleasure (chapter 5), 
 bringing together Solms’s ‘Conscious Id’, Freud’s topology of the psyche, 
Damasio’s structure of selfhood, Withy’s uncanny Dasein, and Žižek’s 
commentary on Kant’s ‘transcendental subject’ (chapter 6), 
 outlining a correspondence between Damasio’s tiered theory of selfhood, 
Freud’s topologies, and Robbins’s primordial and reflective representational 
consciousness. (chapter 6).  
 an ‘experiential’ account of the Freudian unconscious that aligns it with the 
uncanny, as outlined above. 
However, my deepest engagement has been with film production, a process I encounter 
as largely intuitive and built from an attitude of play.
691
 The language that best describes 
                                                 
687. Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Percept, Affect, and Concept’, What is Philosophy? p. 164. Original italics. 
688. Ibid.  
689. Ibid., pp. 169‒170.  
690. Ibid., p. 169.  
691. I use ‘play’ in recognition of the activity performed by young children and other animals from which they develop an 
understanding of each other and their environment. I also use it in resistance to the derogatory association of play with childishness. 
As a young art student being re-introduced to the idea of play, given permission to respond without having to think, re-opened the 
world to me after half a decade of dull secondary education. 
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my activities sounds woolly and vague. Yet through this research and making these 
films I have transported myself through the conceptual landscape of the uncanny, in 
terms of how it is understood by others, how I have experienced it in memory as a lived 
sensation, in the artwork of others, and in a state of open receptiveness to the 
uncanniness of the world. I have acted as a mediator between my own lived experience 
and a manager of metaphor translating the thing before me into a ‘bloc of sensation’. I 
am in this sense both a seer and a conduit. In employing the hotel as a metaphor for the 
psyche (although to a certain extent the metaphor operates succinctly at its point of 
utterance), I transform the physical space into filmic space, into an ambiguous space, or 
‘threshold’ that bridges the real and the fantasy. I make a composition of affect through 
the metaphor of the hotel, and through the ideas in Freud’s text, for the viewer to 
experience as a labyrinthine, unhomely, and alienating.
692
 Although Psychotel and 
Unhomely Street have characters and story-arcs, they are not the principal narrative 
elements; instead, the academic and intellectual conception of the uncanny and 
hauntology in relation to post-concussive syndrome provide the narrative landscape of 
these films. In this sense they embody the research.  
 
‘There is in reality, only a current of existence and the opposing current; thence 
proceeds the whole evolution of life.’
693
 This quote from Bergson features as voice-over 
in the last third of Psychotel. It summarises the film and my feeling about the uncanny 
at the end of the research period. Bergson’s élan vital, controversial but seductive, 
provides for me at least a metaphorical alternative, or antidote, to individualistic 
thinking. To conclude I draw on Deleuze and Guattari. They write: ‘Through having 
seen Life in the living or the Living in the lived, the novelist or painter returns 
breathless and with bloodshot eyes.’ They describe artists as athletes of sorts, not the 
‘muscular type’, rather an ‘Affective athleticism’, an athleticism of becoming that 
reveals only forces that are not its own’.
694
 They expand:  
 
                                                 
692. This notion of filmic space as an ambiguous threshold between the real and the fantasy is further discussed in Dilek Altuntaş, 
‘Hotel as a Double Metaphor: Space, Representation, Reality and Beyond’, in Design and Cinema: Form Follows Film, edited by 
Belkis Uluoğlu et al., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006, pp. 99‒110. 
693. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1911, p. 185. This 
quote with reference to opposing forces brings to mind Freud’s twin notions of Eros and Thanatos. The death-drive, although 
mentioned in the voice-over of Psychotel is notably absent from the thesis. I am tempted to suggest it haunts the thesis in its 
absence. Although arguably an important concept from psychoanalysis in relation to the uncanny I can only say I have never got on 
with it. While I have come across provocative material that uses it for analytical purpose I have remained unable to integrate it into 
my thinking. This may in itself be interesting in psychoanalytic terms and  may say something of how Thanatos operates but for 
now I hold it aloft for a future research project. 
694. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 172.  
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 Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach 
 and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation. This is because from the moment 
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This study aims to investigate the neurological underpinnings of the uncanny. It is 
comprised of three sections: a behavioural study by which an image set is obtained, an 
fMRI study wherein brain scans were recorded from two participants who viewed 
presentations of uncanny images and control images, and a short film entitled Scanner 
that describes the process of the study and presents the findings. 
 
Stage 1: Behaviour study 
This involved a non public online survey in which 250 participants were asked to rate 
300 images according to ‘eeriness’ valence. The word ‘eerie’ was used as it was felt 
uncanny might be confusing. The highest scoring images were employed in the second 
stage of the study which involved fMRI scanning two participants. 
The images were sourced from internet searches for ‘the uncanny’, ‘eerie’, ‘creepy’, and 
‘spooky’, images posted on student blogs on the subject of the uncanny, and control 
images, selected to make sets of related images.  
The participants were approached through an email to staff at both Sheffield Hallam 
University and The University of Sheffield, as well personal networks. Participation 




The top 30 most ‘eerie’ images are collated at the back of this report, as well as image 
several sets to demonstrate the range of images used and show uncanny valence across 
image sets. 
 
Stage 2. fMRI study 
The fMRI survey involved scanning two participants in order to investigate the brain 
activations associated with response to uncanny images. The findings are not scientific 
due to the very small sample, however the study demonstrates a method that can be 
repeated and future results can be compiled with this survey towards a scientific 
outcome. 
Two participants were invited to take part in fMRI scans. It was made clear to 
participants that they did not have to participate in the study. Participants were healthy 
adults who were screened and judged safe for MRI compatibility. Scanning took place 
in the 3T University MRI scanner in the Royal Hallamshire Hospital. A full structural 
                                                 
696. See Ethics Report, appendix 4, participant information and consent forms. 
iv 
 
scan was followed by a functional scan of approximately 30 minutes (10 minutes per 
run with three runs). Using an event related design, stimuli involved viewing sequences 
of 150 image, of which two thirds were neutral images and a one third was eerie images.  
 
Stage 3. Film: Scanner 
The film attempts to reveal the process of the surveys and instil an uncanny response in 
the audience. The approach to the film was to reduce the informational signalling that 
takes the spectator through factual information using voice-over and diagrams. 
Although the information is present, it is not set up in a standard documentary format. 
This may appropriately contribute to unease in the viewer. The inclusion of the pig’s 
head introduces death which is  known to induce an uncanny response.
697
 The film 
commences with introductory voice-over from Freud followed by an anecdote from 
Ramachandran.
698
 These present the method of comparing neuroscience and 
psychoanalysis that is central to this research and establishes the documentary as non-
standard. Firm conclusions cannot be drawn from the survey as only two participants 
were scanned. The film addresses method more than results and may be of more 
relevance to an audience with an interest in non-standard film form rather than a science 
audience. The distribution plan is to submit the film for science, sci-art, experimental, 















                                                 
697. See chapter 7 of the thesis for a discussion of death and the uncanny. 
698. See Freud, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 206, and Ramachandran, Phantoms in the Brain, pp. 36‒37. See chapter 2 of the thesis for a 
fuller discussion. 
699. I do not anticipate it being an easy film to program. Short film program curators build screenings of similar theme and content. 
The subject matter is obscure for the art film festival and the form is unusual for the documentary and science festival. This may be 









Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey. In the following you will be shown an 
image for a few seconds. This will be followed by a ‘rating slide’: 
 
To rate the image according to how eerie it makes you feel, ‘click’ on the black line in the 
appropriate location. 
 





Click the black bar in the location best representing how eerie you feel about the image 
you have just seen:  
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Position : 30 
 




mean valence 49.5 
 




Position : 44 
 




mean valence 45.5 
 




Position : 57 
 




mean valence 43.6 
 




Position : 62 
 




mean valence 43.1 
 









































Position : 63 
 




mean valence 42.7 
 




Position : 75 
 




mean valence 40.9 
 




Position : 87 
 




mean valence 39.9 
 




Position : 105 
 




mean valence 37.5 
 










































Position : 108 
 




mean valence 37.4 
 




Position : 128 
 




mean valence 34.8 
 




Position : 175 
 




mean valence 28.3 
 




Position : 217 
 




mean valence 23.3 
 


















































Survey results summary 
 
The survey was always intended to produce material for a film rather than being a 
scientific survey in its own right. We did not have sufficient funding for a full survey 
that would have required a minimum of six participants for the brain scanning survey. 
The image set, edited into two short film sequences with control images can be seen 
here: 
 
Reel 1: <https://vimeo.com/manage/226726365> 
Reel 2: <https://vimeo.com/manage/226720995> 
 
password for both reels is: FMRI 
 
The image set constitutes a scientific output with 250 participants rating the initial 300 
images. The fMRI study could be repeated using the films above. A speculative 
interpretation of the fMRI study was that the uncanny images generated increased 
activity in the visual cortex while scans corresponding to the control images showed 
activity in the secondary visual cortex. The control images, of everyday items and 
landscapes, promoted associated thinking, perhaps employing the personal 
encyclopaedia. One of the participants showed more secondary visual cortex activity 
during the control images than the other, so without further participant information this 
summary is speculative. The uncanny images showed some deeper processing perhaps 
indicating the initiation of a process of learning.  
 
The scan results were adapted to fit a standardised model of the brain. This involves 
some distortion of the actual results. This is a common method in this type of survey. 
The benefits of this approach is that results from surveys using the same model can be 
compared and an image of brain regions can start to be deduced. As this generalisation 
slightly distorts the individual participant’s scan results, a larger sample is needed to 
compensate for this method. Another issue in this survey, as noted in chapter 2 of the 
thesis, was that participants of the online survey, when rating images according to 





ANALYSIS OF SELECTED IMAGES FROM THE BEHAVIOURAL STUDY 
This image was rated highest for eeriness valance. 
 
This image can be interpreted according to Jentsch’s account that we find things 
uncanny when we are unsure if they are alive or dead.
700
 The vertical orientation give a 
vaginal appearance to the facial slits that allows for the image to be seen as one of 
castration, relating to Freud’s description of uncanniness. The spoon in the eye socket is 
the punctum, which introduces the idea of cannibalism and eye removal.
701
 This is 
identified by Royle as inducing feelings of uncanniness.
702
 He suggests this is at the 
heart of the fear of The Sandman, E. T. A. Hoffman’s short story, referred to by Jentsch 
and Freud in their articles on the uncanny, since the eyes are removed to be fed to the 
Sandman’s young. Royle points to Freud’s description of the totem meal, the cannibal 
savages devouring of the father in Totem and Taboo, as one of the earliest cultural 
taboos.
703
 The spoon also arouses a sense of unhomeliness, with household objects used 
for eye removal, and the removal of eyes relates to the Oedipus complex, as Oedipus 
takes out his own eyes after learning of his unwitting incest with his mother. Freud 
suggests that castration might have been a more fitting punishment. The Oedipus 
complex is the resolution of the castration complex, and Freud states that from dream 
analysis it is clear that the eye stands for the testicles in symbolic terms.
704
 
While this may sound far-fetched, it must be noted that image number seven out of 
three hundred was a kitchen colander containing what are euphemistically called prairie 
oysters, otherwise known as buffalo testicles. 
                                                 
700. Jentsch, On the Psychology of the Uncanny, pp. 7–16. 
701. Barthes, ‘Punctum: Partial Feature’, Camera Lucida, pp. 43–6. The term punctum means a small and distinct point. Barthes 
uses it to discuss an element of a photograph that arrests the viewer and contributes to an understanding of the image as a whole.  
702. Royle, ‘Cannibalism for starters’, The Uncanny, pp. 205–12. 
703. Freud (1913), ‘Totem and Taboo’, pp. 77–8. 
704. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 231. 
Position : 1 
Image name / identifier  
cba92018bebf70823aab19860f43e347.jpg 
mean valence 65.9 










In Archive Fever Derrida suggests that psychoanalysis is specifically a Jewish enquiry 
with the emphasis on castration stemming from the practice of circumcision.
705
 As a 
recent World Health Organization report stated that one third of the males are 
circumcised, I suggest it has wider implications.
706
 At the start of this year The 
Guardian reported that there were at least two hundred million female genital 
mutilation victims, suggesting that a tendency to mutilate sexual organs, in order to 




















                                                 
705. Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. by Eric Prenowitz, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1995. 
706. World Health organization report of 2007 stated that one third of the males are circumcised, 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prevalence_of_circumcision˃accessed14 May 2016. 
707. The Guardian reported that there were at least 200 million FGM victims, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/feb/05/research-finds-200m-victims-female-genital-mutilation-alive-today>accessed 
14 May 2016. 
Position : 7 
Image name / identifier  
MeatCoulander.jpg 
mean valence 57.9 


















































The Editions II, published by MA Bibliothèque, edited by Sharon Kivland, with 
contributors from the Ph.D. and MA, ADRC, 2014/5 cohort from Sheffield Hallam 
University. Launched at the London Artist’s Book Fair, Whitechapel Gallery 2015, it is 
in the collection of Tate Britain library and archives, the CdLA, France, and has been 
exhibited at Volumes, Independent Publishing Fair in Zurich, the Vox Populi gallery, 
Philadelphia, and is in the Floating Library collection, Minnesota. 
 









THE GOOD READER is a series that addresses reading, as both virtue and duty. The 
editor invites authors she considers to be good readers. She agrees with Nabokov that a 
good reader, a major reader, an active and creative reader, is a re-reader. 
The Editions II is a group artists book project published by MA Bibliotheque, edited by 
Sharon Kivland, with contributors from the Sheffield Hallam University, Art and 
Design MA and Ph.D. student cohort. Launched at London Artists Book fair in 2015 at 
the Whitechapel, it has been bought by Tate Britian archive and library book collection, 
exhibited at Volumes exhibition, independent publishing fair in Zurich, the Vox Populi 
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‘Profile: Susannah Gent’ at the 66th International Short Film Festival of Oberhausen, 
2020. This retrospective of my films in May 2020, comprises two curated screenings 
including new work. 
Unhomely Street premiered at the 63rd International Short Film Festival of Oberhausen 
in 2017, and has been exhibited at ‘Against the Slow Cancellation of the Future’ 
conference at Goldsmiths College, London in 2017, ‘Spectre of the Real’ exhibition, 
Socially Engaged Art Salon, Brighton, 2019, and ‘Limbo’ exhibition, Socially Engaged 
Art Salon, Brighton, 2019. 
 
Publication 
‘The Unconscious and the City: a Neuropsychoanalytic Exploration of Cinematic 
Space’, in Narrating the City, edited by Ayşegül Akçay, Bristol: Intellect Books, 2019. 
This chapter followed a conference presentation, ‘Unhomely Street: A Filmic 
Exploration of the Unconscious and the City’, at ‘Moving Images, Static Spaces: 
Architecture, Art, Media, Film, Digital Art and Design, at Architucture MPS, Altinbaş 
University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2018. 
‘Exorcising Unhomely Street: filmic intuition and the representation of hauntology’, 
Journal for Artistic Research, issue 14, 
<https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/285865/285866> 




‘Intuitive Filmmaking and the Territorial Unconscious’, at the ‘12th Annual Deleuze 
and Guattari conference’, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2019 
‘Unhomely Street: A Filmic Exploration of the Unconscious and the City’, at ‘Moving 
Images, Static Spaces: Architecture, Art, Media, Film, Digital Art and Design, at 
Architucture MPS, Altinbaş University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2018 
‘The Wandering Mind: a filmic investigation of the uncanny and the walking body’, at 
‘Wild or Domesticated - Uncanny in historical and contemporary perspectives to mind’, 
The House of Science and Letters in Helsinki, Finland, 2016 
lxxxvii 
 
‘The Neuroscientific Uncanny: an investigation into the limits of scientific method’ at 
‘Wild or Domesticated - Uncanny in historical and contemporary perspectives to mind’, 
The House of Science and Letters in Helsinki, Finland, 2016 
‘The Sound of Sickness or Unhomely Street: affect in the abscence of direction in the 
essay film’, at ‘Performa, Performance and Performability: Actualities and Futures’ 
conference, University of Leeds, 2016 
‘Methodological Windows: a view of the uncanny through scientific survey, 
psychoanalysis, and film’, at the ‘Method 2016’ conference at Sheffield Hallam 
University, 2016 
 
Further distribution plan 
Psychotel will be entered into experimental feature film categories in British Council 
and Flamin Films supported festivals. 
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A note on the fMRI scanner jurisdiction 
 
The fMRI scanner used in the survey is located at the Hallamshire Hospital, however it 
is University of Sheffield research equipment and is under their jurisdiction. This means 
that the ethics procedure did not require an NHS ethics report. I conducted the ethics 
approval process through the University of Sheffield, headed By Yael as the 
Department of Cognitive Psychology was used to assessing approval for this type of 
study using this equipment. 






























Participant Information Sheet 
Before you decide whether to take part, it is important that you understand what you 
will be required to do. Please take the time to read the following information and feel 
free to ask if anything is not clear or if you need more information. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
In this study, we would like to explore patterns of activation in the brain associated with 
viewing a set of eerie and non-eerie images. The final aim of the study is to create an 
artistic film, exploring research methods used to study the effect of eeriness, while 
creating an eerie feeling in the film. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, 
you will be asked to sign a consent form. However, you will still be free to withdraw at 
any time and without giving a reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
We will arrange a date and time suited to you to meet us at the Radiology Department at 
the Royal Hallamshire Hospital to undergo an fMRI and structural and DTI brain scan.  
 
We will first check that magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is a suitable procedure for 
you. For example, if you might be pregnant or have any metal or electronic implants 
(e.g., a pacemaker), MRI is not suitable for you. Also if you dislike being in enclosed 
spaces, then you may find having an MRI scan unpleasant. 
 
After we have checked these issues, you will have an MRI brain scan. We will take an 
image of your brain and ask you to view both eerie, and non eerie images while in the 
scanner. Your brain activity will be recorded during the scan. If you would like to 
communicate with the experimenter while in the scanner, there is a sound link and you 
can talk to us. If you are uncomfortable or have a problem, it is possible to stop the scan 
at any time. 
 
Once the study is completed, you will be offered the chance to attend an individual 
debriefing session to discuss your results.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
It is necessary to conduct a health screening assessment before you can undergo the 
fMRI scan. This is to ensure it is safe for you to undergo the procedure. If this 
assessment highlights anything that may mean you are unsuitable, then you will be 
unable to participate in the study.  
If the brain scan reveals any unsuspected neurological abnormality, we are obliged to 
refer you to the relevant medical specialist and your GP. If you do not wish this to 
happen, you should not consent to the MRI scan. 
In addition, you may wish to consider whether you would like your brain scans to 






Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
The visual data from the scan will be used in a film that explores the uncanny by 
describing the study you are involved in. You have the option of choosing whether your 
participation in the project remains anonymous or whether you wish to be credited as a 
participant. Apart from being credited as a participant, which is entirely optional, all 
personal information will be treated in strict confidence. Data will be stored on 
password protected computers and only the research team will have access to the data. 
Your test results will not be revealed to anyone, and will be stored annonymised and 
separate from your brain scan. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings of this study will be used in scientific publications and conferences. 
However, we will keep your name and personal details confidential, and we will ensure 
that you cannot be identified in these reports. 
The film containing visual data from the scans will potentially be distributed at 
conferences, film festivals, television and on-line. You will only be credited if you wish. 
Contact for further information 
If you require any further information, please contact Dr. Yael Benn, Department of 
Psychology, email: y.benn@sheffield.ac.uk or Susannah Gent, 
Susannah.Gent@shu.ac.uk  
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